CHINA  AND 


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; U R T F R 

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Cibrar;?  of  Che  Cheologieal  ^emmar;y> 

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FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
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7 


I 


t 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NBW  YORK  • BOSTON  • CHICAGO  • DALLAS 
ATLANTA  • SAN  FRANCISCO 


MACMILLAN  & CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  • BOMBAY  • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 


THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


Courtesy  of  Far  Eastern  Bureau. 

Hsu  Shih-chang,  elected  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic, 
September  4,  1918. 


CHINA 

AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


BY  ^ 

W.  REGINALD  WHEELER 

OF  THE  FACULTY  OF  HANGCHOW  COLLEGE, 
HANGCHOW,  CHINA 


ILLUSTRATED 


Jl3eto  gotb 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1919 


All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1919 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  electrotyped . Published,  January,  1919 


TO 

THE  BEST  OF  COMPANIONS 
THE  BRAVEST  OF  COMRADES 
THE  WISEST  OF  COUNSELORS 


MY  WIFE 


1 


PREFACE 


After  the  war,  the  attention  of  the  world  will 
more  and  more  shift  to  China  and  the  Far  East. 
The  greatest  potential  market  of  the  world  lies  there: 
the  greatest  need  for  industrial  and  economic  develop- 
ment is  there.  The  Far  East,  in  general,  and  China,  in 
particular,  have  been  profoundly  affected  by  the  war : 
they  will  be  even  more  deeply  influenced  during  the 
peace  which  is  to  follow.  All  of  the  great  powers 
have  financial  interests  in  China;  after  the  war,  these 
interests  will  come  into  sharp  competition  and  rivalry. 
In  their  relations  with  China  and  with  each  other,  the 
nations  will  face  two  alternatives : on  the  one  hand, 
a policy  leading  to  an  imperialism  and  oppression  which 
eventually  will  endanger  the  dearly-bought  world- 
peace  : on  the  other,  a course  of  action  based  on  inter- 
national justice  and  the  development  of  a democracy 
in  the  Far  East  that  will  be  safe  for  the  world.  These 
alternatives  in  Asia  are,  and  will  be,  the  same  as  those 
which  the  world  is  facing  in  Europe  today : the  writer 
believes  they  should  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the 
principles  for  which  the  larger  part  of  mankind  is  now 
fighting  and  that  unless  this  is  done,  on  the  Eastern 
horizon  will  surely  gather  the  dark  clouds  of  another 
world-storm. 

In  this  volume  accordingly,  the  author  — who  has 
lived  in  China  for  the  past  three  years  — has  tried  to 

vii 


Vlll 


PREFACE 


trace  the  more  recent  development  of  this  largest  of 
the  Asiatic  nations,  indicating  some  of  the  problems 
which  it  is  now  facing,  especially  as  they  appear 
against  the  background  of  the  world-war,  and  attempt- 
ing to  point  out  some  of  the  ultimate  issues  to  which 
these  problems,  if  they  remain  unsolved,  will  lead.  To 
these  issues  the  world  at  large  cannot  remain  indiffer- 
ent; and  the  attempt  has  been  made  in  this  volume  to 
present  as  fairly  and  clearly  as  possible  the  facts  of  the 
present  trans-Pacific  situation.  Throughout  the  vol- 
ume, quotations  have  been  made  from  original  docu- 
ments and  statements  of  the  press,  in  order  to  avoid, 
as  far  as  possible,  any  subjective  coloring  of  the 
facts.  Further,  in  the  interests  of  international  har- 
mony and  good-will,  the  more  extreme  and  less  char- 
acteristic utterances  of  the  press  and  of  publicists  of 
the  nations  involved,  have  been  omitted.  To  this  sit- 
uation in  the  Far  East,  it  is  hoped  that  the  standards 
and  ideals  formulated  by  the  free  peoples  of  the  world 
will  be  applied;  and  the  writer  believes  that  in  the 
application  of  these  standards  and  ideals  will  be  found 
a solution  — and  the  only  solution  — of  problems 
which  are  of  momentous  consequence  for  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

The  author  desires  to  express  his  grateful  obliga- 
tion to  Professor  F.  Wells  Williams,  of  Yale  Univer- 
sity, and  to  Dr.  John  E.  Williams,  Vice-President  of 
Nanking  University,  who  have  given  helpful  advice, 
and  made  valuable  criticisms  of  the  manuscript.  To 
the  Peking  Gazette,  formerly  under  the  able  editorship 


PREFACE 


IX 


of  Mr.  Eugene  Chen,  the  author  is  indebted  for  many 
excerpts  from  contemporaneous  documents  and  articles 
of  value.  Acknowledgment  is  made  of  the  permission 
of  D.  Appleton  & Co.  to  use  the  summary  of  Treaties 
Concerning  the  Integrity  of  China  and  Korea,  and 
The  Maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  which  appears  in 
Dr.  Hornbeck’s  volume,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the 
Far  East;  and  the  permission  of  Dodd,  Mead  & Co.  for 
the  use  of  the  translation  of  The  Memorandum  of  the 
Black  Dragon  Society,  contained  in  Mr.  Putnam- 
Weale’s  book.  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China. 
Some  of  the  material  in  this  book  was  originally  pub- 
lished in  the  Current  History  Magazine  of  the  New 
York  Times,  and  in  the  Evening  Telegram  of  Portland, 
Oregon;  acknowledgment  is  made  of  the  courteous 
permission  of  the  publishers  to  use  this  in  the  present 
volume.  In  the  absence  of  the  author  in  China,  Dr. 
D.  Johnson  Fleming  has  kindly  consented  to  supervise 
the  publication  of  the  book  and  for  his  willingness  to 
undertake  this  task  the  writer  is  grateful. 

In  conclusion,  the  author  wishes  to  express  his 
appreciation  of  the  services  of  Miss  G.  D.  O’Neill  and 
her  co-workers,  of  Pasadena,  in  preparing  the  manu- 
script for  the  press,  and  his  gratitude  for  the  courtesies 
of  his  publishers. 

Westmoreland  Place, 

Pasadena,  California, 

October  i,  1918. 


I- 


I 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

Preface vii 

I  The  Attack  Upon  the  Chinese  Republic 
FROM  Without,  During  the  First  Year 

OF  THE  War I 

II  The  Attack  Upon  the  Chinese  Republic 
FROM  Within,  During  the  Second  Year 
OF  THE  War 25 

III  The  Progress  in  Chinese  Republican 

Government,  Leading  to  a New  For- 
eign Policy 48 

IV  China’s  Severance  of  Diplomatic  Rela- 

tions WITH  THE  Central  Powers  . . 59 

V  The  Declaration  of  War  Against  Ger- 
many AND  Austria 76 

VI  The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  Between 

America  and  Japan  Concerning  China  102 

VII  The  Chinese-Japanese  Military  Agree- 
ment OF  1918 127 

VIII  China’s  Future  as  Affected  by  the  Aims 

OF  THE  Allies 145 

Appendices 184 

An  Introductory  Bibliography  on  China  . . 252 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Hsu  Shih-chang,  elected  President  of  the  Chinese 

Republic,  September  4,  1918  . . . Frontispiece 

FACING 

PAGE 


An  Outpost  of  Tsingtao,  the  German  Stronghold  in 

China 12 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  First  President  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public   36 

Li  Yuan-hung,  Second  President  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public   54 

Feng  Kwo-chang,  Third  President  of  the  Republic, 

and  Staff,  in  Peking,  October  10,  1917  ...  90 


Viscount  Ishii,  Japanese  Ambassador  to  America, 

and  Reception  Committee  in  New  York,  1917  . 116 

Review  at  Peking  of  Chinese  Troops,  a Detachment 

of  whom  have  joined  the  Allied  Forces  in  Siberia  134 

Japanese  Troops,  in  Allied  Expeditionary  Force  in 


Siberia 140 

Chinese  Labor  Battalions  ready  for  Embarkation  to 

France 158 


Dr.  V.  K.  Wellington  Koo,  Chinese  Minister  to 
America,  after  receiving  an  honorary  degree 
from  Columbia  University  in  1917  ....  172 


f 


I 


I 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  FROM 
WITHOUT,  DURING  THE  FIRST  YEAR 
OF  THE  WAR 

japan’s  capture  of  tsingtao  and  the  twenty- 
one  DEMANDS 

The  Great  War  first  burst  forth  in  Europe,  but  its 
effects  were  felt  at  once  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
globe.  These  effects  were  both  immediate  and  far- 
reaching.  Momentous  as  were  the  results  of  the  first 
year  of  the  war  in  Europe,  they  were  equally  signifi- 
cant in  Asia,  and  the  making  of  the  new  map  of  the 
Orient  was  one  of  the  most  important  features  of  the 
first  stage  of  the  great  conflict. 

On  August  I,  1914,  Germany  declared  war  on  Rus- 
sia and  France;  just  two  weeks  later  Japan  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  Germany,  demanding  its  complete  with- 
drawal from  its  possessions  in  the  Pacific.  On  August 
23rd,  Japan  declared  war;  within  three  months,  Tsing- 

I 


2 CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tao,  the  Oriental  stronghold  of  the  Germans,  with  the 
co-operation  of  a small  British  force,  was  captured, 
and  the  Japanese  were  installed  in  Germany’s  place  in 
the  province  of  Shantung.  Two  months  later,  Japan 
presented  a series  of  demands  on  China,  divided  into 
five  groups,  the  acceptance  of  which  would  have  placed 
China  definitely  in  the  position  of  a vassal  state. 
After  less  than  four  months  of  negotiations,  on  May 
8,  1915,  China  accepted  four  groups  of  these  demands, 
leaving  the  fifth  open  for  future  discussion.  Thus,  in 
the  first  nine  months  of  the  first  year  of  the  Great  War, 
Germany’s  political  and  military  power  were  eliminated 
in  the  Orient;  Japan  had  taken  over  its  possessions  in 
China;  and  China  had  been  forced  to  concede  to  Japan 
extensive  territorial  rights,  economic  privileges,  and 
military  concessions  of  great  strategic  importance. 
Thus  the  ante-bellum  situation  in  the  Far  East  was 
entirely  altered,  and  new  problems  of  international 
policy  and  relations  were  created.  The  spark  struck 
at  Sarajevo  had,  indeed,  kindled  a world-wide  flame; 
Europe  and  Asia,  the  Occident  and  the  Orient,  alike 
were  to  feel  its  transforming  force. 

In  order  fully  to  comprehend  the  action  of  both 
China  and  Japan  during  this  period,  an  understanding 
of  their  development  and  international  position  is 
necessary.  The  summer  of  1914  found  China  still  in 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  3 

the  throes  of  the  attempt  to  gain  political  stability 
within  its  own  boundaries ; to  make  its  newly  founded 
republic  a stable  reality.  Less  than  three  years  before, 
on  October  lo,  1911,  a revolution  against  the  existing 
Manchu  dynasty  had  broken  out;  on  February  12, 
1912,  the  Manchus  signed  their  Edict  of  Abdication. 
A republican  form  of  government  had  already  been 
set  up  at  Nanking,  with  Doctor  Sun  Yat-sen  as  Pro- 
visional President;  when  the  Manchus  abdicated,  Dr. 
Sun  voluntarily  gave  place  to  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  be- 
came the  first  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic.  A 
provisional  constitution  was  adopted  and  Peking  was 
chosen  as  the  capital.  Elections  to  the  new  National 
Assembly  were  held  in  the  following  winter  and  the 
two  houses  met  in  Peking  in  April,  1913.  Ever  since 
the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  two  clearly  recog- 
nized parties  had  been  in  existence;  one  composed  of 
the  Radicals  and  the  Liberals,  made  up  chiefly  of 
Southerners,  with  Dr.  Sun  as  their  leader;  the  other 
consisting  of  Conservatives  and  the  Military  Party 
who  supported  Yuan.  The  writing  of  the  Provisional 
Constitution  had  been  done  by  the  Southerners ; it  lim- 
ited the  power  of  the  President  and  gave  Parliament 
a large  measure  of  authority.  The  majority  of  the 
first  Parliament  were  Radicals.  There  was  much  fric- 
tion between  Yuan  and  the  Assembly;  it  was  increased 


4 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


by  Yuan’s  signing,  without  the  consent  of  Parliament, 
a loan  with  the  bankers  of  the  Five  Powers,  includ- 
ing  Japan,  the  United  States  having  withdrawn;  by 
Yuan’s  expulsion  of  various  Southerners  from  of- 
fice; and  by  the  assassination  of  one  of  their 
prominent  leaders  ^ in  Shanghai,  Yuan’s  govern- 
ment being  charged  by  many  Southerners  with  his 
murder.  Finally  the  President’s  command  to  the 
Military  Governor  of  one  of  the  Southern  provinces 
to  give  up  his  office,  together  with  the  sending  of 
Northern  troops  to  enforce  the  order,  brought  on 
armed  resistance  and  the  rebellion  of  the  summer  of 
1913.  Nanking  was  captured  by  the  Northern  troops 
and  the  rebellion  collapsed.  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  and 
many  of  his  associates  fled  to  Japan.  In  October  the 
Assembly  passed  the  laws  which  provided  for  the  elec- 
tion of  the  President.  On  October  6th,  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  was  elected  President  by  the  two  Assemblies  for 
a term  of  five  years;  and  on  the  next  day,  Li  Yuan- 
hung  was  elected  Vice-President.  The  United  States 
and  several  South  American  republics  had  already  rec- 
ognized the  Chinese  Republic ; now  the  European 
Powers  and  Japan  did  the  same.  Thus  the  Republic 
acquired  a recognized  international  status. 

But  the  drafting  of  the  new  constitution  was  ac- 
1 Sung  Chiao-jen, 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  5 

companied  by  more  friction,  and  finally,  on  November 
4th,  Yuan  purged  the  Parliament  by  expelling  the  Rad- 
ical members;  the  National  Assembly  was  dissolved 
and  an  Administrative  Council  was  formed  in  its  place. 
On  May  i,  1914,  a constitution  designated  as  the 
Constitutional  Compact,  which  had  been  drawn  up  by 
a conference  organized  in  March,  was  promulgated. 
Professor  F.  J.  Goodnow,  of  Columbia  University, 
who  had  been  appointed  Constitutional  Adviser,  had 
a large  influence  in  forming  this  instrument.  This 
constitution  gave  large  powers  to  the  President,  grant- 
ing him  practically  an  absolute  veto-power  and  the 
right  to  re-election  after  a term  of  ten  years.  It  pro- 
vided for  a One-chamber  Parliament.  After  drawing 
it  up,  the  Constitutional  Compact  Conference  worked 
out  provisions  for  a Council  of  State  with  the  vice- 
president  as  speaker,  which  would  act  as  a legisla- 
tive body  until  a new  assembly  could  be  elected.  This 
Council  of  State  began  its  work  on  June  30,  1914.  It 
had  before  it  the  amendment  of  the  laws  governing  the 
presidential  elections,  to  make  them  conform  to  the 
new  compact;  and  the  laws  concerning  the  formation 
of  the  new  Parliament. 

This,  then,  was  the  situation  in  China  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Great  War.  From  her  own  viewpoint, 
her  problems  were  almost  entirely  internal ; her  whole 


6 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


mind  was  bent  on  the  task  of  building  up  a republic 
in  place  of  the  old  empire.  She  faced  enormous  diffi- 
culties in  the  lack  of  a system  of  universal  education, 
of  adequate  transportation  facilities,  of  modern  means 
of  industrial  production  and  manufacture,  and  of  any 
general  development  of  her  natural  resources.  She 
had  to  adjust  her  meagre  finances  to  the  pressure  and 
demands  of  a government  of  the  twentieth  century, 
and  she  seemed  to  be  tending  toward  an  autocratic  gov- 
ernment under  the  guise  of  a republic.  She  had  little 
energy  to  spare  for  new  foreign  relations  and,  when 
the  war  broke  out,  as  a matter  of  course,  she  at  once 
announced  her  neutrality. 

There  was  some  hope  that  Chinese  territory  would 
not  be  involved  in  the  military  operations  of  the  con- 
flict; but  the  ultimatum  of  Japan  to  Germany  on 
August  15th  at  once  brought  the  war  to  China’s  doors. 
Japan,  in  sending  this  ultimatum,  avowedly  acted  as  the 
ally  of  Great  Britain.  The  rise  of  Japan  in  power 
and  international  prestige  had  been  meteoric.  In  com- 
paratively few  years  she  had  broken  away  from  her 
seclusion;  had  set  up  a monarchy  in  place  of  a feudal 
state ; and  had  definitely  turned  her  face  toward  prog- 
ress and  reform.  In  this  step  she  was  a full  generation 
in  advance  of  China,  from  which  country  she  had  or- 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  7 

iginally  drawn  her  written  language,  her  arts,  and  much 
of  her  civilization.  As  a result  of  two  victorious  wars 
she  had  sprung  into  the  front-rank  of  world  powers. 
In  1895  she  had  won  Formosa  and  the  neighbouring 
Pescadores  Islands  from  China;  Korea  had  been  made 
independent,  and  the  Liaotung  Peninsula,  including 
Port  Arthur,  had  been  ceded  to  Japan.  This  last  terri- 
tory Japan  was  forced  to  return  to  China  on  representa- 
tions of  Russia,  Germany  and  France;  but  in  1905, 
after  the  victory  over  Russia,  Port  Arthur  and  the  Rus- 
sian railways  and  privileges  in  that  section  were  finally 
won.  All  Russia’s  concessions  and  powers  in  Southern 
Manchuria  were  given  to  Japan,  and  her  paramount  in- 
terests were  recognized  in  Korea.  In  1910,  Korea  was 
formally  annexed.  In  1911,  at  the  time  of  the  Chi- 
nese revolution  against  the  Manchus,  Mongolia  became 
virtually  independent,  and  Japan  began  to  turn  her 
attention  to  the  eastern  and  inner  portions  of  that 
province  which  bordered  the  Japanese  possessions  in 
Southern  Manchuria. 

In  the  meantime  in  Europe,  friendly  relations  were 
being  built  up  between  Great  Britain,  France  and  Rus- 
sia; their  community  of  interests  was  evident  at  Alge- 
ciras  and  in  Persia.  Japan  was  admitted  into  this 
friendship  first  in  1902,  by  the  formation  of  the  Anglo- 


8 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Japanese  alliance,  which  was  revised  and  extended  in 
1905  and  1911:  and,  in  1907,  in  the  agreement  be- 
tween France  and  Japan  regarding  Far-Eastern  affairs, 
which  paved  the  way  for  a reconciliation  with  France’s 
ally,  Russia.  In  1909,  the  United  States  suggested  in 
the  interests  of  the  open-door  that  the  Manchurian 
railways  be  neutralized  but,  as  an  answer,  in  July, 
1910,  Russia  and  Japan  entered  into  an  agreement  to 
preserve  the  status  quo  ^ without  compliance  with  the 
American  request.  Thus  in  two  decades  the  Japanese 
Empire  had  risen  to  a place  of  equality  among  the 
great  nations,  and  it  had  gained  the  power  to  adapt 
and  enforce  her  own  foreign  policy  in  the  world-tur- 
moil produced  by  the  Great  War. 

The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  contained  the  follow- 
ing stipulations : 

“If  by  reason  of  an  unprovoked  attack  or  aggres- 
sive action,  wherever  arising,  either  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Powers  should  be  involved  in  war  in  defence  of 
its  territorial  rights  or  special  interests,  . . . the  other 
High  Contracting  Party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assist- 
ance of  its  ally  and  will  conduct  the  war  in  common 
and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it.” 

1 This  wa5  to  be  followed  in  1916  by  a Russo-Japanese  agree- 
ment providing  for  mutual  assistance  in  case  either’s  posses- 
sions in  the  Far  East  were  threatened  by  a third  power. 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  9 

When  Japan  accordingly  mobilized  its  army  and  its 
fleet  and,  on  August  15th,  sent  its  ultimatum  to  Ger- 
many, its  demands  were  two-fold: 

“ First, — to  withdraw  immediately  from  Japanese 
and  Chinese  waters  German  men-of-war  and  armed 
vessels  of  all  kinds,  and  to  disarm  at  once  those  that 
cannot  be  withdrawn. 

Second, — To  deliver  on  a date  not  later  than  Sep- 
tember 15th  to  the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities,  with- 
out condition  or  compensation,  the  entire  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow,  with  a view  to  the  eventual  restora- 
tion of  the  same  to  China.” 

A reply  within  a week  was  demanded  and,  none 
being  received,  Japan  declared  war. 

Considerable  uneasiness  \vas  evident  in  the  Orient 
concerning  Japan’s  ultimate  intentions,  and  several 
statements  were  made  by  Japanese  statesmen  to  allay 
these  suspicions.  Thus  on  the  day  Japan’s  ultimatum 
was  delivered  to  Germany,  Count  Okuma,  the  Pre- 
mier, sent  a telegram  to  the  press  in  America,  saying: 
“ Japan’s  proximity  to  China  breeds  many  absurd  ru- 
mours; but  I declare  that  Japan  acts  with  a clear  con- 
science in  conformity  with  justice,  and  in  perfect 
accord  with  her  Ally.  Japan  has  no  territorial  ambi- 
tions and  hopes  to  stand  as  the  protector  of  the  peace 
in  the  Orient.”  Again,  in  August  24th,  he  tele- 


lO 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


graphed  a message  to  The  Independent  (New  York), 
saying  in  part : ''  As  Premier  of  Japan,  I have  stated 

and  I now  again  state  to  the  people  of  America  and 
of  the  world  that  Japan  has  no  ulterior  motive,  no 
desire  to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought  of  depriv- 
ing China  or  other  peoples  of  anything  which  they  now 
possess.  My  government  and  my  people  have  given 
their  pledge,  which  will  be  as  honourably  kept  as  Japan 
always  keeps  promises.” 

On  September  2,  Japanese  troops  were  landed  on  the 
coast  of  Shantung  Province  from  where  they  marched 
overland  to  Tsingtao.  China’s  fears  concerning  the 
possibility  of  its  neutrality  being  violated  seemed  jus- 
tified, as  the  Japanese  army  took  possession  of  various 
towns  and  cities  in  the  interior,  as  well  as  the  railroad 
to  the  provincial  capital ; assumed  control  of  the  means 
of  communication;  and  made  requisitions  upon  the 
Chinese  population.  A small  force  of  British  troops 
were  landed  inside  the  German  leased  territory  and 
co-operated  nominally  in  the  siege  of  Tsingtao.  On 
November  16,  the  city  surrendered  and  the  German 
military  and  naval  power  in  the  Far  East  was  elim- 
inated. 

Japan  now  had  an  opportunity  to  survey  the  world 
situation  as  affected  by  the  war  and  to  orient  itself  in 
relation  to  it.  By  the  end  of  1914  it  was  apparent 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  II 


that  the  war  would  not  end  quickly : momentous 
changes  in  national  alignments  were  in  progress;  and 
an  unequalled  opportunity  seemed  to  present  itself  in 
Japan  for  satisfying  various  territorial  and  economic 
ambitions.  As  later  events  demonstrated,  these  ambi- 
tions and  aims  were  five  in  number.  First,  to  suc- 
ceed Germany  in  its  position  and  possessions  in  Shan- 
tung; second,  to  consolidate  the  Manchurian  territory 
won  in  the  war  with  Russia  and  to  add  to  it  a part 
of  Mongolia;  third,  to  gain  a controlling  share  in  the 
iron  output  of  China;  fourth,  to  secure  the  military 
safety  of  Japan  by  rendering  impossible  the  lease  of 
any  of  China’s  ports  or  coastal  islands;  fifth,  if  pos- 
sible, to  enter  into  such  close  economic,  military  and 
political  relations  with  China,  as  to  make  it,  with  all 
its  vast  resources,  tributary  to  Japan.  These  five  aims 
were  expressed  in  the  Twenty-one  Demands  served  on 
China  on  January  i8,  1915. 

The  review  of  these  demands  by  any  true  friend  of 
Japan  is  not  a pleasant  task.  It  is  only  fair  to  say 
that  the  liberal-minded  statesmen  of  the  Empire,  be- 
cause of  the  international  suspicion  aroused,  look  upon 
these  demands  with  regret.  Every  friend  of  Japan 
and  China  hopes  that  the  agreements  will  be  reviewed 
at  the  final  Peace  Conference  in  the  light  of  the  prin- 
ciples for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting. 


12  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Before  the  demands  were  presented  to  China  there 
were  various  rumours  current  concerning  them. 
Many  Japanese  statements  were  made  advocating  a 
more  aggressive  policy  towards  China.  Perhaps  the 
most  important  of  these  was  a secret  memorandum 
of  the  Black  Dragon  Society  (so-named  from  its  con- 
nection with  the  “ Black  Dragon  ” province  of  Man- 
churia).^ This  statement  was  by  chance  disclosed 
some  months  after  the  serving  of  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands. After  outlining  the  world’s  situation  as  it 
affected  China  and  Japan,  it  emphasized  the  necessity 
of  solving  the  Chinese  question  at  once  and  of  form- 
ing a defensive  military  alliance  with  China,  and  named 
most  of  the  objectives  which  were  sought  later  in  the 
Japanese  Demands.  It  also  contained  a surprisingly 
accurate  forecast  of  Japanese  foreign  policy  as  a re- 
sult of  the  war. 

As  already  indicated  in  the  ultimatum  to  Germany 
and  in  Count  Okuma’s  message  to  America,  Japan 
had  made  statements  concerning  the  return  of  Kiao- 
chow  and  concerning  any  attempt  to  secure  more  ter- 
ritory or  privileges  from  China.  But  a change  of 
mind  was  indicated  in  December  by  certain  statements 
made  in  the  Japanese  Parliament  by  Baron  Kato,  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs.  Having  been  asked  if  Kiao- 


1 See  Appendix  L 


Copyright  by  Underwood  & Underwood, 
An  Outpost  of  Tsingtao,  the  German  Stronghold  in  China. 

The  white  buildings  in  tlie  centre  are  the  German  barracks;  fortifications  ami  guns  are  concealed  in  the  hills  in  the 
ground.  Tsingtao  was  captured  by  Jai)anese  and  I’ritish  troops  on  Nov.  i6,  1914. 


) 

1 

i 

\ 

\ 


4 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  1 3 

chow  would  be  returned  to  China,  he  stated  that  the 
question  regarding  its  future  was  at  present  unan- 
swerable, and  further  that  Japan  had  never  committed 
herself  to  return  Kiaochow  to  China.  This  changed 
attitude  was  revealed  again  in  the  ultimatum  which 
Japan  presented  to  China  in  May  to  force  acceptance 
of  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  In  this  ultimatum  Japan 
used  the  non-restoration  of  Kiaochow  as  a weapon 
with  which  to  coerce  China  into  an  acceptance  of  the 
Demands.  In  the  ultimatum,  she  said  in  part,  “ From 
the  commercial  and  military  points  of  view,  Kiao- 
chow is  an  important  place,  in  the  acquisition  of  which 
the  Japanese  Empire  sacrificed  much  blood  and  money, 
and  after  its  acquisition,  the  Empire  incurs  no  obliga- 
tion to  restore  it  to  China.”  Then,  in  an  accompany- 
ing note,  she  added : If  the  Chinese  Government  ac- 

cepts all  the  articles  as  demanded  in  the  ultimatum,  the 
offer  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiaochow 
to  China,  made  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  April,  will  still 
hold  good.”  In  other  words,  Japan  was  holding  Kiao- 
chow as  a pawn  to  bargain  with,  and  would  continue 
to  hold  this  territory,  unless  her  other  demands  were 
satisfied. 

The  entire  group  of  requests  concerning  Shantung, 
as  contained  in  Group  I of  the  original  Twenty-one 
Demands,  was  as  follows : 


14 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Group  I 

‘‘Art.  I.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give 
full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese 
Government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the  rights  of 
the  German  Government  relating  to  the  disposition  of 
all  rights,  interests  and  concessions,  which  Germany, 
by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  rela- 
tion to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

“ Art.  2.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  that 
within  the  Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast 
no  territory'  or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  a third 
Power  under  any  pretext. 

“ Art.  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  to 
Japan’s  building  a railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow 
to  join  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  railway. 

“ Art.  4.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  important 
cities  and  towns  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Com- 
mercial Ports.  What  places  shall  be  opened  are  to  be 
jointly  decided  upon  in  a separate  agreement.” 

The  second  group  of  demands  dealt  with  the  Jap- 
anese sphere  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia.  As  the 
result  of  the  war  with  Russia,  Japan  had  secured  a 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  1 5 

twenty-five  year  lease  on  Port  Arthur  and  control  of 
the  neighbouring  railways  and  Russia’s  rights  in 
Southern  Manchuria.  She  was  looking  with  longing 
eyes  towards  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  but  as  yet  had 
no  rights  there.  Now,  in  a preamble  to  this  second 
group,  Japan  stated  that  the  “ Chinese  Government 
has  ahmys  acknowledged  the  special  position  enjoyed 
by  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia,” and  demanded  a ninety-nine  year  lease  of  Port 
Arthur  and  the  important  railways  of  that  region ; and 
privileges  of  trade  and  mining  and  residence  in  both 
Manchuria  and  Mongolia  alike.  These  privileges 
went  far  beyond  any  granted  in  other  provinces  of 
China.  They  practically  transformed  Southern  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  into  Japanese  de- 
pendencies. The  detailed  Demands  were : 

Group  II 

“ The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, since  the  Chinese  Government  has  always 
acknowledged  the  special  position  enjoyed  by  Japan  in 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  agree 
to  the  following  articles: — 

‘‘Art.  I.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 


i6 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


and  the  term  of  lease  of  the  South  Manchurian  Rail- 
way and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  be  ex- 
tended to  the  period  of  99  years. 

“ Art.  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the  right  to 
lease  or  own  land  required  either  for  erecting  suitable 
buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  farming. 

“ Art.  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside 
and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  and  to  engage  in  business  and  in  manufac- 
ture of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

“ Art.  4.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  grant 
to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  opening  the  mines 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 
As  regards  what  mines  are  to  be  opened,  they  shall  be 
decided  upon  jointly. 

“ Art.  5.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  in 
respect  of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned  herein  below  the 
Japanese  Government’s  consent  shall  be  first  obtained 
before  action  is  taken: — 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  sub- 
ject of  a third  Power  to  build  a railway  or  to  make  a 
loan  with  a third  Power  for  the  purpose  of  building  a 
railway  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia. 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  1 7 

“(b)  Whenever  a loan  is  to  be  made  with  a third 
Power  pledging  the  local  taxes  of  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as  security. 

“ Art.  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  if 
the  Chinese  Government  employs  political,  financial  or 
military  advisers  or  instructors  in  South  Manchuria  or 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  Japanese  Government 
shall  first  be  consulted. 

“ Art.  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  the 
control  and  management  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Rail- 
way shall  be  handed  over  to  the  Japanese  Government 
for  a term  of  99  years  dating  from  the  signing  of  this 
Agreement.” 

Japan  has  not  a sufficient  supply  of  iron  ore;  China 
is  rich  in  this  mineral;  and  the  solution  was  obvious. 
In  Group  III  the  largest  iron  company  in  China  was  to 
be  made  a joint  concern,  and  the  future  mining  opera- 
tions of  the  Yangtze  Valley  were  to  be  placed  within 
Japanese  control.  The  Agreement  read: 

Group  III 

“ The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, seeing  that  Japanese  financiers  and  the  Han- 
yehping  Co.  have  close  relations  with  each  other  at 


i8 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


present  and  desiring  that  the  common  interests  of 
the  two  nations  shall  be  advanced,  agree  to  the  follow- 
ing articles : — 

“Art.  I.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually 
agree  that  when  the  opportune  moment  arrives  the 
Hanyehping  Company  shall  be  made  a joint  concern 
of  the  two  nations  and  they  further  agree  that  without 
the  previous  consent  of  Japan,  China  shall  not  by  her 
own  act  dispose  of  the  rights  and  property  of  whatso- 
ever nature  of  the  said  Company  nor  cause  the  said 
Company  to  dispose  freely  of  the  same. 

“ Art.  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  all 
mines  in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by  the 
Hanyehping  Company  shall  not  be  permitted,  without 
the  consent  of  the  said  Company,  to  be  worked  by 
other  persons  outside  of  the  said  Company;  and 
further  agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to  carry  out  any  un- 
dertaking which,  it  is  apprehended,  may  directly  or  in- 
directly affect  the  interests  of  the  said  Company,  the 
consent  of  the  said  Company  shall  first  be  obtained.” 

Group  IV  involved  Japanese  control  over  Chinese 
coasts,  which  would  ward  off  any  future  military 
measure  by  another  Power.  It  read : 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  I9 

Group  IV 

“ The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment with  the  object  of  effectively  preserving  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  agree  to  the  following 
special  articles : — 

“ The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede  or 
lease  to  a third  Power  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island 
along  the  coast  of  China.” 

But  the  real  extent  of  the  Japanese  ambitions  was 
revealed  in  Group  V.  A new  sphere  — Fukien  — was 
named,  and  the  right  to  build  strategic  railways  from 
the  coast  up  the  Yangtse  River  Valley  was  requested. 
In  addition,  China  was  to  employ  Japanese  advisers  in 
political,  financial  and  military  affairs;  police-courts  in 
important  cities  were  to  be  jointly  administered; 
China’s  arsenals  and  war  munitions  were  to  be  con- 
trolled by  Japan.  These  demands,  if  granted,  would 
have  put  China  definitely  in  the  position  of  a vassal 
state  of  Japan.  They  were  practically  the  same  as 
the  terms  forced  upon  Korea  before  its  annexation. 
In  detail  they  were : 

Group  V 

“Art.  I.  The  Chinese  Central  Government  shall 
employ  influential  Japanese  advisers  in  political, 
financial  and  military  affairs. 


20 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


“ Art.  2.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches  and  schools 
in  the  interior  of  China  shall  be  granted  the  right  of 
owning  land. 

''  Art.  3.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  Government 
and  the  Chinese  Government  have  had  many  cases  of 
dispute  between  Japanese  and  Chinese  police  to  settle, 
cases  which  caused  no  little  misunderstanding,  it  is  for 
this  reason  necessary  that  the  police  departments  of 
important  places  (in  China)  shall  be  jointly  adminis- 
tered by  Japanese  and  Chinese  or  that  the  police  de- 
partments of  these  places  shall  employ  numerous  Jap- 
anese, so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help  to  plan 
for  the  improvement  of  the  Chinese  Police  Service. 

“ xA.rt.  4.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a fixed 
amount  of  munitions  of  war  (say  50%  or  more)  of 
what  is  needed  by  the  Chinese  Government;  or  that 
there  shall  be  established  in  China  a Sino-Japanese 
jointly-worked  arsenal.  Japanese  technical  experts 
are  to  be  employed  and  Japanese  material  to  be  pur- 
chased. 

‘‘  Art  5.  China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right 
of  constructing  a railway  connecting  Wuchang  with 
Kiukiang  and  Nanchang,  another  line  between  Nan- 
chang  and  Hangchow,  and  another  between  Nanchang 
and  Chaochou. 

''  Art.  6r  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  21 


mines,  build  railways  and  construct  harbour-works 
(including  dock-yards)  in  the  Provinces  of  Fukien, 
Japan  shall  be  first  consulted. 

“ Art.  7.  China  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall 
have  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda  in  China.”  ^ 

These  Tw'enty-one  Demands  were  rather  curiously 
prefaced  by  the  statement:  “The  Japanese  Govern- 

ment and  the  Chinese  Government,  being  desirous  of 
maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  good  neighbourhood  between 
the  tw^o  nations,  agree  to  the  following.”  They  were 
presented  by  the  Japanese  Minister  directly  to  the  Pres- 
ident, Yuan  Shih-kai.  The  utmost  secrecy  w’as  main- 
tained and,  when  rumours  became  current,  the  Japanese 
Government  officially  denied  their  existence.  A 
month  later,  it  issued  a statement  listing  only  eleven 
demands.  Group  V and  the  more  objectional  requests 
being  omitted.  On  April  26th,  in  place  of  the  original 
Twenty-one  Demands,  twenty-four  wxre  presented 
with  slightly  different  w^ording.  On  May  7,  an  ulti- 
matum was  sent  by  Japan,  demanding  the  immediate 
acceptance  of  the  first  four  groups  and  threatening 
force  if  a favourable  answer  was  not  received.  The 
fifth  group  was  to  be  held  over  for  future  negotiations. 

1 Refers  to  preaching  Buddhism. 


22 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


On  May  8,  China  submitted,  at  the  same  time  affirming 
in  a supplementary  statement  that  it  was  forced  to  take 
this  step  and  that  it  would  not  be  responsible  for  any 
consequent  infringements  upon  the  treaty  rights  of 
other  nations  or  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door.” 
The  conclusion  of  these  negotiations  marked  the 
winning  by  Japan  of  most  of  its  original  objectives. 
The  hope  of  making  China  entirely  subservient  had  not 
been  realized,  but  Japan’s  power  over  the  Republic  had 
been  enormously  increased  and  the  acquiring  of  final 
control  seemed  only  a matter  of  time.  The  situation 
was  summed  up  by  Dr.  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  a lead- 
ing authority  on  Far  Eastern  affairs,  as  follows: 

“ Whatever  her  intentions,  Japan  has  accomplished 
in  regard  to  China  at  least  five  things : she  has  consoli- 
dated her  own  position  in  her  northern  sphere  of  influ- 
ence, Manchuria;  she  has  driven  the  Germans  out  of 
their  former  sphere  of  influence.  Shantung,  and  has 
constituted  herself  successor  to  Germany’s  rights;  she 
has  given  warning  that  she  considers  Fukien  Province 
an  exclusive  sphere  for  Japanese  influence;  she  has  un- 
dertaken to  invade  the  British  sphere  of  influence ; and 
she  stands  in  a position  to  menace  and  to  dictate  to 
the  Peking  government.  A glance  at  the  map  of 
North  China  will  show  how  completely  Peking  is  at 
Japan’s  mercy.  In  control  of  Port  Arthur  and  of  the 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  23 

Shantung  Peninsula,  Japan  commands  the  entrance  to 
the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  which  is  the  doorway  by  sea  to 
Tien-tsin  and  Newchwang.  In  possession  of  Tsing- 
tao,  Dairen,  and  (virtually)  of  Antung  and  New- 
chwang, Japan  thus  commands  every  important  port 
and  harbour  of  the  Yangtse.  With  the  Manchurian 
railways  penetrating  the  heart  of  Manchuria  and  the 
Shantung  Railway  extending  to  the  heart  of  Shantung 
— and  with  the  right  to  extend  the  latter  line  to  join 
the  Peking-Hankow  line  — Japan  is  in  a position, 
should  she  so  choose,  at  any  moment  to  grind  Peking 
between  the  millstones  of  her  military  machine.  So 
far  as  strategy  is  concerned,  Japan  has  North  China 
commercially,  militarily,  and  politically  at  her  mercy.”  ^ 
The  interest  aroused  among  the  nations  by  these  ne- 
gotiations was,  of  course,  keen,  and  the  matter  at- 
tracted world-wide  publicity.  The  United  States  was 
the  only  great  power  not  involved  in  the  war  in  Eu- 
rope, and  it  was  perhaps  natural  that  it  should  be  the 
one  country  openly  to  voice  a protest  against  the  set- 
tlement. On  May  i6  she  delivered  the  following  note 
to  the  Chinese  Government  at  Peking  and  to  the  Japan- 
ese Government  at  Tokyo: 

“ In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations 

^ S.  K.  Hornbeck,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far-East,  page 
346. 


24 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


which  have  taken  place  or  which  are  now  pending  be- 
tween the  Government  of  China  and  the  Government 
of  Japan  and  the  agreements  which  have  been  reached 
and  as  a result  thereof,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  the  honour  to  notify  the  Government  of  the 
Chinese  Republic  that  it  cannot  recognize  any  agree- 
ment or  undertaking  which  has  been  entered  into,  or 
which  may  be  entered  into  between  the  Governments 
of  China  and  Japan  impairing  the  treaty  rights  of  the 
United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China,  the  political  or 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China,  or  the 
international  policy,  commonly  known  as  the  open  door 
policy.” 

Thus  the  first  year  of  the  Great  War  brought 
changes  of  the  most  vital  importance  to  the  Orient. 
Whether  or  not  these  changes  shall  become  permanent 
can  be  decided  only  at  the  conference  which  will  come 
at  the  close  of  the  world-conflict. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  FROM 
WITHIN,  DURING  THE  SECOND  YEAR 
OF  THE  WAR 

THE  ATTEMPT  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  TO  RESTORE  THE 
MONARCHY 

The  first  year  of  the  war  brought  vital  changes  in 
China’s  foreign  relations,  especially  in  those  with 
Japan.  The  second  year  saw  changes  within  the  coun- 
try of  almost  as  great  importance. 

These  changes,  in  their  ultimate  result,  were  in  line 
with  the  world  tendencies  of  the  present  time  toward 
democracy  and  popular  government.  Writing  in 
August,  1916,  to  the  New  York  Times,  the  author 
tried  to  sum  up  the  events  of  the  preceding  months, 
saying  in  part: 

‘‘If  it  were  not  for  the  all-absorbing  cataclysm  in 
Europe,  all  eyes  would  be  turned  toward  the  Orient 
and  the  great  movements  now  in  evidence  there.  Cer- 
tainly the  developments  in  India  and  Japan  since  the 
Great  War  began  are  of  vast  importance  in  the  mould- 
ing of  the  future  of  Asia.  But  it  is  in  China,  espe- 

25 


26 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


dally  during  the  past  year,  that  events  of  unique  inter- 
est have  taken  place.  The  sudden  clamour  for  the 
change  of  the  infant  republic  into  a monarchy,  which 
began  last  fall ; the  continued  agitation  for  this  trans- 
formation in  the  form  of  government,  culminating  on 
Dec.  II  in  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  Convention  of 
Representatives  of  the  Citizens  for  a Monarchy,  with 
Yuan  Shih-kai  at  its  head;  the  gradual  appearance  of 
a most  serious  opposition,  resulting  in  the  revolt  of  the 
southern  provinces;  the  sudden  cancellation  of  the 
monarchial  project  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  on  March  22; 
the  effort  to  oust  Yuan  as  President,  ending  dramat- 
ically with  his  death  on  June  6,  and  the  election  of  Li 
Yuan-hung  as  President  in  his  stead;  — these  are  a 
few  of  the  main  events  in  a most  absorbing,  hard-won 
fight  between  democracy  and  autocracy  in  the  Far 
East.  ...  In  this  fight  for  the  republic  in  China, 
America  should  have  a very  real  interest  and  sym- 
pathy.” 

The  summer  of  1915  found  China  just  recovering 
from  the  shock  of  the  Japanese  aggressions;  in  retalia- 
tion, the  country  was  entering  upon  a nation-wide  boy- 
cott of  Japanese  goods  and  productions.  Attempts 
were  being  made  to  raise  a National  Salvation  Fund  to 
be  applied  toward  strengthening  the  nation  in  every 
possible  way.  . The  gifts  toward  this  latter  cause  were 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  2/ 

from  all  classes ; one  ricksha  coolie  in  a certain  city  was 
said  to  have  given  to  the  fund  forty  Mexican  dollars, 
the  saving  of  his  entire  lifetime. 

Ever  since  the  dissolution  of  Parliament  in  Novem- 
ber, 1913,  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  moving  toward  a 
centralized  government,  with  the  power  in  the  hands  of 
a few  of  his  lieutenants.  There  were  open  suggestions 
of  a return  to  a monarchy.  The  Japanese  demands 
hastened  this  entire  movement.  In  support  of  a return 
to  the  monarchy  the  arguments  were  in  the  main  three : 
first,  that  a monarchy,  and  one  of  militaristic  tenden- 
cies, was  stronger  than  a Republic.  Germany  and 
Japan  were  cited  as  examples.  Second,  that  at  the 
close  of  the  war,  if  there  were  not  a strong  govern- 
ment — if  the  right  of  succession  were  not  clear  — 
and  if  civil  strife,  which  seemed  common  in  a Repub- 
lic, continued ; — the  other  nations  would  step  in  and 
take  control  of  China  and  would  put  a ruler  of  their 
own  choosing  on  the  throne,  just  as  Japan  had  done  in 
Korea  before  its  annexation.  A third  reason  was  the 
wish  of  the  eldest  son  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  succeed  his 
father  as  Emperor. 

Shortly  after  the  Japanese  ultimatum  in  May,  the 
Chou  An  Hui  (Society  for  the  Preservation  of  Peace) 
was  organized  with  the  purpose  of  spreading  propa- 
ganda in  support  of  the  monarchical  idea.  A pamphlet 


28 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


by  a scholar  called  Yang  Tu  was  circulated  in  August, 
giving  the  reasons  for  the  proposed  change.  It  was 
entitled  “ A Defence  of  the  Monarchical  Movement,” 
and  was  in  the  form  of  a dialogue  between  a stranger 
and  a citizen  of  the  Republic.  Three  excerpts  will  be 
sufficient  to  exhibit  its  type  of  reasoning. 

“ The  people  of  a republic  are  accustomed  to  listen 
to  the  talk  of  equality  and  freedom  which  must  effect 
the  political  and  more  especially  the  military  adminis- 
tration. . . . But  the  German  and  Japanese  troops  ob- 
serve strict  discipline  and  obey  the  orders  of  their 
chiefs.  That  is  why  they  are  regarded  as  the  best 
soldiers  in  the  world.  France  and  America  are  in  a 
different  position.  They  are  rich  but  not  strong.  The 
sole  difference  is  that  Germany  and  Japan  are  ruled 
by  monarchs  while  France  and  America  are  republics. 
Our  conclusion  therefore  is  that  no  republic  can  be 
strong.  . . . The  best  thing  for  us  to  do  is  to  adopt 
part  of  the  Prussian  and  part  of  the  Japanese  in  our 
constitution-making.  . . . 

“ The  vital  question  of  the  day,  setting  aside  all 
paper  talk,  is  whether  or  not  China  has  a suitable  man 
to  succeed  President  Yuan  Shih-kai.  . . . Confusion 
and  disturbance  will  follow  with  great  rapidity.  Then 
foreign  countries  which  have  entertained  wild  am- 
bitions, availing  themselves  of  the  distressful  situation 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  29 

in  China,  will  stir  up  ill-feelings  among  these  parties 
and  so  increase  the  disturbances.  When  the  proper 
time  comes,  various  countries,  unwilling  to  let  a single 
country  enjoy  the  privilege  of  controlling  China,  will 
resort  to  armed  intervention.  In  consequence  the  east- 
ern problem  will  end  in  a rupture  of  the  international 
peace.  Whether  China  will  be  turned  at  that  time  into 
a battleground  for  the  Chinese  people  or  for  the  for- 
eign Powers  I cannot  tell  you.  It  is  too  dreadful  to 
think  of  the  future  which  is  enshrouded  in  a veil  of 
mystery.  However,  I can  tell  you  that  the  result  of 
this  awful  turmoil  will  be  either  the  slicing  of  China 
like  a melon  or  the  suppression  of  internal  trouble  with 
foreign  assistance  which  will  lead  to  dismemberment. 
As  to  the  second  result  some  explanation  is  necessary. 
After  foreign  countries  have  helped  us  to  suppress  in- 
ternal disturbances,  they  will  select  a man  of  the  type 
of  Li  Wang  of  Korea,  who  betrayed  his  country  to 
Japan,  and  make  him  Emperor  of  China.  Whether 
this  man  will  be  the  deposed  emperor  or  a member  of 
the  Imperial  family  or  the  leader  of  the  rebel  party, 
remains  to  be  seen.  In  any  event  he  will  be  a figure- 
head in  whose  hand  will  not  be  vested  political,  finan- 
cial and  military  power,  which  will  be  controlled  by 
foreigners.  All  the  valuable  mines,  various  kinds  of 
industries  and  our  abundant  natural  resources,  will 


30 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


likewise  be  developed  by  others.  China  will  thus  dis- 
appear as  a nation.”  ^ 

Here  in  very  glaring  terms  was  shown  the  fear  of 
attempting  to  work  out  a democracy  in  a world  of  sup- 
posedly militaristic  nations.  China  was  afraid  to  go 
on  with  the  experiment.  The  only  safety  seemed  to 
lie  in  a reversion  to  armed  autocracy.  The  Asiatic 
world  was  not  “ safe  for  democracy,”  and  China  had 
no  friend  whom  she  could  trust  to  make  it  safe  for 
her  to  continue  her  attempts  in  that  direction. 

All  these  factors  became  clear  later,  but  to  observers 
living  in  China,  the  political  situation  in  the  fall  of 
1915  was  full  of  mystery.  Since  the  dissolution  of 
Parliament  the  republic  had  been  one  in  name  rather 
than  in  fact ; but  the  speed  with  which  the  monarchical 
movement  gained  headway  surprised  most  onlookers. 
The  sentiment  among  the  middle  and  lower  classes  of 
the  Yangtze  Valley  and  the  south  seemed  strongly 
against  the  monarchy  and  against  Yuan  Shih-kai  for 
apparently  supporting  it.  The  writer  talked  with  men 
of  all  classes  — ricksha-coolies,  Confucian  scholars, 
Buddhist  priests,  and  returned  students,  and  every  one, 
after  taking  due  precaution  against  being  overheard, 
came  out  in  support  of  the  republic  and  denounced 

1 Putnam-Weale,  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,  pages 
151  and  161. 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  3 1 

Yuan.  Dr.  Morrison,  after  a tour  of  inspection  of  the 
Yang-tse  Valley,  described  the  sentiment  of  the  people 
as  one  of  “ solid  resentment  ” against  the  whole  move- 
ment. The  feeling  was  even  stronger  in  the  south. 

There  were  certain  indications  even  then  that  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  acquiescent  in,  if,  indeed,  not  a supporter 
of,  the  monarchical  movement.  Persistent  rumours 
came  from  close  friends  of  his  in  the  capital  that  he 
was  influenced  by  his  son  to  make  the  change  for  the 
latter’s  benefit  as  his  successor.  Only  former  officials 
and  friends  of  the  administration  were  allowed  to  vote 
in  December.  The  editor  of  one  of  the  Monarchist 
newspapers  in  Shanghai,  which  was  blown  up  by  the 
Republicans,  stated  outright  amid  the  smoking  ruins 
of  his  office  that  he  had  special  permission  from  the 
Central  Government  for  his  propaganda.  But  the 
publication  by  the  Republican  Government  in  the  fol- 
lowing summer  of  over  sixty  secret  communications  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai’s  Government  preceding  and  during  the 
election  in  the  Fall  brought  out  clearly  the  entire  situa- 
tion; the  whole  monarchical  effort,  in  the  words  of 
Putnam  Weale  of  Peking,  was  stamped  as  “ a cool  and 
singular  plan  to  forge  a national  mandate  which  has 
few  equals  in  history.” 

In  publicly  beginning  its  propaganda  in  August,  fol- 
lowing the  publishing  of  the  pamphlet  by  Yang  Tu, 


32 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


the  monarchical  movement  very  cleverly  used  a state- 
ment of  Dr.  Francis  J.  Goodnow,  President  of  Johns 
Hopkins  University,  and  political  adviser  to  the  Chi- 
nese Government.  Dr.  Goodnow’s  opinion  was  purely 
an  academic  one;  he  stated  that  a change  from  a repub- 
lic to  a monarchy  could  be  successfully  made  under 
three  conditions:  first,  that  the  peace  of  the  country 
was  not  thereby  imperiled;  second,  that  the  laws  of 
succession  should  first  be  securely  fixed;  third,  pro- 
vision should  be  made  for  some  form  of  constitutional 
government.  Of  course,  the  Monarchists,  in  quoting 
this  opinion,  entirely  omitted  these  conditional  clauses. 

On  Aug.  i6  the  Chou  An  Hui  published  its  first 
manifesto  referring  to  this  statement.  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
in  a speech  before  the  State  Council,  said  among  other 
things : “ I regard  the  proposed  change  as  unsuitable 

to  the  circumstances  of  the  country.”  But  on  Aug.  30 
the  first  secret  telegram  was  dispatched  from  Peking 
concerning  the  proposed  change  of  government.  It 
was  a code  telegram  to  the  Military  and  Civil  Gov- 
ernors of  the  provinces,  to  be  deciphered  personally  by 
them  with  the  Council  of  State  code.  After  certain 
initial  steps  are  mentioned  in  detail,  the  document 
reads : 

The  plan  suggested  is  for  each  province  to  send  in 
a separate  petition,  the  draft  of  which  will  be  made  in 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  33 

Peking  and  wired  to  the  respective  provinces  in  due 
course.  ...  You  will  insert  your  own  name  as  well 
as  those  of  the  gentry  and  merchants  of  the  province 
who  agree  to  the  draft.  These  petitions  are  to  be 
presented  one  by  one  to  the  Legislative  Council  as  soon 
as  it  is  convoked.  At  all  events,  the  change  in  the 
form  of  the  State  will  have  to  be  effected  under  colour 
of  carrying  out  the  people’s  will.”  ^ 

The  Monarchical  Society,  realizing  that  matters  had 
progressed  sufficiently  by  this  time  for  it  to  assert 
itself,  on  Sept.  27,  under  the  leadership  of  Yang  Tu 
and  Sun  Yu-chun,  dispatched  a code  telegram  to  the 
Military  and  Civil  Governors,  asserting  that  all  danger 
of  a true  expression  of  provincial  wishes  must  be  erad- 
icated. The  telegram  offers  suggestions  regarding  the 
government  of  the  different  districts  and  then  con- 
cludes : 

“ In  order  to  clothe  the  proceedings  with  an  appear- 
ance of  regularity,  the  representatives  of  the  districts, 
though  they  are  really  appointed  by  the  highest  mili- 
tary and  civil  officials  of  the  province,  should  still  be 

1 The  telegrams  and  communications  quoted  in  this  chapter  ap- 
pear in  full  in  a publication  of  the  Republican  Government  of 
China  with  the  title : “ The  People’s  Will : An  Exposure  of  the 
Political  Intrigues  at  Peking  Against  the  Republic  of  China,”  and 
in  the  columns  of  the  Peking  Gazette. 


34 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


nominally  elected  by  the  districts.  As  soon  as  the 
representatives  of  the  districts  have  been  appointed, 
their  names  should  be  communicated  to  the  respective 
district  magistrates,  who  are  to  be  instructed  to  draw 
up  the  necessary  documents  in  detail,  and  to  cause  a 
formal  election  to  be  held.  Such  documents  should, 
however,  be  properly  antedated.” 

On  Sept.  29  Chu  Chi-chun,  Military  Governor  of 
Mukden,  representing  the  Administrative  Council, 
telegraphed  as  follows : 

“ While  the  plan  of  organization  is  determined  by 
the  Administrative  Council,  the  carr}dng  out  of  the 
ulterior  object  of  such  plan  rests  with  the  superinten- 
dents in  chief  of  the  election.  They  should,  therefore, 
assume  a controlling  influence  over  the  election  pro- 
ceedings and  utilize  them  to  the  best  advantage.  The 
representatives  of  the  citizens  should  be  elected,  one 
for  each  district  wherever  possible,  from  among  the 
officials  who  are  connected  with  the  various  Govern- 
ment organs  in  the  provincial  capital,  so  that  there 
may  be  no  misunderstanding  as  to  the  real  object  of 
voting.” 

This  telegram  indicated  that  the  representative  or- 
gan of  the  people  was  under  the  control  of  high  officials 
and  was  “ utilized  ” by  them  “ to  the  best  advantage,” 
and  that  the  representatives  themselves  were  to  be 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  35 

chosen  from  among  those  connected  with  the  Govern- 
ment organizations  in  the  various  provincial  capitals. 

On  October  ii  the  National  Convention  Bureau  sent 
the  following  telegram : 

‘‘  The  future  peace  and  safety  of  the  nation  depend 
upon  the  documents  exchanged  between  the  Govern- 
ment organs  and  Peking  and  those  in  the  provinces. 
Should  any  of  these  come  to  the  notice  of  the  public, 
the  blame  for  failure  to  keep  official  secrets  will  be  laid 
upon  us.  Moreover,  as  these  documents  concern  the 
very  foundation  of  the  State,  they  will,  in  case  they  be- 
come known,  leave  a dark  spot  on  the  political  history 
of  our  country.  Upon  their  secrecy  depends  our  na- 
tional honour  and  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  both  our  own 
people  and  foreigners.  ...  We  hope  you  will  appoint 
one  of  your  confidential  subordinates  to  be  specially 
responsible  for  the  safe  custody  of  the  secret  docu- 
ments.” 

Despite  the  increasing  unrest  among  the  people,  a 
circular  telegram  was  dispatched  on  Oct.  23,  which 
apparently  ''  drove  the  last  nail  into  the  coffin  of  the 
Chinese  Republic.”  It  was  a nomination  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  and  read : 

The  letters  of  nomination  to  be  sent  in  after  the 
form  of  state  shall  have  been  put  to  the  vote,  must 
contain  the  following  words ; ' We,  the  citizens’  rep- 


36  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

resentatives,  by  virtue  of  the  will  of  the  citizens,  do 
hereby  respectfully  nominate  the  present  President 
Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Emperor  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and 
invest  him  to  the  fullest  extent  with  all  the  supreme 
sovereign  rights  of  the  State.  He  is  appointed  by 
Heaven  to  ascend  the  Throne  and  to  transmit  it  to  his 
heirs  for  ten  thousand  generations.’  These  characters, 
forty-five  in  all,  must  not  be  altered  on  any  account. 

Before  the  form  of  the  State  has  been  settled,  the 
letters  of  nomination  must  not  be  made  public.  A 
reply  is  requested.” 

A few  days  later  — Oct.  28  — the  attention  of  the 
Central  Government  was  drawn  by  Japan,  England, 
and  Russia  (later  supported  by  France  and  Italy  as 
allies)  toward  the  inadvisability  of  taking  steps  that 
would  threaten  the  peace  of  China;  but  Lu  Cheng- 
hsiang.  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  replied  that  it 
was  too  late  to  retract,  as  the  matter  had  already  been 
decided.  When  their  surprise  over  this  unexpected 
reply  had  subsided,  those  in  charge  of  the  plot  sent  the 
following  state  telegram  to  the  provinces : 

A certain  foreign  power,  under  the  pretext  that 
the  Chinese  people  are  not  of  one  mind  and  that 
troubles  are  to  be  apprehended,  has  lately  forced  Eng- 
land and  Russia  to  take  part  in  tendering  advice  to 
China.  In  truth,  all  foreign  nations  know  perfectly 


Lopynglit  oy  unacrwood  & Underwood,  N.  i. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  First  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic. 


% 


\ 


► 


► 


► 


! 


> 


». 


•■  ■ .-  ■■  / 

■ ■ ">  A.  ■■ 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  37 

well  that  there  will  be  no  trouble,  and  they  are  obliged 
to  follow  the  example  of  that  power.  If  we  accept 
the  advice  of  other  powers  concerning  our  domestic 
affairs  and  postpone  the  enthronement,  we  should  be 
recognizing  their  right  to  interfere.  Hence,  action 
should  under  no  circumstances  be  deferred.  When 
all  the  votes  of  the  provinces  unanimously  recommend- 
ing the  enthronement  shall  have  reached  Peking,  the 
Government  will,  of  course,  ostensibly  assume  a waver- 
ing and  compromising  attitude,  so  as  to  give  due  re- 
gard to  international  relations.  The  people,  on  the 
other  hand,  should  show  their  firm  determination  to 
proceed  with  the  matter  at  all  costs,  so  as  to  let  the 
foreign  powers  know  that  our  people  are  of  one  mind. 
If  we  can  only  make  them  believe  that  the  change  of 
the  republic  into  a monarchy  will  not  in  the  least  give 
rise  to  trouble  of  any  kind,  the  effects  of  the  advice 
tendered  by  Japan  will  ipso  facto  come  to  naught.”  ^ 
On  Dec.  21  was  played  the  last  act  in  the  drama. 
Forty-eight  hours  before  General  Tsai  Ao  threw  down 
the  gauntlet  in  Yunnan,  because  of  the  strange  quiet 
that  pervaded  the  country  the  Monarchists  boldly  de- 
termined to  pay  no  further  heed  to  any  suggestion  that 

1 There  is  evidence  for  the  view  that  Japan  at  first  encouraged 
Yuan  in  his  monarchical  aspirations,  and  then  suddenl}^  reversed 
its  position. 


38  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

they  withdraw  from  their  purpose,  even  though  force 
be  threatened.  For  it  had  been  discovered,  after  the 
ballot  boxes  were  opened  on  Dec.  ii  that  every  voter 
had  cast  his  ballot  for  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  be  Emperor! 
And  he,  isolated  in  his  palace  from  the  populace  and 
deceived  by  his  followers,  had  accepted  the  nomina- 
tion. 

All  that  remained  now  was  to  blot  out  every  trace 
of  the  conspiracy,  that  the  deceit  “ should  not  stain  the 
opening  pages  of  the  history  of  the  new  dynasty,” 
as  a later  telegram  read,  which  is  in  part  quoted  below : 

“ No  matter  how  carefully  their  secrets  may  have 
been  guarded  (it  asserts),  still  they  remain  as  perma- 
nent records  which  might  compromise  us;  and  in  the 
event  of  their  becoming  known  to  foreigners  we  shall 
not  escape  severe  criticism  and  bitter  attacks,  and,  what 
is  worse,  should  they  be  handed  down  as  part  of  the 
national  records,  they  will  stain  the  opening  pages  of 
the  history  of  the  new  dynasty.  The  Central  Govern- 
ment, after  carefully  considering  the  matter,  has  con- 
cluded that  it  would  be  better  to  sort  out  and  burn  the 
documents  so  as  to  remove  all  unnecessary  records  and 
prevent  regrettable  consequences.  For  these  reasons 
you  are  hereby  requested  to  sift  out  all  telegrams,  let- 
ters, and  dispatches  concerning  the  changes  in  the  form 
of  the  State,  whether  official  or  private,  whether  re- 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  39 

ceived  from  Peking  or  the  provinces  (excepting  those 
required  by  law  to  be  filed  on  record),  and  cause  the 
same  to  be  burned  in  your  presence.” 

Such  intrigues  were  certain  to  bear  fruit,  and  on 
Dec.  23,  Tsai  Ao  and  Tang  Chi-yao,  Governors  of 
Yunnan,  revolted,  and  blazed  the  way  for  the  rebel- 
lion which  ultimately  should  oust  Yuan  from  power. 
They  declared  that  Yuan  had  been  guilty  of  “ delib- 
erately misrepresenting  the  people’s  will  by  induce- 
ments and  threats,”  and  took  their  stand  once  more  for 
the  republic.  Yunnan  was  followed  by  Kweichow. 

Despite  this  protest,  the  beginning  of  the  new 
dynasty^  was  set  for  January  i,  1916,  and  the 
Government  buildings  in  the  larger  cities  were  dec- 
orated with  the  national  flag  in  honour  of  the  event. 
Memorials  praying  for  an  early  ascension  of  the 
throne  were  sent  to  Peking  by  various  Monarchists. 
But  on  January  26,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  dubbed  the  “ Ta 
Huang  Ti  ” ('‘Great  Emperor”)  by  the  Peking 
Ga:^ette,  a.  Republican  sympathizer,  announced  that 
the  enthronement  would  be  postponed : “ The  Prov- 

ince of  Yunnan  is  opposing  the  Central  Govern- 
ment and  under  some  pretext  a rebellion  has  been 
raised  in  these  regions.  . . . We  are  profoundly 
grieved  to  confess  that  a portion  of  the  people  are  dis- 
1 Called  Hung  Hsien. 


40 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


satisfied  with  us.  ...  To  perform  the  ceremony  of 
enthronement  at  this  juncture  would,  therefore,  set  our 
heart  on  thorns.  The  enthronement  will  have  to  be 
postponed  to  a date  when  the  affairs  in  Yunnan  are 
again  under  control.” 

The  month  of  February  was  one  of  speculation  and 
of  discouragement  on  the  part  of  the  Republicans. 
The  control  of  the  military  forces  of  the  north  was 
tightened  in  all  suspected  centres;  Nanking,  which  had 
been  the  hotbed  of  revolution  for  the  last  four  years, 
was  practically  under  martial  law;  soldiers  with  fixed 
bayonets  patrolled  the  streets;  signs  were  put  up  in  the 
tea  houses  and  Government  schools  forbidding  any  dis- 
cussion of  political  affairs;  infractions  of  this  rule 
were  severely  punished.  But  the  unrest  continued,  a 
statement  of  one  of  the  scholars  in  Nanking  being  in- 
dicative of  public  sentiment  in  general.  On  being 
asked  by  the  author  what  he  thought  of  the  new  flag 
which  the  Monarchists  proposed  for  the  nation,  he  said 
he  thought  the  best  design  would  be  a white  flag  with 
a great  black  spot  in  the  centre  (for  Yuan  Shih-kai). 

This  dissatisfaction  found  active  expression  in  the 
revolt  on  March  17  of  Kuangsi,  which  made,  among 
others,  the  following  demands  upon  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment: The  cancellation  of  the  empire  and  reinsti- 

tution of  the  republican  form  of  government;  the  abdi- 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  4I 

cation  of  Yuan  Shih-kai;  and  the  convocation  of  a 
legislative  body  which  should  represent  and  be  capable 
of  expressing  the  authentic  will  of  the  people.” 

On  March  22  this  was  answered  by  a mandate  from 
Yuan  cancelling  the  whole  monarchical  movement.  In 
it  he  said : “ I am  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  desig- 

nation petitions  submitted  are  unsuited  to  the  demands 
of  the  time,  and  the  official  acceptance  of  the  imperial 
throne  is  hereby  cancelled.  ...  I now  confess  that  the 
faults  of  the  country  are  the  result  of  my  own  faults.” 
Although  Yuan  had  relinquished  his  ambition  for 
the  throne,  he  was  not  willing  to  abdicate  entirely,  and 
nothing  short  of  this  would  satisfy  the  Southerners. 
Chekiang  Province  revolted  and  its  Governor  fled; 
Kwangtung  followed.  The  press  was  full  of  fiery 
articles  calling  for  Yuan’s  retirement.  On  April  27 
General  Tsai  Ao,  the  great  military  leader  of  the  Re- 
publicans, sent  a long  telegram  to  Peking  urging  Yuan 
to  retire,  and  concluding  with  a threat:  “If,  how- 

ever, you  should  continue  to  linger  and  delay  to  make 
a prompt  decision  in  the  sense  of  retirement  and  com- 
pel the  people  to  elaborate  their  demands  in  plainer 
language,  your  retirement  will  be  compulsory  instead 
of  voluntary,  and  your  high  virtue  will  be  lowered.” 
This  was  followed  by  a similar  appeal  by  Dr.  Wu 
Ting-fang. 


4^ 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Yuan  remaining  obdurate,  on  May  lo  the  southern 
provinces  elected  Li  Yuan-hung  as  President.  On 
May  17  Liang  Chi-chao,  the  Republican  leader,  who 
had  the  highest  reputation  among  the  scholars  of 
China,  telegraphed  Peking : “ Since  Hsaing-Cheng 

(Yuan  Shih-kai)  has  been  morally  defeated  in  the  eyes 
of  Chinese  as  well  as  foreigners,  the  iron  verdict  has 
been  passed  on  him  demanding  his  retirement.”  This 
was  backed  on  May  18,  the  following  day,  by  a state- 
ment of  300  members  of  the  former  National  Assem- 
bly, which  Yuan  had  dissolved  in  1913. 

Through  all  this  discussion  Nanking  had  remained 
neutral.  On  May  15  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  held 
a conference  of  the  representatives  of  the  ten  provinces 
which  were  still  loyal.  The  conference  accomplished 
little  except  to  emphasize  the  growing  demand  for 
Yuan’s  retirement.  On  May  24  Szechuan  revolted, 
and  two  days  later  Yuan  first  publicly  announced  his 
intention  to  retire,  saying : “ My  wish  to  retire  is  my 

own  and  originated  with  myself.  I have  not  the 
slightest  idea  of  lingering  with  a longing  heart  at  my 
post.”  On  May  29  Yuan  issued  a long  statement  in 
which  he  reviewed  in  detail  his  action  in  connection 
with  the  attempted  change  of  Government.  Two  sen- 
tences are  rather  interesting  in  the  light  of  the  present 
knowledge  of  the  entire  situation: 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  43 

“ I,  the  great  President,  have  done  everything  I 
could  to  ascertain  the  real  will  of  the  people  by  taking 
measures  to  prevent  every  possible  corruption,  the 
same  being  in  pursuance  of  my  wish  to  respect  the  will 
of  the  people.  ...  In  dealing  with  others  I,  the  great 
President,  have  always  been  guided  by  the  principle  of 
sincerity.” 

The  comment  upon  this  mandate  by  the  editor  of 
the  Peking  Gacctte,  himself  a Chinese,  is  indicative  of 
the  sentiment  of  the  country  at  that  time : 

“If  there  were  not  a growing  danger  with  every  day 
that  the  Chief  Executive  tarried  in  office,  moderate 
Chinese  might  be  inclined  to  read  with  some  patience 
and  in  a sense  of  sympathy  the  mandate  issued  on 
iMonday  night,  which  we  translate  in  full  today.  It  is 
obviously  the  attempt  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  set  himself 
right  with  posterity  and  to  state  for  the  future  his- 
torian his  own  version  of  a transaction  that  has  made 
him  weaker  than  the  child-ruler  who  preceded  him. 
There  is  no  time  to  reread  what  has  already  been  as- 
severated time  and  again  to  a skeptical  world.  There 
is  no  time  to  shed  a tear  for  a fall  from  greatness  that 
is  without  parallel  in  history.  The  nation’s  perils 
thicken  and  the  voice  of  the  people  clamours  for  the 
retirement  that  is  to  bring  surcease  of  their  harass- 
ment. Again  we  bid  him  be  wise  and  leave  the  work 


44 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


that  must  be  done  by  other  hands  under  surer  knowl- 
edge of  the  great  new  forces  in  our  midst/’ 

During  the  following  week  Yuan  Shih-kai  became 
seriously  ill,  and  on  June  6 he  died,  the  cause  of  his 
death  being  urinaemia.  A few  hours  before  his  death 
he  issued  his  last  mandate,  in  which  he  handed  over 
the  Government  to  the  Vice-President.  His  closing 
words  were  not  without  pathos : “ Owing  to  my  lack 

of  virtue  and  ability,  I have  not  been  able  fully  to  trans- 
form into  deed  what  I have  desired  to  accomplish ; and 
I blush  to  say  I have  not  realized  one-ten-thousandth 
part  of  my  original  intention  to  save  the  country  and 
the  people.  ...  I was  just  thinking  how  I could  retire 
into  private  life  when  illness  has  suddenly  overtaken 
me.  . . . The  ancients  once  said,  ‘ It  is  only  when  the 
living  do  try  to  become  strong  that  the  dead  are  not 
dead.’  This  is  also  the  wish  of  me,  the  great  Presi- 
dent.” 

President  Li  Yuan-hung  at  once  entered  upon  his 
office,  beginning  on  June  7,  according  to  the  Peking 
Gazette,  “ the  work  that  ought  to  have  been  begun  four 
years  ago.”  His  first  mandate  was  as  follows: 

I 

Yuan-hung  has  assumed  the  office  of  President  on 
this  the  7th  day  of  the  sixth  month.  Realizing  his  lack 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  45 

of  virtue,  he  is  extremely  solicitous  lest  something  may 
miscarry.  His  single  aim  will  be  to  adhere  strictly  to 
law  for  the  consolidation  of  the  republic  and  the 
moulding  of  the  country  into  a really  constitutionally 
administered  country.  May  all  officials  and  people  act 
in  sympathy  with  this  idea  and  with  united  soul  and 
energy  fulfil  the  part  that  is  lacking  in  him.  This  is 
his  great  hope.” 

The  issuing  of  the  mandate  was  followed  by  tele- 
grams from  most  of  the  provinces,  stating  their  loyalty 
to  the  new  President  and  to  the  Republican  Govern- 
ment. A few  days  later  Liang  Shih-yi,  the  chief 
counsellor  and  adviser  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  among  the 
Monarchists,  resigned  from  his  position  in  the  Govern- 
ment ; thus  the  chief  obstacle  to  harmony  was  removed. 
The  efforts  of  the  new  Republican  Government  were 
then  directed  toward  the  establishment  of  a Parlia- 
ment, according  to  the  Provisional  Constitution 
adopted  at  Nanking  in  1912.  The  Constitutional 
Compact  adopted  in  May,  1914,  was  discarded.  Par- 
liament was  reconvened  on  August  i,  and  the  follow- 
ing month  a Cabinet  was  formed  with  Tuan  Chi-jui  as 
Premier.  Feng  Kwo-chang  was  elected  Vice-Presi- 
dent. Thus  the  Republic  of  China  again  took  up  its 
course  as  a national  entity. 

The  first  year  of  the  war  had  brought  grave  dangers 


46  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  the  Chinese  Republic  from  without.  In  the  second 
year  it  encountered  equally  grave  dangers  from  within. 
The  overthrow  of  militarism,  for  a time  at  least, 
within  its  own  borders,  prepared  the  way  for  a more 
sympathetic  understanding  of  the  great  world  situation 
in  which  a similar  principle  was  at  stake.  In  its  best 
ideals  and  traditions  China  had  always  been  an  oppo- 
nent of  military  power  unfettered  by  the  will  of  the 
people.  The  right  of  rebellion  against  tyrants  had 
brought  to  a close  many  of  its  ancient  dynasties.  The 
scholar  had  stood  the  highest  in  the  social  scale : the 
soldier  the  lowest.  The  Confucian  Classics,  which 
have  had  a greater  influence  than  any  other  writing  in 
moulding  the  mind  of  the  people,  contain  many  pas- 
sages emphasizing  the  importance  of  the  government 
being  founded  on  the  popular  will,  and  designating  the 
ruler  as  a servant  of  the  people.  “ In  a state,  the  peo- 
ple are  most  important:  the  ruler  is  of  least  impor- 
tance.” “Heaven  (or  God)  sees  as  my  people  see: 
Heaven  (or  God)  hears  as  my  people  hear.”  “The 
commander  of  the  forces  of  a large  state  may  be  car- 
ried off,  but  the  will  of  even  the  humblest  of  its  sub- 
jects cannot  be  taken  from  him.”  In  the  Analects,  the 
essentials  of  government  had  been  named:  imperfect 
as  was  the  comprehension  of  the  average  Chinese  in 
1915-16  of  all  that  democracy  and  popular  govern- 


THE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  CHINESE  REPUBLIC  47 

merit  meant,  there  seemed  to  have  been  some  glimmer- 
ing understanding  concerning  the  principles  at  stake : 
principles  which  were  named  by  the  Great  Sage  of 
China  over  twenty-four  hundred  years  ago. 

Tsze-kung  asked  about  Government.  The  Master 
(Confucius)  said,  “ The  essentials  of  Government  are 
that  there  be  sufficient  food,  sufficient  military  equip- 
ment, and  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  their  rulers.” 
Tsze-kung  said:  “If  it  cannot  be  helped,  and  one 

of  these  must  be  dispensed  with,  which  of  the  three 
should  be  foregone  first?” 

“ The  military  equipiuent,”  said  the  Master. 
Tsze-kung  again  asked:  “If  it  cannot  be  helped, 

and  one  of  the  remaining  two  must  be  dispensed  with, 
which  of  them  should  be  foregone?” 

The  Master  answered : “ Part  with  the  food. 

For,  from  of  old,  death  has  been  the  lot  of  all  men ; but 
if  the  people  have  no  faith  in  their  rulers,  the  State 
cannot  stand.”  ^ 

'^Analects  of  Confucius,  Book  12,  Chapter  7. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERN- 
MENT LEADING  TO  A NEW  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Ox  the  third  anniversary  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
Great  War,  Parliament  was  re-convened  in  China,  and 
a new  start  was  made  upon  Republican  paths.  Fol- 
lowing the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  June,  Li  Yuan- 
hung  had  been  made  President;  Feng  Kwo-chang, 
Governor  of  Kiangsu  Province,  and  recognized  leader 
of  the  Yangtze  Valley  region,  had  been  elected  Vice- 
President;  and  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  appointed  Pre- 
mier of  the  Cabinet,  which  was  organized  in  Septem- 
ber. On  Sept.  15th,  Parliament  set  to  work  on  the 
drafting  of  the  permanent  constitution.  The  Chinese 
ship  of  state  seemed  to  be  sailing  on  comparatively 
smooth  waters.  This  calm  was  not  broken  until  the 
bursting  of  the  storm  over  the  declaration  of  war  with 
Germany  and  Austria  eight  months  later. 

The  general  satisfaction  over  the  progress  in  consti- 
tutional government  is  shown  by  a description  of  state 
affairs  sent  to  America  by  the  writer  on  Feb.  ii,  1917. 

48 


CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT 


49 


‘‘  Hangchow,  China. 

“ The  prophecy  made  in  verse  by  Rudyard  Kipling 
concerning  the  fate  of  the  man  who  should  try  to 
‘ hustle  the  East  ’ is  fast  becoming  an  anachronism.  It 
is  especially  inapplicable  to  the  evolution  of  the  govern- 
ment of  China.  A year  ago  the  infant  republic  appar- 
ently had  been  strangled  and  a monarchy  reared  in  its 
stead;  January  i,  1916,  was  set  as  the  beginning  of  the 
new  dynasty  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  at  its  head;  and  prep- 
arations were  being  made  for  the  enthronement ; no  dis- 
cussion of  political  affairs  was  allowed,  signs  forbid- 
ding it  being  put  up  in  all  public  places.  A protest 
against  the  monarchy  by  Liang  Chi-chao,  one  of  the 
chief  Republican  leaders,  involved  him,  as  he  himself 
admitted,  ‘ in  serious  difficulties,  exposing  his  life  to 
grave  dangers.’  Now,  however,  all  this  is  changed. 
The  republic  has  been  re-established.  Parliament  hav- 
ing been  in  session  over  seven  months:  Yuan  Shih-kai 
is  dead,  and  President  Li  Yuan-hung  is  at  the  head  of 
the  Government;  the. draft  constitution  for  the  republic 
has  passed  the  first  reading,  with  its  articles  guaran- 
teeing freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  of  worship; 
Liang  Chi-chao  himself  has  visited  Peking  where  he 
was  honoured  as  few  Chinese  have  been  honoured  by 
their  countrymen.  A concrete  illustration  of  the  com- 
parative strength  of  Yuan  Shih-kai’s  government  and 


50 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


the  present  one  is  afforded  by  the  situation  in  this 
city  of  Hangchow,  the  capital  of  Chekang  Province. 
Ten  months  ago  following  the  lead  of  Yunnan,  Kwei- 
chow, and  Kuangsi,  Chekiang  revolted  against  Yuan 
Shih-kai  and  declared  itself  in  favour  of  a real  republic. 
The  Governor,  who  was  a friend  of  Yuan,  was  forced 
to  flee;  and  all  connection  with  Peking  was  severed. 
Today  as  a result  of  a minor  quarrel  among  the  Hang- 
chow officials,  the  central  Government  has  sent  down 
its  own  appointee,  Yang  Shan-teh,  as  Governor,  and 
he  has  been  accepted  by  the  people  without  disturbance. 
This  is  the  first  time  that  an  outside  representative  of 
the  central  Government  has  been  Governor  of  Che- 
kiang, and  in  the  judgment  of  experienced  foreigners, 
his  acceptance  by  the  people  is  a valuable  indication 
of  the  strength  of  the  present  government.  In  the 
words  of  Putnam  Weale,  of  Peking,  ‘ President  Li 
Yuan-hung’s  seven  months’  quiet  tenure  of  office  has 
indeed  brought  the  prospects  of  ultimate  success  much 
nearer  than  it  was  at  any  time  under  Yuan  Shih-kai’s 
so-called  iron  rule,  proving  conclusively  that  in  civil- 
ized communities,  reason  has  many  times  the  value  of 
that  disruptive  and  criminal  agency, — force.’ 

“ The  whole  political  situation,  marking  the  emer- 
gence of  China  from  the  realm  of  mediaeval,  autocratic 


CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT  5 1 

government  into  that  of  modern,  representative  govern- 
ment, is  a drama  of  intense  interest.  The  Chinese  are 
passing  through  the  same  stages  in  political  philosophy 
that  America  and  France  and  other  democratic  nations 
have  traversed.  They  are  settling  now  their  “ Magna 
Charta  ” and  their  “ Bill  of  Rights.”  The  discussion 
of  the  constitution  was  begun  on  September  15,  with 
C.  T.  Wang,  whom  I knew  at  Yale,  now  the  Vice 
President  of  the  Senate,  as  Chairman  of  the  Prelim- 
inary Examination  meetings.  The  first  reading  was 
finished  and  a report  made  on  January  19th.  The 
eleven  original  chapters  and  several  additional  ones 
were  discussed.  The  chapters  concerning  the  “ form 
of  State,”  that  of  a republic;  the  rights  of  citizens, 
including  freedom  of  speech,  and  freedom  of  worship; 
the  two-house  system  of  parliament ; the  appointment 
of  a Premier  and  Cabinet;  the  organization  of  law 
courts;  were  all  passed  by  the  necessary  three-quarter 
vote  of  the  quorum  made  up  of  two-thirds  member- 
ship of  the  two  houses.” 

There  were  three  subjects  which  aroused  special 
discussion  at  the  Capital.  They  were  the  budget, 
local  self-government  and  State  religion.  The  matter 
of  finance  was  always  a trying  one,  as  China  had  to 
rely  largely  on  foreign  loans.  The  money  advanced 


52 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


by  America  was  generally  welcomed,  and  the  announce- 
ment that  America  intended  to  encourage  investment 
in  China  was  greeted  with  satisfaction. 

The  provincial  self-government  bill  was  passed  in 
the  first  reading  January  loth  after  much  discussion, 
and  the  President  issued  a mandate  supporting  it. 
He  said  in  part : 

‘‘  In  the  olden  days  the  district  and  prefect  system 
formed  the  beginning  of  an  excellent  system  of  gov- 
ernment, and  the  services  of  the  village  elders  and 
district  councillors  were  reported  as  valuable  aids  to 
good  administration.  The  spirit  of  self-government 
had  therefore  already  been  developed  in  ancient  times. 
. . . In  the  Tsing  Dynasty  a beginning  was  made 
in  self-government,  and  a system  far  from  complete 
and  satisfactory  was  set  up.  When  the  republic  was 
formed  the  work  was  continued  . . . and  at  this 
time  of  general  reform,  when  it  is  necessary  to  build 
up  a strong  foundation  of  democratic  administration, 
we  should  draw  up  a suitable  system,  and  enforce  the 
same  within  a definite  time  limit.  ...  By  such  a 
system  we  may  reach  the  stage  of  universal  peace. 
This  is  my  ambitious  hope.” 

The  question  of  a state  religion  was  brought  up  in 
connection  with  Chapter  Three  of  the  Constitution, 
guaranteeing  religious  liberty  for  all.  An  article  of 


CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT  53 

that  chapter  stated  that  the  Confucian  ethics  should 
be  used  as  a basis  in  primary  education.  A move- 
ment was  started  among  the  older,  conservative  mem- 
bers of  Parliament  to  have  Confucianism  as  a state 
religion,  but  of  the  twenty  “ parties  ” or  groups  in 
Parliament,  a canvass  revealed  that  only  four  supported 
this  measure,  although  most  of  them  favoured  an 
emphasis  upon  Confucian  ethics  in  the  school  system. 
During  the  first  week  of  February  the  discussion  was 
most  lively  while  this  article  was  undergoing  a second 
reading.  Various  arguments  were  advanced  on  either 
side,  several  of  them  sounding  rather  strange  in  the 
ears  of  foreigners.  Some  of  the  points  in  favour  of 
Confucianism  were:  (i)  The  great  influence  of  Con- 

fucius in  China  in  the  past  and  present ; (2)  the  foreign- 
mission  schools  teach  the  “ Four  Books  ” of  Confu- 
cius; (3)  most  of  the  Western  Nations  have  discarded 
Christianity;  and  China  should  not  seek  to  pick  it  up. 
Against  the  measure  : ( i ) Confucius  was  a teacher 

of  ethics,  not  religion;  (2)  his  teaching  has  more  to  do 
with  the  sovereign  than  the  people,  and  is  not  fitting 
for  a republic;  (3)  a state  religion  was  not  republican; 
(4)  such  a measure  would  conflict  with  the  chapter  on 
religious  freedom.  Finally,  on  February  9th  it  was 
voted  to  cease  discussion,  and  five  different  amend- 
ments advocating  a state  religion  were  defeated.  The 


54 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Peking  Ga::ette,  edited  by  a young  progressive  Chinese, 
commented  thus  upon  the  meeting: 

''  Yesterday’s  meeting  of  the  Conference  on  Con- 
stitution was  historic  for  the  reason  that  the  question 
whether  the  Republic  of  China  shall  create  a prec- 
edent, in  the  history  of  Republicanism  by  making  one 
of  the  many  religions,  if  Confucianism  can  be  called 
a religion,  the  State  religion  of  the  country,  was 
settled  after  a long  and  serious  struggle.  The  Con- 
fucianists  resorted  to  every  possible  means  to  win  but 
the  odds  against  them  were  too  strong.  The  question 
of  freedom  of  religious  belief  is  by  no  means  settled 
but  the  attempt  to  give  the  Republic  a State  religion 
has  been  definitely  defeated.” 

A few  quotations  from  the  native  press  of  the  coun- 
try will  reveal  the  spirit  of  the  people  at  that  time.  It 
should  be  remembered  that  a year  before  practically  no 
expression  of  public  opinion  was  allowed. 

On  January  12th  the  Min-Kwo-hsin-pao  spoke  as 
follows : 

^'  Coming  as  we  do  in  sight  of  the  sacred  instru- 
ment of  Government  which  is  to  protect  us  from 
tyranny  and  misrule  and  assure  to  us  the  blessings  of 
liberty  and  democracy,  it  is  fitting  that  we  recall  the 
bloodshed  and  tribulations  through  which  we  have 
triumphed  over  monarchy  and  autocracy.  . . . The 


Copyright  by  Underwood  & Underwood,  N.  Y. 
Li  Yuan-hung,  Second  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic. 


A 


I 


CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT 


55 


mere  possession  of  a Constitution  is  one  thing,  and 
its  enjoyment  is  another.  We  care  for  no  hollow 
Constitution,  but  we  are  willing  to  die  for  a Consti- 
tution that  is  a reality.  We  know  the  spirit  of  our 
people,  so  ‘Ten  Thousand  Years  ’ to  our  Constitu- 
tion.” On  January  17th  the  Kung-min-pao  expressed 
itself  thus : “ We  have  a Republic  but  not  a demo- 

cracy. The  Republic  was  established  by  the  revolu- 
tion of  1911.  But  Democracy  is  still  in  the  making. 
By  wresting  from  the  Monarchy  our  form  of  govern- 
ment, half  of  the  battle  was  won;  and  now  we  have 
to  bend  our  energy  to  training  our  people  in  demo- 
cracy.” 

On  January  27th  the  Peking  Jih-pao  emphasized  the 
need  of  moral  strength  back  of  all  political  changes 
— its  message  was  a thoughtful  and  valuable  one  at 
that  time : 

“ Signs  of  progress  in  the  country  are  not  lacking. 
Intellectually  the  people  have  taken  a leap  forward. 
The  idea  of  democracy  and  general  knowledge  of 
modern  learning  are  gradually  being  spread  among  the 
people.  This  is  a hopeful  sign.  But  knowledge  with- 
out moral  backbone  is  worse  than  ignorance.  The 
morality  of  our  people,  we  are  sorry  to  say,  has  not 
kept  pace  with  their  advance  in  knowledge.  We  are 
in  the  same  predicament  as  France  was  immediately 


56  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

after  her  great  revolution.  The  people  have  cut  adrift 
from  old  traditions,  but  have  not  assimilated  new  ideas 
and  principles  rapidly  enough  to  supply  the  resulting 
moral  vacuum.  We  can  say  without  fearing  challenge 
that  the  morality  of  the  people  is  everything  in  the 
life  of  a nation.  While  we  may  be  busy  instituting 
reforms  and  improving  the  minds  of  the  people,  we 
must  not  for  a minute  lose  sight  of  this  signal  fact 
— the  soul  of  the  nation.” 

In  conclusion,  the  opinions  of  two  foreigners,  one 
an  Englishman,  the  other  an  American,  concerning 
the  situation  as  it  then  appeared,  are  worthy  of  quota- 
tion. The  first  is  Mr.  Putnam  Weak,  for  many  years 
a correspondent  in  Peking,  and  author  of  several  stand- 
ard books  on  the  Far  East.  On  January  i6th,  he 
wrote  in  the  Peking  Ga::ette  as  follows : 

“ The  conviction  which  the  writer  has  consistently 
cherished,  that  the  situation  in  this  country  is  as  good 
as  could  possibly  be  expected  — and  gives  reasonable 
promise  of  peaceful  development  in  the  future  — seems 
based  on  sound  premises.  . . . The  Chinese  as  a 
people  are  temperamentally  suited  to  representative 
government;  they  are  reasonable,  tactful,  conciliatory 
and  humorous;  four  saving  graces  which  will  carry 
them  very  far  along  the  road  to  political  success.  Like 
a solid  piece  of  iron  which  binds  the  nation  together 


CHINESE  REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT 


57 


is  its  immense,  majestic,  abiding  common-sense.” 

At  a recent  dinner  in  Shanghai  given  by  the  Ameri- 
can Consul  General,  which  was  attended  by  prominent 
Chinese  and  Americans,  the  Honourable  Victor  Mur- 
doch spoke  as  follows : 

“ The  Republic  is  here  to  stay  in  China ; the  same 
brand  of  democracy  which  has  built  up  the  United 
States  can  build  up  China.  ...  I have  observed  a 
great  deal  of  this  spirit  while  I have  been  here  in 
China.  . . . Here  is  a wonderful  people,  industrious 
beyond  any  other  people,  sober  beyond  others,  good- 
humoured,  and  law-abiding.  ...  No  one  can  reach 
the  limits  of  China.  China  is  the  place  of  the  future. 
I have  been  impressed  by  everything  I have  seen  in 
this  country,  with  its  promise  of  future  development, 
but  one  thought  that  lingers  longest  in  my  mind  is 
this : China’s  future  development  and  prosperity  lie 

in  her  form  of  government.  It  must  be  a republic 
to  obtain  results.  What  the  old  flag  has  done  for 
America,  the  Chinese  flag  can  do  for  the  Chinese  peo- 
ple. It  is  a banner  of  no  dynasty  but  a people’s  flag, 
and  people  who  are  industrious  and  sober  and  self- 
governing,  can  endure  for  ever  — and  so  can  the 
United  States  and  China.” 

This  was  the  situation  in  China  when  the  announce- 
ment of  Germany’s  unrestricted  submarine  warfare 


58  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

was  made  to  the  World.  That  policy  irrevocably 
changed  the  course  of  the  Nations,  and  brought  the 
American  Republic  to  the  brink  of  war;  the  great  Re- 
public in  the  Orient  was  not  -to  escape  similar  effects. 


CHAPTER  IV 


CHINA’S  SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 
WITH  THE  CENTRAL  POWERS 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  as  has  been 
related,  China  declared  its  neutrality,  and  bent  all  its 
energies  to  the  building  up  of  its  newly-founded  repub- 
lic. But  before  the  middle  of  the  third  year  of  the 
war  had  passed,  it  became  apparent  that  the  Republic 
must  take  some  stand  in  relation  to  the  issues  of  the 
great  struggle.  Four  conditiops^  influenced  it  in  this 
regard.  The  Republic  seemed  at  last  to  be  making 
headway  toward  stability  and  permanence,  and  with 
the  new  national  consciousness  came  a clearer  reali- 
zation of  the  principles  at  stake  in  the  war.  Secondly, 
China  desired  a place  at  the  Peace  Conference  which 
would  settle  the  question  of  the  disposal  of  Kiaochow 
and  the  German  interests  in  Shantung  and,  as  she 
hoped,  would  review  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  In 
1905  in  the  Portsmouth  Treaty,  Japan  had  negotiated 
directly  with  Russia  concerning  Manchuria,  although  it 
was  a province  of  China,  and  China  was  not  admitted 
until  the  final  decisions  were  reached.  This  was  a 

59 


i 


6o 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


precedent  which  China  could  not  afford  to  see  repeated 
in  Shantung,  if  she  were  to  continue  as  a sovereign 
state;  and  so  she  was  ready  to  make  any  effort  tc 
gain  a voice  in  the  eventual  international  conference 
In  the  third  place,  America  seemed  to  be  more  and 
more  turning  toward  some  sort  of  active  participation 
in  the  conflict,  and  China  desired  to  keep  its  foreign 
policy  close  in  accord  with  that  of  the  nation  which 
it  regarded  as  its  best  friend.  Finally,  two  incidents 
in  its  foreign  relations  in  the  latter  part  of  1917  had 
aroused  China  afresh  to  a consciousness  of  its  weak- 
ness and  its  lack  of  international  standing.  These 
two  events  were  the  Chengchiatun  dispute  with  Japan 
in  Manchuria,  and  the  Lao-hsi-kai  incident  in  Tientsin 
with  the  French  Government. 

Chengchiatun  was  a Manchurian  market-town  sit- 
uated near  the  Mongolian  border.  It  was  of  some 
importance  as  a trade  centre  and  had  been  menaced 
by  one  of  the  Mongol  brigands  at  the  time  of  the 
Manchu  restoration.  The  Twenty-eighth  Division  of 
the  Chinese  army  had  been  stationed  there  to  protect 
the  town  and  preserve  order.  In  August  a detach- 
ment of  Japanese  troops  was  sent  there  to  carry  out 
manoeuvres.  Their  presence  in  that  portion  of  Man- 
churia could  be  justified  only  by  a most  liberal  inter- 
pretation of  Japanese  treaty-rights.  On  August  13, 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 


6l 


a dispute  arose  between  a Japanese  merchant  named 
Yoshimoto  and  a Chinese  fish-pedlar;  the  Japanese 
attempted  to  punish  the  pedlar;  a Chinese  soldier 
interfered ; other  soldiers  of  both  nationalities  came  up ; 
and  a melee  resulted,  in  which  several  Japanese  and 
Chinese  were  wounded  and  killed.  Exaggerated  re- 
ports were  published  in  the  Japanese  press  and  its 
Government  at  once  took  up  the  matter  and  demanded 
a series  of  privileges  and  concessions  in  that  region 
and  the  neighbouring  territor}\  The  first  demands 
were : 

1.  Punishment  of  the  General  commanding  the 
Twenty-eighth  Division. 

2.  The  dismissal  of  officers  at  Chengchiatun  respon- 
sible for  the  occurrence  as  well  as  the  severe  punish- 
ment of  those  who  took  direct  part  in  the  fracas. 

3.  Proclamations  to  be  posted  ordering  all  Chinese 
soldiers  and  civilians  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  IMongolia  to  refrain  from  any  act  calculated  to 
provoke  a breach  of  the  peace  with  Japanese  soldiers 
or  civilians. 

4.  China  to  agree  to  the  stationing  of  Japanese 
police  officers  in  places  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  where  their  presence  was  con- 
sidered necessary  for  the  protection  of  Japanese  sub- 
jects. China  also  to  agree  to  the  engagement  by  the 


62 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


officials  of  South  Manchuria  of  Japanese  police  ad- 
visers. 

And  in  addition: 

1.  Chinese  troops  stationed  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  to  employ  a certain  number 
of  Japanese  military  officers  as  advisers. 

2.  Chinese  military  cadet  schools  to  employ  a cer- 
tain number  of  Japanese  military  officers  as  instruc- 
tors. 

3.  The  Military  Governor  of  Mukden  to  proceed 
personally  to  Port  Arthur  to  the  Japanese  Military 
Governor  of  Kwantung  to  apologize  for  the  occur- 
rence and  to  tender  similar  personal  apologies  to  the 
Japanese  Consul  General  in  Mukden. 

4.  Adequate  compensation  to  be  paid  by  China  to 
the  Japanese  sufferers  and  to  the  families  of  those 
killed. 

These  privileges  if  granted  would  have  paved  the 
way  for  a Japanese  Protectorate  over  Southern  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Mongolia.  Negotiations  continued 
during  the  fall  and  final  agreement  was  reached  on 
the  five  following  terms: 

1.  The  General  commanding  the  Twenty-eighth  Di- 
vision to  be  reprimanded. 

2.  Officers  responsible  to  be  punished  according  to 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  63 

law.  If  the  law  provides  for  severe  punishment,  such 
punishment  will  be  inflicted. 

3.  Proclamations  to  be  issued  enjoining  Chinese 
soldiers  and  civilians  in  the  districts  where  there  is 
mixed  residence  to  accord  considerate  treatment  to 
Japanese  soldiers  and  civilians. 

4.  The  Military  Governor  of  Mukden  to  send  a 
representative  to  Port  Arthur  to  convey  his  regret 
when  the  Military  Governor  of  Kwantung  and 
Japanese  Consul  General  at  Mukden  are  there  to- 
gether. 

5.  A solatium  of  $500  (Five  Hundred  Dollars)  to 
be  given  to  the  Japanese  merchant  Yoshimoto. 

This  settlement  was  generally  satisfactory  to  the 
Chinese;  but  the  original  demands  had  caused  them 
much  anxiety,  and  impressed  upon  them  the  necessity 
of  securing  a better  understanding  of  their  rights  as 
a sovereign  power. 

The  Lao-hsi-kai  incident  with  France  was  of  less 
importance.  The  French  Consular  authorities  of 
Tientsin  desired  to  have  their  concession  extended  and 
had  been  negotiating  with  the  Chinese  Government 
for  additional  space.  The  negotiations  had  dragged 
on  for  some  years  and  a final  agreement  had  been 
practically  reached  concerning  this  additional  grant  of 


64  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

land  which  was  to  be  put  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a 
joint  Franco-Chinese  Administration.  Some  addi- 
tional opposition  was  raised  by  the  Chinese,  and  finally 
the  French  Consul-General  sent  an  ultimatum  demand- 
ing that  the  Chinese  police  be  removed  and  the  addi- 
tional territory  be  placed  under  French  supervision 
and  control.  The  time-limit  of  the  ultimatum  having 
expired,  a French  detachment  of  soldiers  took  posses- 
sion of  the  property;  the  Chinese  policemen  were  re- 
moved and  imprisoned;  and  French  sentries  were  sta- 
tioned along  the  boundary.  Protests  arose  from  the 
Chinese  of  the  city  and  of  North  China;  the  native 
servants  and  employes  of  the  French  Concession  left  in 
a body.  The  arrested  Chinese  police  were  ultimately 
released  but  no  immediate  settlement  was  reached  con- 
cerning the  matter  in  question.  The  incident  could 
easily  have  been  averted  and  was  not  of  great  im- 
portance, except  as  it  was  used  by  German  propa- 
gandists, but  it  served  to  increase  China’s  desire  to 
be  treated  as  an  equal  by  the  European  Powers. 

For  the  reasons  cited,  the  country  was  ready  in  the 
fall  of  1916  to  step  out  into  a more  active  participa- 
tion in  the  world’s  events,  and  when  President  Wilson 
sent  out  his  peace  inquiry  of  December  19,  1916, 
China  answered  at  once,  expressing  its  willingness  to 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  65 

join  in  the  international  effort  to  eradicate  wars  of 
aggression;  “to  assure  the  respect  of  the  principle 
of  the  equality  of  nations,  whatever  their  power  may 
be,  and  to  relieve  them  of  the  peril  of  wrong  and  vio- 
lence.” The  note  of  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  American  Minister  at  Peking  was  as 
follows : 

“ I have  examined  with  the  care  which  the  gravity 
of  the  question  demands  the  note  concerning  peace 
which  President  Wilson  has  addressed  to  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  Allies  and  the  Central  Powers  now  at 
war  and  the  text  of  which  Your  Excellency  has  been 
good  enough  to  transmit  to  me  under  instructions  of 
your  Government. 

“ China,  a nation  traditionally  pacific,  has  recently 
again  manifested  her  sentiments  in  concluding  treaties 
concerning  the  pacific  settlement  of  international  dis- 
putes, responding  thus  to  the  voeux  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference held  at  The  Hague. 

“ On  the  other  hand,  the  present  war,  by  its  pro- 
longation, has  seriously  affected  the  interests  of  China, 
more  so  perhaps  than  those  of  other  Powers  which 
have  remained  neutral.  She  is  at  present  at  a time 
of  reorganization  which  demands  economically  and 
industrially  the  co-operation  of  foreign  countries,  a 


66 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


co-operation  which  a large  number  of  them  are  unable 
to  accord  on  account  of  the  war  in  which  they  are 
engaged. 

“ In  manifesting  her  sympathy  for  the  spirit  of 
the  President's  Note,  having  in  view  the  ending  as 
soon  as  possible  of  the  hostilities,  China  is  but  acting 
in  conformity  not  only  with  her  interests  but  also 
with  her  profound  sentiments. 

“ On  account  of  the  extent  which  modern  wars  are 
apt  to  assume  and  the  repercussions  which  they  bring 
about,  their  effects  are  no  longer  limited  to  belligerent 
States.  All  countries  are  interested  in  seeing  wars 
becoming  as  rare  as  possible.  Consequently  China 
cannot  but  show  satisfaction  with  the  views  of  the 
Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  of  Am- 
erica who  declare  themselves  ready,  and  even  eager, 
to  co-operate  when  the  war  is  over,  by  all  proper  means 
to  assure  the  respect  of  the  principle  of  the  equality 
of  nations,  whatever  their  power  may  be,  and  to  re- 
lieve them  of  the  peril  of  wrong  and  violence.  China 
is  ready  to  join  her  efforts  with  theirs  for  the  attain- 
ment of  such  results  which  can  only  be  obtained 
through  the  help  of  all." 

Thus  China  was  ready  to  act,  when  the  German 
Government  threw  down  the  challenge  to  the  civilized 
world  by  its  declaration  of  unlimited  submarine  war- 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  67 

fare.  America  severed  diplomatic  relations,  and  on 
February  4th  sent  a note  to  China,  as  to  all  neutrals, 
suggesting  that  they  follow  its  example.  In  less  than 
a week  the  Chinese  Republic  actually  took  this  step. 
Writing  from  China  on  February  i6th,  the  author 
described  the  decision  as  follows : 

Hangchow,  China,  February  i6. 

“ The  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
America  and  Germany  has  had  far-reaching  effects  in 
China.  I was  in  Shanghai  when  the  news  came  and 
the  city,  in  which  there  are  over  20,000  foreigners, 
including  1000  Germans,  was  greatly  stirred.  Crowds 
gathered  around  the  bulletin  boards,  just  as  they  did 
in  Europe  during  the  first  days  of  August,  1914.  The 
English  and  Erench  were  openly  elated;  the  Germans 
were  correspondingly  depressed ; and  the  Chinese 
appeared  in  doubt  as  to  their  action  in  this  crisis.  The 
American  gunboats  and  cruisers  in  the  harbour  were 
loading  supplies  and  coaling,  in  preparation  for  de- 
parture in  case  a declaration  of  war  necessitated  such 
action. 

“ The  indecision  which  at  first  marked  the  action 
of  the  Chinese  and  their  government,  has  been  cast 
aside  by  the  decision  of  the  government  on  Eebruary 
9,  when  it  boldly  followed  the  course  of  America  by 


68 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


sending  a similar  declaration  to  Germany.  This  ac- 
tion has  been  greeted  on  all  sides  as  a sign  of  the 
virility  of  the  present  republican  government,  and  the 
first  step  in  modern  participation  in  world  affairs. 

“ After  America  severed  relations  with  Germany 
there  was  serious  discussion  at  Peking  of  China's 
future  action.  The  younger  element  in  the  govern- 
ment were  eager  to  follow  America’s  example;  the 
older,  more  conseiA*ative  leaders  counselled  caution  and 
a maintenance  of  neutrality.  The  most  experienced 
statesmen,  including  Liang  Chi-chao,  who  is  so  largely 
responsible  for  the  present  Republican  government, 
were  summoned  to  the  capitol  for  conference.  Fi- 
nally, after  an  all-day  meeting  on  February  9,  decisive 
action  was  agreed  upon,  and  notes  were  sent  to  Ger- 
many and  to  America.  The  note  to  Germany  follows  : 

“ " A telegraphic  communication  has  been  received 
from  the  Chinese  minister  at  Berlin  transmitting  a 
note  from  the  German  government  dated  February  i, 
1917,  which  makes  known  that  the  measures  of 
blockade  newly  adopted  by  the  government  of  Ger- 
many will,  from  that  day,  endanger  neutral  merchant 
vessels  navigating  in  certain  prescribed  zones. 

“ ‘ The  new  measures  of  submarine  warfare  in- 
augurated by  Germany,  imperiling  the  lives  and 
property  of  Chinese  citizens  to  even  a greater  extent 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  69 

than  the  measures  previously  taken  which  have  already 
cost  so  many  human  lives  to  China,  constitute  a vio- 
lation of  the  principles  of  public  international  law  at 
present  in  force;  the  tolerance  of  their  application 
would  have  as  a result  the  introduction  into  interna- 
tional law  of  arbitrary  principles  incompatible  with 
even  legitimate  commercial  intercourse  between  neutral 
states  and  belligerent  powers. 

“ ‘ The  Chinese  government,  therefore,  protests  en- 
ergetically to  the  imperial  German  government  against 
measures  proclaimed  on  February  i,  and  sincerely 
hopes  that  with  a view  to  respecting  the  rights  of 
neutral  states  and  to  maintaining  the  friendly  rela- 
tions between  these  two  countries,  the  said  measures 
will  not  be  carried  out. 

‘‘  ‘ In  case  contrary  to  its  expectations  its  protest  be 
ineffectual  the  government  of  the  Chinese  republic  will 
be  constrained  to  its  profound  regret,  to  sever  diploma- 
tic relations  at  present  existing  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. It  is  unnecessary  to  add  that  the  attitude  of 
the  Chinese  government  has  been  dictated  purely  by 
the  desire  to  further  the  cause  of  the  world’s  peace 
and  by  the  maintenance  of  the  sanctity  of  international 
law.’ 

“ On  the  same  day  China,  through  its  Foreign  Min- 
ister, sent  the  following  note  to  the  American  Minister 


70 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


in  Peking  for  transmission  to  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment : 

‘‘  ‘ I have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  excellency’s  note  of  the  4th  of  February,  1917, 
informing  me  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  view  of  the  adoption  by  the 
German  government  of  its  new  policy  of  submarine 
warfare  on  February  ist,  has  decided  to  take  certain 
action  which  it  judges  necessary  as  regards  Germany. 

“ ‘ The  Chinese  government,  like  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  is  reluctant  to  believe  that 
the  German  government  will  actually  carry  into  excu- 
tion  those  measures  which  imperil  the  lives  and 
property  of  citizens  of  neutral  states  and  jeopardize 
the  commerce,  even  legitimate,  between  neutrals  as 
well  as  between  neutrals  and  belligerents  and  which 
tend,  if  allowed  to  be  enforced  without  opposition, 
to  introduce  a new  principle  into  public  international 
law. 

“ ‘ The  Chinese  government  also  proposes  to  take 
such  action  in  the  future  as  will  be  deemed  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  principles  of  international 
law.’ 

“ The  China  Press,  an  American  newspaper  of 
Shanghai,  comments  thus  upon  this  action : 

“ ‘ The  note  of  warning  to  Germany  marks  a bold 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 


71 


and  heroic  departure  from  historic  precedent  for  China. 
It  shows  that  things  are  moving  in  the  republic,  and 
moving  rapidly,  and  we  believe  that  it  will  be  fully 
justified  by  events.’  In  commenting  on  the  action,  the 
Peking  Ga.'^ette,  a native  paper,  says  that  ‘ The  decision 
arrived  at  is  in  every  sense  a victory  of  the  younger 
intellectual  forces  over  the  older  mandarinate,  whose 
traditions  of  laissez  faire  and  spineless  diplomacy  have 
hitherto  cost  China  so  much.’ 

“ These  sentiments  are  re-echoed  in  various  other 
native  papers  that  decry  ‘ Prussian  militarism  ’ — and 
advise  China’s  following  America’s  action.  The  rea- 
sons underlying  the  decision  are  expressed  fairly  well 
by  the  Kim  Yuan  Fao  in  an  editorial  which  appeared 
under  the  headline  ‘ Now  or  Never,’  the  day  before 
the  government  acted : 

“ ‘ This  is  the  time  for  action.  We  must  range  our- 
selves on  the  side  of  justice,  of  humanity  and  of  inter- 
national law.  We  must  also  win  a place  for  our- 
selves, friends,  in  the  council  of  nations  by  prompt 
and  decisive  action.  Now,  Germany’s  submarine 
policy  and  the  United  States’  resolute  stand  against 
lawlessness  and  wholesale  atrocity  have  given  us  the 
opportunity. 

“ ' Germany’s  submarine  policy  is  a challenge  to  the 
world.  America  has  accepted  the  challenge.  Shall 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


we  do  Otherwise?  If  we  have  a particle  of  respect  for 
ourselves,  the  way  pointed  out  by  the  United  States 
is  the  road  to  honour  and  self-respect. 

“ ‘ Then,  is  it  not  altogether  unprofitable  to  join  the 
allies  if  we  consider  the  question  only  from  a national 
point  of  view?  In  the  present  state  of  the  world, 
it  is  impossible  for  any  nation  to  stand  alone.  We 
must  have  allies,  if  not  so  sanctified  in  treaties,  yet  in 
a mutual  bond  of  sympathy.  This  is  the  best  oppor- 
tunity for  us  to  win  friends  among  the  powers. 
Possibly  we  will  have  only  a little  say  in  the  peace 
conference,  but  since  we  have  been  willing  to  help 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia  and  the  United  States, 
our  appeal  will  not  be  unheeded  when  we  should  be  in 
difficulties.  Although  we  have  been  observing  the 
strictest  neutrality  in  the  war,  there  are  many  questions 
at  the  peace  conference  which  will  touch  us  vitally. 
There  is,  for  instance,  the  question  of  Tsingtao  to 
settle,  and  the  Japanese  actions  in  Manchuria  and 
in  connection  with  the  Twenty-one  demands  will  have 
to  be  brought  up  in  review.  Cultivate  friendship 
when  our  friends  are  in  need,  and  not  when  they  are 
above  wants.  Now  or  never  must  we  show  the  world 
that  this  is  a nation  which  is  not  always  on  the  sick 
list,  but  living,  pulsating  and  with  a fighting  spirit.’  ” 

After  the  sending  of  the  Chinese  note  to  Germany 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 


73 


nothing  was  heard  from  that  quarter  for  several  weeks. 
Then  came  the  torpedoing  of  the  French  ship,  Atlas, 
on  which  were  over  five  hundred  Chinese  labourers. 
The  Cabinet  was  in  favour  of  breaking  off  relations, 
and  on  March  loth  the  question  was  sent  to  Parlia- 
ment for  decision.  The  Lower  House  upheld  the 
Cabinet  decision  and  the  next  day  the  Senate  did  the 
same. 

The  long-awaited  German  answer  arrived  on  the 
day  the  Lower  House  voted.  In  part  it  was  as  fol- 
lows : 

The  Imperial  German  Government  expresses  its 
great  surprise  at  the  action  threatened  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  China  in  its  note  of  protest. 
Many  other  countries  have  also  protested,  but  China, 
which  has  been  in  friendly  relations  with  Germany, 
is  the  only  State  which  has  added  a threat  to  its  pro- 
test. 

. . . “ Germany’s  enemies  were  the  first  to  declare 
a blockade  on  Germany  and  the  same  is  being  per- 
sistently carried  out.  It  is  therefore  difficult  for  Ger- 
many to  cancel  her  blockade  policy.  The  Imperial 
Government  is  nevertheless  willing  to  comply  with 
the  wishes  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
China  by  opening  negotiations  to  arrive  at  a plan  for 
the  protection  of  Chinese  life  and  property,  with  the 


74  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

view  that  the  end  may  be  achieved  and  thereby  the 
utmost  regard  be  given  to  the  shipping  rights  of  China. 
The  reason  which  has  prompted  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  adopt  this  conciliatory  policy  is  the  knowledge 
that,  once  diplomatic  relations  are  severed  with  Ger- 
many, China  will  not  only  lose  a truly  good  friend 
but  will  also  be  entangled  in  unthinkable  difficulties.” 

This  note  arrived  too  late  to  have  any  effect  on 
Parliament,  which  upheld  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet 
as  indicated. 

The  mildness  of  Germany’s  note  of  March  loth  was 
rather  a surprise  to  the  inhabitants  of  China,  who  re- 
membered the  seizure  of  Tsingtao  in  1898,  and  other 
actions  in  Shantung  as  the  result  of  the  murder  of 
two  German  missionaries;  and  the  ruthlessness  of  the 
German  troops  at  the  time  of  the  Boxer  uprising. 
A leading  Chinese  lawyer  commented  on  the  change 
of  attitude,  his  remarks  being  an  indication  of  the 
new  position  won  by  China  in  world-politics: 

“ The  troops  under  Count  Waldersee,  leaving  Ger- 
many for  the  relief  of  Peking,  were  instructed  by 
the  War  Lord  to  grant  no  quarter  to  the  Chinese  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  were  to  be  so  disciplined 
that  they  would  never  dare  look  a German  in  the 
face  again. ^ The  whirligig  of  time  brings  in  its 

1 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  armies  under  Attila  were 


SEVERANCE  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  75 

own  revenge,  and  today,  after  the  lapse  of  scarcely 
seventeen  years,  we  hear  the  V ossische  Zeitung  com- 
menting on  the  diplomatic  rupture  between  China  and 
Germany,  lamenting  that  even  so  weak  a State  as  the 
Far  Eastern  Republic  dares  look  defiantly  at  the  Ger- 
man nation ! ” 

On  March  14th  the  German  and  Austrian  Ministers 
and  their  staffs  were  handed  their  passports  and  the 
German  and  Austrian  interests  were  turned  over  to 
the  Dutch  Legation.  Thus  did  China  take  its  first 
step  toward  participation  in  the  cause  of  the  Allies. 

held  up  as  examples  for  the  German  soldiers  to  follow,  by  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  in  1900,  in  his  speech  to  the  German  troops  embarking 
for  China.  This  was  perhaps  the  first  association  of  the  term 
“Huns”  with  German  forces.  The  Kaiser’s  exact  words  were: 
“ As  soon  as  you  come  to  blows  with  the  enemy  he  will  be 
beaten.  No  mercy  will  be  shown!  No  prisoners  will  be  taken! 
As  the  Huns,  under  King  Attila,  made  a name  for  themselves, 
which  is  still  mighty  in  traditions  and  legends  to-day,  may  the 
name  of  German  be  so  fixed  in  China  by  your  deeds,  that  no 
Chinese  shall  ever  again  dare  even  to  look  at  a German  askance. 
. . . Open  the  way  for  KulHir  once  for  all.” 


CHAPTER  V 


CHINA’S  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 
AND  AUSTRIA 

On  March  14,  1917,  China  severed  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  Germany;  exactly  five  months  later,  on 
August  14th,  she  declared  war.  The  strain  of  reach- 
ing this  final  decision  shook  the  Republic  to  its  founda- 
tions, temporarily  causing  a complete  breakdown  of 
the  Central  Government,  and  indirectly  making  pos- 
sible the  brief  restoration  of  the  Manchus  which  took 
place  in  July.  But  eventually  the  Chinese  ship-of- 
state  righted  itself  and  emerged  on  the  broad  seas 
of  world-relationships  as  a recognized  member  of  the 
league  of  the  Allies. 

The  breaking  off  of  relations  with  Germany  brought 
to  light  the  state  of  discord  which  had  existed  for 
some  time  between  the  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  and 
the  President,  Li  Yuan-hung.  The  former  was  a 
military  leader  and  had  been  trained  in  the  Manchu 
type  of  government.  The  latter  was  a real  republi- 
can in  spirit  and  had  insisted  that  every  act  of  the 
State  be  carried  out  according  to  the  existing  Con- 

76 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  77 

stitution.  The  Premier  desired  to  break  off  relations 
without  consulting  Parliament;  the  President  insisted 
on  the  latter  step,  and  after  Tuan  had  threatened  to 
resign,  and  had  actually  left  the  capital  for  Tientsin, 
the  President  persuaded  him  to  return  and  to  present 
the  question  to  Parliament.  This  was  done  with  the 
result  already  indicated. 

Having  taken  two  steps,  the  next  move  was  to  de- 
clare war.  Here,  however,  appeared  many  difficulties. 
It  is  hard  for  a foreigner  to  judge  Chinese  public 
opinion,  but  after  a trip  through  the  coast  cities  into 
the  interior,  the  following  arguments  for  and  against 
the  declaration  seemed  to  the  writer  to  be  involved.^ 

The  reasons  in  favour  of  the  declaration  seemed  to 
be  four  in  number.  First,  the  intelligent  Chinese 
sympathized  deeply  with  the  cause  of  the  Allies,  espe- 
cially in  their  championing  the  rights  of  small  or  weak 
nations,  with  the  protection  of  such  countries  from 
aggression  and  the  assurance  to  them  of  the  right  to 
work  out  their  own  destinies  unafraid.  This  formula 
seemed  to  fit  the  facts  of  China’s  relationships  in  the 
Orient.  She  was  trying  to  build  up  a republic;  she 

1 An  interesting  account  of  events  in  Peking  preceding  the  war 
declaration  is  given  in  an  article  by  Carson  Chang,  Secretary 
to  the  President,  entitled  “ The  Inside  History  of  China’s  Decla- 
ration of  War,”  Millard’s  Review,  Aug.  17,  ’18. 


j8  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

had  made  many  costly  mistakes;  but  ultimate  success 
seemed  possible  if  she  could  be  protected  from  attack 
by  predatory  powers.  The  Allies  promised  such  pro- 
tection to  all  such  weak  nations,  and  China  could  not 
but  be  in  sympathy  with  their  aims. 

Secondly,  China  desired  a place  in  the  Peace  Con- 
ference which  would  be  held  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
There  were  many  questions  affecting  its  own  terri- 
tory and  rights  which  would  come  up  then,  and  China 
desired  a voice  in  their  settlement.  The  German  rights 
in  Shantung  which  seemed  likely  to  fall  to  Japan; 
the  subject  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands;  the  future 
of  the  Boxer  Indemnity;  the  principle  of  ex-terri- 
toriality and  foreign  control  of  some  of  China’s 
sovereign  rights;  all  these  and  many  other  matters 
might  be  reviewed  at  this  future  conference.  China 
wished  to  be  heard  there,  and  the  best  hope  of  securing 
a place  at  the  Council  Table  seemed  to  lie  in  joining 
the  Allies. 

China  has  always  been  influenced  by  the  United 
States;  she  trusts  American  friendship;  and  is  willing 
to  follow  its  leadership.  The  United  States  is  the 
only  great  nation  which  has  never  deprived  China 
of  any  of  its  territorial  possessions;  by  the  return  of 
the  unused  portion  of  the  Boxer  Indemnity,  she  had 
impressed  China  with  the  genuineness  of  her  friend- 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  79 

ship;  through  the  Chinese  students  who  have  gone  to 
America,  the  best  traditions  of  the  Republic  had  been 
brought  to  China.  The  Chinese  Republic  was  striv- 
ing after  American  ideals  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
and  in  shaping  its  international  policy  it  was  ready  to 
listen  to  America’s  voice.  Morever,  the  American 
Minister  at  Peking,  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  had  a wide 
influence  among  Chinese  officials.^  Thus,  when  the 
United  States  severed  relations  with  Germany,  China 
at  once  followed  suit;  when  America  declared  war 
in  April,  the  Chinese  leaders  were  ready  to  do  the 
same,  and  were  delayed  only  by  the  internal  situation 
which  at  once  arose. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  joining  of  the  Allies  seemed 
to  promise  to  the  party  in  power  which  made  this  de- 
cision, considerable  advantages  in  strength  and  pres- 
tige, and  the  Chinese  politicians  were  not  slow  to 
grasp  this  fact. 

An  example  of  the  reasoning  of  those  in  favour 
of  a declaration  of  war  was  that  of  the  scholar  Liang 
Chi-chao,  whose  services  to  the  Republic  have  already 
been  mentioned. 

1 The  personal  influence  of  the  American  Minister  and  his 
associates  at  Peking,  throughout  all  the  negotiations  leading 
up  finally  to  a declaration  of  war,  was  one  of  the  strongest  fac- 
tors in  inducing  China  to  join  the  Allies. 


8o 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


“ The  peace  of  the  Far  East  was  broken  by  the 
occupation  of  Kiaochow  by  Germany.  This  event 
marked  the  first  step  of  the  German  disregard  for 
international  law.  In  the  interests  of  humanity  and 
for  the  sake  of  what  China  has  passed  through,  she 
should  rise  and  punish  such  a country,  that  dared  to 
disregard  international  law.  Such  a reason  for  war 
is  certainly  beyond  criticism. 

. . . "‘  Some  say  that  China  should  not  declare  war 
on  Germany  until  we  have  come  to  a definite  under- 
standing with  the  Entente  Allies  respecting  certain 
terms.  This  is  indeed  a wrong  conception  of  things. 
We  declare  war  because  we  want  to  fight  for  humanity, 
international  law  and  against  a national  enemy.  It 
is  not  because  we  are  partial  towards  the  Entente  or 
against  Germany  or  Austria.  International  relations 
are  not  commercial  connexions.  Why  then  should 
we  talk  about  exchange  of  privileges  and  rights?  As 
to  the  revision  of  customs  tariff,  it  has  been  our 
aspiration  for  more  than  ten  years  and  a foremost 
diplomatic  question,  for  which  we  have  been  looking 
for  a suitable  opportunity  to  negotiate  with  the  foreign 
Powers.  It  is  our  view  that  the  opportunity  has  come 
because  foreign  Powers  are  now  on  very  friendly 
terms  with  China.  It  is  distinctly  a separate  thing 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  8 1 


from  the  declaration  of  war.  Let  no  one  try  to  con- 
fuse the  two. 

. . . “ In  conclusion  I wish  to  say  that  whenever  a 
policy  is  adopted  we  should  carry  out  the  complete 
scheme.  If  we  should  hesitate  in  the  middle  and  be- 
come afraid  to  go  ahead  we  will  soon  find  ourselves 
in  an  embarrassing  position.  The  Government  and 
Parliament  should  therefore  stir  up  courage  and  boldly 
make  the  decision  and  take  the  step.” 

Opposed  to  the  four  general  reasons  given  for  par- 
ticipation on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  there  were  five 
groups  of  arguments.  The  first  was  the  difficulty 
China  had  in  reconciling  the  professed  aims  of  the 
Allies  with  its  experienced  relations  with  Japan. 
Rightly  or  wrongly,  for  the  past  twenty  years,  China 
had  stood  in  mortal  terror  of  its  island  neighbour. 
It  had  lost  to  it  Formosa,  Korea,  portions  of  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia,  Tsingtao  and  the  German  hold- 
ings in  Shantung,  and  had  just  recently  gone  through 
the  humiliation  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  The 
Allied  program  in  Europe  called  for  reparation  and 
restitution  for  international  injuries;  China  could  not 
understand  why  this  principle  should  not  be  accepted 
in  Asia,  especially  as  it  applied  to  its  relations  with 
Japan.  The  existing  Terauchi  government  professed 


82 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


to  be  friendly  to  China,  but  the  Chinese  felt  that 
such  a friendly  attitude  could  not  now  be  reciprocated, 
unless  reparation  were  made  for  the  acts  of  the  past. 
Thus  fear  of  Japan  was  an  undoubted  obstacle  to 
China’s  believing  in  the  Allied  aims  as  applied  to 
the  Orient. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Chinese  were  still  afraid 
of  Germany’s  power  and  feared  the  eventual  vengeance 
of  its  army  if  China  should  dare  to  declare  war.  Ger- 
man propaganda  had  skilfully  magnified  German 
successes  and  Allied  losses,  and  in  1917  the  average 
Chinese  believed  firmly  that  Germany  would  win  the 
war.  German  officers  had  trained  the  Chinese  army, 
as  they  had  the  Japanese  troops,  and  they  stood  for 
military  efficiency  and  power  in  the  eyes  of  the  Chinese. 

Furthermore,  Germany,  despite  its  harsh  treatment 
in  the  past,  had  energetically  and  cleverly  conducted 
a campaign  to  win  the  favour  of  the  Chinese,  sending 
out  consuls  and  diplomatic  officials  who  were  scholars 
in  Chinese  literature  and  philosophy  with  sufficient 
funds  to  entertain  Chinese  officials  as  they  like  to  be  en- 
tertained ; on  the  other  hand,  the  Allies  had  at  various 
times,  perhaps  unconsciously,  offended  the  Chinese. 
The  opium  trade, — carried  on  largely  by  citizens  of 
the  Allied  countries  in  the  foreign  settlements, — which 
followed  the  British  ‘‘  opium  war  ” and  the  seizure  of 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  83 

Hongkong  and  other  territory;  the  recent  Lao-hsi- 
kai  affair  in  Tientsin,  where  French  officials  attempted 
to  appropriate  property  which  the  Chinese  thought 
was  theirs;  the  advice  of  the  American  adviser,  Dr. 
Goodnow,  to  return  to  the  Monarchy;  the  ineffectual 
enforcement  of  the  Open  Door;  all  these  facts  tended 
to  produce  a pessimism  in  the  minds  of  the  Chinese 
regarding  idealistic  words  which  seemed  to  be  un- 
backed by  deeds.  This  pessimism  was  shared  by  many 
of  the  younger  foreign  educated  leaders  in  regard  to 
the  favourable  outcome  of  the  Conference  at  the  close 
of  the  war;  to  many  it  seemed  immaterial  whether 
or  not  China  should  have  a voice  in  the  council. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  younger  progressive  element 
of  the  republic  feared  the  new  power  which  would 
accrue  to  the  more  conservative  party  in  control  of 
the  government  at  the  time  of  the  war-decision.  They 
were  afraid  that  the  new  power  would  be  used  as 
Yuan  Shih-kai  had  used  the  financial  support  of  the 
five  Powers  in  1913,  to  restrict  and  harm  the  more 
democratic  tendencies  of  the  Republic. 

Other  factors  were  a realization  that  their  own 
military  power  was  slight,  and  a fear  of  “ losing  face  ” 
by  comparison  with  the  Allies;  the  fear  that  food 
prices  would  increase;  the  devotion  to  peace,  which 
is  deep  rooted  in  the  nation;  and  finally  the  policy 


84  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

of  proud  isolation,”  which  until  recent  years  had 
marked  all  China’s  relations  with  other  nations.  It 
was  a long  step  for  a people  ruled  for  centuries  by 
an  alien  dynasty  to  attempt  republican  self-govern- 
ment: it  was  an  almost  incredible  act  for  China  as  a 
whole  to  grasp  the  existing  world  situation  and  to 
take  its  proper  place  in  relation  to  it. 

An  illustration  of  this  general  opposition  against 
the  declaration  of  war  was  the  statement  of  Kang 
Yu-wei,  formerly  a fellow-reformer  of  Liang  Chi- 
chao.  In  it  he  said  in  part : 

. . . "‘  The  breach  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany  is  no  concern  of  ours.  But  the  Government 
suddenly  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany 
and  is  now  contemplating  entry  into  the  war.  This 
is  to  advance  beyond  the  action  of  the  United  States 
which  continues  to  observe  neutrality.  And  if  we 
analyse  the  public  opinion  of  the  country,  we  find  that 
all  peoples  — high  and  low,  well-informed  and  igno- 
rant — betray  great  alarm  when  informed  of  the  rup- 
ture and  the  proposal  to  declare  war  on  Germany, 
fearing  that  such  development  may  cause  grave  peril 
to  the  country. 

. . . "‘  Which  side  will  win  the  war  ? I shall  not 
attempt  to  predict  here.  But  it  is  undoubted  that  all 
the  arms  of  Europe  — and  the  industrial  and  financial 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  85 

strength  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  — have  proved 
unavailing  against  Germany.  On  the  other  hand, 
France  has  lost  her  Northern  provinces;  and  Belgium, 
Serbia  and  Rumania  are  blotted  off  the  map.  Should 
Germany  be  victorious,  the  whole  of  Europe  — not 
to  speak  of  a weak  country  like  China  — would  be 
in  great  peril  of  extinction.  Should  she  be  defeated, 
Germany  still  can  — after  the  conclusion  of  peace  — 
send  a fleet  to  war  against  us.  And  as  the  Powers 
will  be  afraid  of  a second  world-war,  who  will  come 
to  our  aid?  Have  we  not  seen  the  example  of  Korea? 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  army  of  righteousness 
u'hich  will  come  to  the  assistance  of  weak  nations. 
I cannot  bear  to  think  of  hearing  the  angry  voice  of 
German  guns  along  our  coasts ! ” ^ 

Such  was  the  situation  in  general,  following  the 
severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany.  Pub- 
lic opinion  seemed  about  evenly  divided,  but  never- 
theless it  seemed  fairly  certain  that  the  third  step  ” 
of  the  declaration  of  war  against  Germany  would  be 
taken  in  due  time.  Thus,  on  April  i6,  following  the 
detention  of  the  Chinese  Minister  at  Berlin,  the  Peking 
Gazette,  the  most  influential  of  the  papers  published 
by  the  Chinese,  requested  an  early  decision.  But  at 
this  point  the  Premier  thought  fit  to  summon  a council 
1 Putnam -Weale,  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,  page  334. 


86 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


of  Military  Governors  and  their  representatives  to 
hasten  the  decision  of  the  country,  and  the  ultimate 
consequences  were  disastrous. 

The  conference  met  April  25.  After  much  arguing 
and  exhorting,  the  majority  of  the  conference  were 
won  over  to  the  view  of  the  Premier.  But  signs  of 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Parliament  against  the 
Premier  and  his  supporters  began  to  develop.  There 
was  also  the  feeling  that  the  Premier  had  promised 
certain  returns  from  the  Allies,  such  as  increase  of  the 
Chinese  customs  duties,  and  relief  from  the  Boxer 
indemnity,  but  that  on  account  of  the  opposition  of 
Japan,  and  for  other  reasons,  these  returns  could  not 
be  secured. 

On  May  i,  however,  the  Cabinet  passed  the  vote 
for  war  without  asking  conditions  or  returns,  and  on 
May  7 the  President,  through  the  Cabinet,  sent  a 
formal  request  to  Parliament  to  approve  of  this  declar- 
ation. Parliament  delayed,  and  then,  on  May  10,  an 
attempt  was  made  to  force  it  into  a decision  by  a mob 
which  gathered  outside  the  National  Assembly  and 
threatened  the  members  of  both  houses.  There  seems 
to  be  little  doubt  that  some  official  of  the  Government 
had  incited  and  promised  protection  to  the  mob,  as 
it  collected  at  10  o’clock  in  the  morning,  and  was  not 
dispersed  until  ii  at  night,  when  the  report  was  cir- 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  87 

culated  that  a Japanese  journalist  had  been  killed. 
The  Peking  Gazette  openly  accused  the  Premier  of 
being  behind  the  riot.  Telegrams  from  all  parts  of 
the  country  poured  in  protesting  against  this  attempted 
coercing  of  Parliament;  all ’the  Ministers  of  Tuan's 
Cabinet  resigned,  leaving  him  standing  alone. 

On  May  i8,  the  Peking  Gazette,  edited  by  Eugene 
Chen,  a Chinese  born  and  educated  in  England  and 
a British  subject,  a brave  opponent  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 
and  the  monarchical  schemes,  and  a staunch  supporter 
of  the  republic,  published  an  article  entitled  “ Selling 
China,"  in  which  it  accused  the  Premier  of  being  will- 
ing to  conclude  with  the  Japanese  Government  an 
agreement  which  much  resembled  Group  V of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  of  1915.  That  night  Mr.  Chen 
was  arrested,  and  later,  without  any  fair  trial,  he 
was  sentenced  to  four  months’  imprisonment.  The 
case  stirred  up  much  comment,  and  finally,  as  a result 
of  the  intercession  of  C.  T.  Wang  and  others,  on 
June  4,  the  President  pardoned  him. 

Meanwhile  events  were  marching  swiftly.  The 
contest  between  militants  and  democrats  was  clearcut. 
Demands  were  made  for  Tuan’s  retirement  from  the 
Premiership;  his  military  friends  on  the  other  hand 
urged  his  remaining  in  office.  On  May  19,  the  de- 
cision was  reached  in  Parliament  that  there  was  a 


88 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


majority  for  war,  but  that  the  question  would  not  be 
decided  while  Tuan  was  Premier.  The  Military  Gov- 
ernors left  on  May  21  amid  much  speculation  and 
some  fear  as  to  their  future  action.  Before  going 
they  sent  a petition  to  the  President,  indirectly  attack- 
ing Parliament,  by  criticizing  the  Constitution  which 
it  had  practically  finished  and  asking  that  Parliament 
be  dissolved  if  the  Constitution  were  not  corrected. 
The  three  points  to  which  they  objected  were: 

1.  When  the  House  of  Representatives  passes  a 
vote  of  lack  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet  Ministers, 
the  President  shall  either  dismiss  the  Cabinet  or  dis- 
solve the  House  of  Representatives,  but  the  said  House 
must  not  be  dissolved  without  the  approval  of  the 
Senate.  (The  French  system.) 

2.  The  President  can  appoint  the  Premier  without 
the  countersignature  of  the  Cabinet  Ministers. 

3.  Any  resolution  passed  by  both  houses  shall  have 
the  same  force  as  law.” 

Obviously  these  three  points  gave  more  power  to 
the  President  and  to  Parliament  than  an  autocratic 
Premier  and  his  supporters  would  desire.  The  answer 
to  this  petition  was  an  increased  demand  for  the  re- 
tirement of  Tuan  and  the  formation  of  a new  Cabinet. 
The  Premier  refusing  to  resign  on  May  23,  the  Presi- 
dent dismissed  him  from  office.  Wu  Ting-fang  was 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  89 

appointed  acting  Premier,  and  there  was  a feeling  of 
relief.  Li  Ching-hsi,  nephew  of  Li  Hung-chang,  was 
nominated  on  May  25  for  Premier,  and  on  May  28  his 
nomination  was  passed  by  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, and  next  day  by  the  Senate.  On  May  30,  C.  T. 
Wang,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  for  Writing  the 
Permanent  Constitution,  published  a statement  saying 
that  the  second  reading  was  practically  finished  and  re- 
viewing the  chief  points  of  interest  in  the  new  docu- 
ment ready  for  promulgation. 

The  Chinese  ship  of  state  seemed  to  have  weathered 
another  of  its  many  storms.  But  suddenly  rumour 
came  from  Anhwei  that  General  Ni  Shih-chung  had 
declared  independence,  and  that  he  was  backed  by 
Chang  Hsun,  an  unlettered  “ war  lord  ” of  Anhwei, 
and  by  most  of  the  other  Northern  Generals  and  Gov- 
ernors, who,  as  Putnam  Weale  put  it,  looked  upon 
Parliament  and  any  Constitution  it  might  work  out  as 
“ damnable  Western  nonsense,  the  real,  essential,  vital, 
decisive  instrument  of  Government  in  their  eyes  being 
not  even  a responsible  Cabinet,  but  a camarilla  behind 
that 'Cabinet  which  would  typify  and  resume  all  those 
older  forces  in  the  country  belonging  to  the  empire 
and  essentially  militaristic  and  dictatorial  in  their 
character.”  This  declaration  of  revolt  was  received 
without  approval  by  the  people  of  the  country.  The 


90 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


writer  talked  with  men  from  many  sections  of  the 
country,  and  they  all  agreed  that  the  Military  Gover- 
nors had  no  definite  ideal  or  purpose,  except  their 
own  glory  and  power. 

All  waited  for  the  President  to  speak.  His  answer 
to  this  defiance  came  in  no  uncertain  tones  and  was 
received  by  patriots  with  enthusiasm.  Some  of  the 
more  important  passages  in  his  message  were: 

It  is  a great  surprise  to  me  that  high  provincial 
officials  could  have  been  misled  by  such  rumours  into 
taking  arbitrary  steps  without  considering  the  correct- 
ness or  otherwise  of  the  same.  ...  You  accuse  the 
Cabinet  of  violating  law,  yet,  with  the  assistance  of 
a military  force,  you  endeavour  to  disobey  the  orders 
of  the  Government.  The  only  goal  such  acts  can 
lead  to  is  partition  of  the  country  like  the  five  Chi 
and  making  the  country  a protectorate  like  Korea; 
in  which  case  both  restoration  of  the  monarchy  and  the 
establishment  of  the  republic  will  be  an  idle  dream. 
You  may  not  care  for  the  black  records  that  will  be 
written  against  you  in  history,  but  you  ought  certainly 
to  realize  your  own  fate.  . . . 

I am  an  old  man.  Like  the  beanstalk  under  the 
leaf  I have  always  been  watching  for  any  possibility 
of  not  seeing  and  understanding  aright.  Yea,  I walk 
day  and  night  as  if  treading  on  thin  ice.  I welcome 


I 


Copyright  by  U ndcrwood  & Underwood, 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  9 1 

all  for  giving  me  advice  and  even  admonition.  If  it 
will  benefit  the  country,  I am  ready  to  apologize. 

But  if  it  be  your  aim  to  shake  the  foundations 
of  the  country  and  provoke  internal  war,  I declare 
that  I am  not  afraid  to  die  for  the  country.  I have 
passed  through  the  fire  of  trial  and  have  exhausted 
my  strength  and  energy  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end  for  the  republic.  I have  nothing  to  be  ashamed 
of.  I will  under  no  circumstance  watch  my  country 
sink  into  perdition,  still  less  subject  myself  to  become 
a slave  to  another  race. 

“ Of  such  acts  I wash  my  hands  in  front  of  all  the 
elders  of  the  country.  These  are  sincere  words  from 
my  true  heart  and  will  be  carried  out  into  deeds. 

“ Li  Yuan-hung.” 

May  31,  1917. 

Following  the  declaration  of  independence  of  the 
northern  provinces,  most  of  the  southern  ones  declared 
their  opposition  to  this  stand.  They  were  led  by 
Yunnan,  Kweichow,  Kwantung,  and  Kwangsi,  who 
originally  opposed  the  monarchical  movement  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai  in  1916.  Some  of  the  loyal  Generals’  tele- 
grams were  hotly  worded.  From  Tang  Chi-yao,  Gov- 
ernor of  Yunnan: 

“ Chi-yao  is  unpolished  in  thoughts  and  ignorant 


92 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


of  the  ways  of  partisanship  or  factionism.  All  he 
cares  and  knows  about  is  to  protect  the  republic  and 
be  loyal  to  it.  If  any  one  should  be  daring  enough 
to  endanger  the  Chief  Executive  or  Parliament,  I vow 
I shall  not  live  with  him  under  the  same  sky.  I shall 
mount  my  steed  the  moment  order  is  received  from 
the  President  to  do  so.” 

From  a General  in  Kwantung: 

“ The  reason  why  the  rebels  have  risen  against  the 
Government  is  that  they  are  fighting  for  their  own 
posts  and  for  money.  That  is  why  their  views  are 
so  divergent  and  their  acts  so  ill-balanced.  It  is  hoped 
the  President  will  be  firm  to  the  very  last  and  give 
no  ear  either  to  threat  or  inducement.  This  is  the 
time  for  us  to  sweep  away  the  remnants  of  the  mon- 
archist curse  and  reform  the  administration.  With 
my  head  leaning  against  the  spear  I wait  for  the  order 
to  strike  and  I will  not  hesitate  even  if  I should  return 
to  my  native  place  a corpse  wrapped  up  in  horse-skin ! ” 

The  military  party  nevertheless  met  at  Tientsin  and 
elected  Hsu  Shih-chang,  Generalissimo.  But  soon 
signs  of  dissension  appeared  among  them.  On  June 
7 was  made  public  a friendly  warning  from  America. 
The  American  Minister,  Dr.  Reinsch,  transmitted  the 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  93 

following  message  to  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs: 

“ The  Government  of  the  United  States  learns  with 
the  most  profound  regret  of  the  dissension  in  China 
and  desires  to  express  the  most  sincere  desire  that 
tranquillity  and  political  co-ordination  may  be  forth- 
with re-established. 

“ The  entry  of  China  into  war  with  Germany  — or 
the  continuance  of  the  status  quo  of  her  relations  with 
that  Government  — are  matters  of  secondary  consid- 
eration. 

“ The  principal  necessity  for  China  is  to  resume  and 
continue  her  political  entity,  to  proceed  along  the  road 
of  national  development  on  which  she  has  made  such 
marked  progress. 

With  the  form  of  government  in  China,  or  the 
personnel  which  administers  that  government,  the 
United  States  has  an  interest  only  in  so  far  as  its 
friendship  impels  it  to  be  of  service  to  China.  But 
in  the  maintenance  by  China  of  one  central  united 
and  alone  responsible  government,  the  United  States 
is  deeply  interested,  and  now  expresses  the  very  sincere 
hope  that  China,  in  her  own  interest  and  in  that  of 
the  world,  will  immediately  set  aside  her  factional 
political  disputes,  and  that  all  parties  and  persons  will 
work  for  the  re-establishment  of  a co-ordinate  gov- 


94 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


ernment  and  the  assumption  of  that  place  among  the 
powers  of  the  world  to  which  China  is  so  justly  en- 
titled, but  the  full  attainment  of  which  is  impossible 
in  the  midst  of  internal  discord.” 

This  note  was  welcomed  by  Chinese  as  a pledge  to 
support  the  Central  Government.  It  aroused  some 
resentment  in  Japan  because  the  Japanese  had  not 
been  first  consulted.  On  June  9 an  ultimatum  was 
sent  from  Tientsin  either  by  Chang  Hsun  or  by  Li 
Ching-hsi,  threatening  to  attack  Peking  if  Parliament 
was  not  dissolved.  The  President  was  isolated  and 
members  of  Parliament  and  other  democrats  could 
not  reach  him.  Rumour  reported  that  he  was  about 
to  give  in  and  dissolve  Parliament.  The  British  ad- 
viser to  the  Chinese  Government  advised  him  not  to 
do  so.  The  Japanese  adviser  gave  the  opposite 
counsel.  Wu  Ting-fang,  Acting  Premier,  refused  to 
sign  the  mandate.  Finally,  on  June  12,  the  mandate 
was  issued,  countersigned  by  General  Chiang  Chao- 
tsung,  commander  of  the  Peking  gendarmerie.  The 
next  day  an  explanation  was  made  by  President  Li 
in  which  he  admitted  he  was  forced  to  issue  a man- 
date against  his  will,  but  that  he  did  it  to  save  Peking 
and  the  country  from  war  and  destruction.  He  de- 
clared he  would  resign  as  soon  as  opportunity  came. 

On  June  15,  Chang  Hsun  arrived  in  Peking  with 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  95 

Li  Ching-hsi.  Eight  of  the  provinces  that  week  can- 
celled their  independence,  stating  that  their  desire  for 
the  dissolution  of  Parliament  had  been  satisfied.  The 
members  of  the  Parliament  made  their  way,  many  of 
them  in  disguise,  to  Shanghai  and  there  held  meet- 
ings and  sent  out  manifestoes.  Affairs  were  apparently 
at  a standstill  with  the  country  thus  divided  when  the 
great  coup  d’etat  was  carried  out  by  Chang  Hsun. 
Affairs  thereupon  moved  swiftly. 

On  June  30,  Kang  Yu-wei,  a well-known  advocate 
of  the  monarchy,  arrived  in  Peking.  He  had  travelled 
incognito  from  Shanghai.  His  first  visit  was  to  Chang 
Hsun.  On  July  i at  4 a.  m.  Chang  Hsun  and  his 
suite  called  on  the  Manchu  boy-Emperor  ^ and  informed 
him  of  his  restoration,  and  seated  him  on  the  throne. 
President  Li  Yuan-hung  was  requested  to  resign,  but 
refused.  He  was  then  practically  held  prisoner. 
Numerous  imperial  edicts  were  issued,  countersigned 
by  “ Chang  Hsun,  member  of  the  Privy  Council.” 

On  July  3,  Eeng  Kuo-chang  repudiated  any  connec- 
tion with  the  restoration,  his  name  having  appeared 
in  the  edicts  as  one  of  the  petitioners.  The  Military 
Governor  of  Canton  issued  proclamations  that  the 
Cantonese  would  fight  to  maintain  the  republic.  Many 
similar  messages  were  sent  by  other  provinces. 

1 Hsuan  Tung. 


96  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Japanese  troops  proceeded  to  the  Forbidden  City, 
took  President  Li  Yuan-hung  out  of  the  custody  of 
Chang  Hsun’s  men  and  escorted  him  to  the  Japanese 
Legation.  On  July  4 the  President  issued  a pledge 
to  support  the  republic.  On  July  5 hostilities  broke 
out  at  Lang  Fang  on  the  Peking-Tientsin  railway. 
The  diplomatic  body  notified  the  Peking  authorities 
that  the  Procotol  of  1901  providing  for  open  railway 
communication  between  Shanhaikwan  and  Peking 
must  be  observed.  On  the  same  date  trains  out  of 
Peking  were  packed  to  overflowing  with  Chinese  flee- 
ing to  Tientsin. 

By  this  time  the  entire  country,  with  the  exception 
of  three  provinces,  had  declared  its  opposition  to  the 
Manchu  movement.  Tuan  Chi-jui  came  out  of  his 
retirement,  offering  to  take  command  of  the  Repub- 
lican army.  Liang  Chi-chao,  who  was  such  a force 
against  Yuan  Shih-kai,  denounced  the  whole  movement. 

The  Republican  troops  advanced  upon  Peking,  and 
on  July  7,  American,  Japanese,  and  British  soldiers 
arrived  at  the  capital.  An  airplane  later  dropped  a 
bomb  over  Fengtai  station  and  wrecked  the  shed. 
Chang  Fisun’s  troops  at  Paoma  Chang  retired  inside 
the  capital  without  fighting  and  concentrated  at  the 
Temple  of  Heaven.  Another  airplane  flew  over  the 
Forbidden  City  and  dropped  bombs.  Chang  Hsun,  on 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  97 

July  8,  resigned,  but  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor 
was  not  published,  his  protector  holding  out  for  favour- 
able terms. 

Vice-President  Feng  Kuo-chang  assumed  the  office 
of  Acting  President  at  Nanking,  which  was  declared 
the  capital  of  the  Provincial  Government.  Dr.  Wu 
Ting-fang  arrived  in  Shanghai  with  the  seal  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Several  Ministers  of 
the  Manchu  Cabinet  on  this  day  were  captured  while 
attempting  to  escape.  Chang  Hsun  refusing  to  sur- 
render and  50,000  Republican  troops  having  surrounded 
Peking,  on  July  12,  at  four  in  the  morning,  the  attack 
was  begun  in  earnest.  Several  foreigners  were 
wounded ; fire  broke  out  in  the  Forbidden  City ; Chang- 
Hsun  took  refuge  in  the  Dutch  Legation,  and  the 
Republican  flag  was  raised  over  the  Forbidden  City. 

On  July  14,  Tuan  Chi-jui  arrived  in  Peking.  It  is 
rather  interesting  to  note  that  on  July  4 practically  the 
entire  country  voiced  its  “ declaration  of  independ- 
ence ” from  this  Manchu  Government;  on  July  14,  the 
victorious  Republican  generals  entered  the  capital. 
This  opposition  and  this  victory  of  the  Chinese  Repub- 
licans took  place  on  the  Independence  Days  of  the 
American  and  the  French  Republics;  the  coincidences 
seemed  both  significant  and  symbolic.  On  July  15 
Tuan  Chi-jui  assumed  the  office  of  Premier,  though 


98  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  southern  provinces  showed  opposition  to  him.  On 
July  17  President  Li,  in  a telegram  to  the  provinces, 
refused  to  resume  office,  and  Acting  President  Feng 
Kuo-chang  expressed  his  willingness  to  succeed  Li 
Yuan-hung. 

The  attitude  of  liberal  Chinese  during  this  crisis  was 
revealed  by  two  speeches  made  by  former  officials,  July 
13,  in  Shanghai.  Dr.'Wu  Ting-fang,  formerly  Min- 
ister to  the  United  States,  who  had  stood  so  firmly 
against  any  unconstitutional  action  on  the  part  of  the 
monarchists,  said : 

“ The  war  in  Europe  is  being  fought  to  put  an  end 
to  Prussian  militarism;  and  I want  the  Americans 
here  to  understand  that  China’s  present  troubles  are 
due  to  exactly  the  same  causes.  We  are  engaged  in 
a struggle  between  democracy  and  militarism.  Be- 
tween 55  and  60  per  cent,  of  the  taxes  of  China  are 
now  going  to  support  militarism  in  China.  This  must 
be  changed,  but  the  change  must  be  gradual.  I ask 
Americans  to  be  patient  and  give  China  a chance. 
Democracy  will  triumph.  Please  be  patient  with  us. 
Study  China  and  try  to  see  us  from  our  own  point 
of  view  instead  of  your  own. 

I hope  to  see  the  day  when  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
and  fire-coloured  flag  of  China  will  be  intertwined  in 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  99 

an  everlasting  friendship.  These  nations  believe  in 
universal  brotherhood;  in  the  rights  of  the  people  of 
small  nations  to  manage  their  own  affairs,  as  out- 
lined by  the  great  American  President  in  his  war 
declaration.  I make  this  statement  with  hostility  to 
no  nation.” 

Hon.  C.  T.  Wang,  Vice-President  of  the  Chinese 
Senate,  spoke  in  the  same  vein : 

“ The  real  issues  are : Shall  there  be  government 

by  law  or  by  force?  Shall  the  will  of  the  people  as 
expressed  through  the  xA.ssembly  prevail,  or  that  of 
a privileged  few?  Shall  the  military  forces  of  the 
nation  be  used  to  uphold  the  country,  or  to  uphold 
certain  individual  generals?  Upon  these  issues  the 
country  and  the  free  and  democratic  nations  of  the 
West  should  be  called  upon  to  pass  judgment. 

“ With  the  strongly  ingrained  love  for  democracy 
and  the  firm  belief  in  the  necessity  of  subordinating 
military  authority  under  the  civil,  in  the  character 
of  our  people,  we  do  not  hesitate  for  a minute  to 
affirm  that  in  China,  just  as  it  is  in  free  and  democratic 
nations  of  the  world,  constitutionalism  shall  prevail 
over  militarism.  We,  like  the  Entente  Allies,  have 
time  on  our  side.  We  shall  have  to  make  the  same 
sacrifices  for  the  final  victory  of  constitutionalism  and 


lOO 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


democracy  as  they  are  making  in  their  titanic  struggle 
on  the  battlefields  of  Europe.  Let  us  resolve  that  we 
will.” 

During  this  period  of  intense  disturbance  there  was 
a general  feeling  among  foreigners  that  assistance 
should  be  given  to  the  democratic  elements  in  China 
in  their  attempt  to  defend  the  Republic.  Especially 
was  American  sympathy  aroused,  and  various  state- 
ments were  made  by  journalists  and  others,  that  since 
America  was  assisting  the  newest  Asiatic  Republic  of 
Russia  in  its  struggle  against  autocracy,  it  should  also 
extend  its  support  to  the  Republicans  who  were  fight- 
ing the  same  battle  in  China.  Thus  Mr.  T.  F.  Mil- 
lard, a well-known  journalist  and  authority  on  matters 
in  the  Far  East,  on  July  21  voiced  his  idea  of  America’s 
duty : 

‘'Yes,  it  is  very  inconvenient  for  democracy,  at  the 
time  when  the  issue  of  a world-war  is  narrowing  down 
to  a test  of  the  fate  of  democracy,  to  have  two  great 
nations  like  Russia  and  China  trying  republicanism 
for  the  first  time,  and  under  precarious  conditions; 
for  the  difficulties  of  Russia  approximate  the  internal 
difficulties  of  China  with  republicanism.  But  just  be- 
cause the  local  and  general  conditions  are  rather  un- 
favourable, and  further  because  of  the  linking  of  these 
experiments  with  the  cause  of  democracy  throughout 


DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY  10 1 


the  world  by  reason  of  the  war,  it  becomes  virtually 
impossible  for  the  United  States  to  remain  a mere 
spectator  of  the  course  of  events  in  Russia  and  China. 
Action  to  hearten,  encourage,  and  support  Russia  al- 
ready has  been  taken  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment. Action  to  hearten,  encourage,  and  support 
China  in  her  effort  to  maintain  a republic  ought  to  be 
devised  and  undertaken  without  delay.” 

But  the  Republicans  regained  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment without  foreign  assistance,  and  on  August  i, 
Feng  Kwo-chang  succeeded  Ui  Yuan-hung  as  Presi- 
dent. Before  the  new  President  had  been  in  office  a 
week  the  subject  of  the  declaration  of  war  was  again 
brought  up.  There  was  little  opposition  now  to  the 
decision,  and  on  August  14th,  1917,  the  Chinese  Re- 
public formally  declared  war  on  the  German  and 
Austrian  empires. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  JAPAN 
AND  AMERICA  CONCERNING  CHINA 

On  November  2,  1917,  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agree- 
ment between  America  and  Japan  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington. The  agreement,  embodied  in  an  exchange  of 
notes,  defined  the  future  attitude  of  these  two  countries 
toward  China.  Its  important  clauses  were  two  in  num- 
ber: that  the  United  States  recognized  Japan’s  “ special 
interests  ” in  China ; and  that  both  the  United  States 
and  Japan  repledged  themselves  to  observe  the  principle 
of  the  “ open  door  ” and  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China.  The  agreement  was  the  most  important  one 
which  had  been  reached  by  America  in  relation  to  the 
Orient  since  the  Hay  proposal,  in  1899,  to  uphold  the 
principle  of  the  open  door  ” ; and  its  future  bearing  on 
international  relations  in  the  Orient  will  be  large. 

The  general  affirmation  of  the  open  door  ” policy 
was  the  remedy  proposed  by  America  eighteen  years 
before,  to  meet  the  dangerous  situation  fast  develop- 
ing in  China. ^ At  that  time  the  prospect  of  national 

The  principle  of  the  “ open-door,”  or  equal  opportunity,  in 
China,  was  potentially  present  in  Great  Britain’s  first  treaty  — 


102 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 


103 


disintegration  and  partition  by  the  world  powers 
seemed  imminent.  The  history  of  China’s  relations 
with  the  other  nations,  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  United  States,  was  a long  story  of  defeat  and 
losses  of  Chinese  territory  and  sovereign  rights.  In 
1842,  as  a result  of  the  victorious  “ Opium  War,” 
Great  Britain  had  taken  the  Island  of  Hongkong  and, 
later,  portions  of  the  neighbouring  mainland;  in  i860, 
Russia  acquired  Manchurian  territory  east  of  the 
Ussuri  River,  including  Vladivostok  and  the  right  to 
make  the  city  a terminus  of  the  trans-Siberian  Rail- 
way; in  1864,  France  had  taken  Cochin  China,  and  in 
1885,  proclaimed  a protectorate  over  the  nearby  terri- 
tory of  Annam  and  Tongking.  A year  later.  Great 
Britain  conquered  and  annexed  Burma.  As  a result 
of  the  Japanese-Chinese  War  in  1895,  Japan  took 
Formosa  and  the  neighbouring  Pescadores  Islands;  the 
independence  of  Korea  was  recognized,  and  the  Liao- 

relations  with  China  in  1842,  and  the  influence  of  Great  Britain 
in  general  has  been  in  line  with  this  principle.  Anson  Bur- 
lingame, the  first  American  minister  to  China,  who  went  out 
in  1861,  was  a strong  champion  of  the  same  ideal.  Accord- 
ingly the  idea  was  generally  current  in  the  Orient  long  before 
it  was  formally  recognized  in  the  agreements  initiated  by  Sec- 
retary Hay  in  1899.  The  exact  phrase,  “ open-door,”  was  first 
used  in  American  state-documents  in  the  ultimatum  sent  to 
Spain  on  November  21st,  1898,  in  reference  to  the  future 
economic  relations  with  the  Philippines. 


104 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


tung  Peninsula,  including  Port  Arthur,  was  ceded  to 
the  Japanese,  though  Russia,  Germany  and  France  at 
once  compelled  them  to  give  up  the  latter  territory. 
Following  this  war,  the  spirit  of  imperialism  grew 
and  a scramble  for  concessions  began.  As  a result  of 
the  killing  of  two  missionaries,  Germany  seized  Kiao- 
chow  Bay,  including  the  port  of  Tsingtao,  demanding 
a ninety-nine  year  lease,  and  appropriated  the  mining 
and  railway  rights  in  Shantung ; Russia  then  requested 
a similar  lease  of  Port  Arthur,  and  took  over  prac- 
tical control  of  Manchuria;  England  leased  the  forti- 
fied port  of  Wei-hai-wei,  in  Shantung;  France  gained 
a port  in  South  China;  and  Italy  asked  for,  but  was 
refused,  territory  in  Central  China  along  the  coast. 

Not  content  with  leases,  the  powers  began  to  stake 
out  “ spheres  of  interest  ” within  which  they  desired 
special  economic  and  commercial  rights.  England’s 
“ sphere  ” was  in  the  Yangtze  Valley;  Russia’s,  in  the 
territory  north  of  the  Great  Wall;  France’s,  in  South- 
west China;  Germany’s,  in  Shantung.  If  China  should 
be  partitioned,  these  sections  would  become  definite 
possessions  of  these  nations.  The  supervision  of 
certain  governmental  functions  of  China  had  already 
been  placed  in  the  hands  of  citizens  of  the  foreign 
powers,  including  the  collection  of  the  maritime  cus- 
toms, and  later  the  postal  administration  and  salt- 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  IO5 

customs.  In  the  earliest  treaty  relations,  the  principle 
of  “ exterritoriality  ” had  been  recognized,  through 
which  foreigners  were  tried  by  their  own  laws  and 
not  by  the  laws  of  China;  later  foreign  “ settlements  ” 
had  grown  up  in  various  important  cities,  which  were 
under  complete  alien  jurisdiction.  Following  the 
marking  out  of  “ spheres  of  interest  ” came  the  first 
rush  for  railroad  concessions.  At  this  time  and  within 
a few  succeeding  years,  a Franco-Belgian  firm,  backed 
by  Russia,  acquired  the  right  to  build  the  Peking- 
Hankow  line;  the  British,  the  building  of  the  railway 
which  joined  Shanghai  to  Nanking  and  Tientsin,  divid- 
ing the  Shantung  rights  of  the  road  with  the  Germans; 
American  capitalists  secured  the  right  of  building  the 
road  from  Hankow  to  Canton,  but  later  sold  it  to  the 
Chinese  government. 

This  was  the  situation  in  China  at  the  end  of  1898. 
In  that  year  it  was  to  be  affected  by  a policy  suggested 
by  the  United  States.  Up  to  that  time  America’s  for- 
eign policy  in  the  Far  East  consisted  chiefly  in  an 
insistence  upon  the  general  principle  of  non-interfer- 
ence and  non-aggression.  In  1844,  preceding  its  first 
treaty  with  China,  the  United  States  had  said : We 

do  not  desire  any  portion  of  the  territory  of  China, 
nor  any  terms  and  conditions  whatever  which  shall 
be  otherwise  than  just  and  honourable  to  China  as  well 


io6 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


as  to  the  United  States,”  and  it  had  lived  up  to  that 
statement.  But,  in  December,  1898,  as  a result  of  the 
Spanish-American  War,  the  United  States  was  put  in 
possession  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  there  arose 
at  once  a need  for  a formation  of  a Far  Eastern  Policy. 
Great  Britain,  especially,  had  begun  to  look  with  con- 
cern on  the  situation  developing  in  China  and  she 
greeted  with  cordiality  the  proposal  of  Secretary  Hay, 
in  1899,  that  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  ” should 
be  henceforth  formally  recognized;  signifying  that 
thereafter  no  part  of  China  should  be  reserved  by  any 
nation  for  its  own  particular  economic  or  political 
advantage.  This  principle  was  again  stated  in  1900 
in  an  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
and  was  accepted  later  by  all  the  Powers,  Russia  alone 
making  certain  reservations.  Its  important  clauses 
were  as  follows : first,  that  no  power  would  in  any 
way  interfere  with  any  treaty  port  or  any  vested 
interest  within  any  so-called  ‘ sphere  of  interest  ’ or 
leased  territory  which  it  might  have  in  China  ” ; 
second,  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time  being 
shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all 
such  ports  as  are  within  said  ^ sphere  of  interest  ’ (un- 
less they  be  ‘ free  ports  ’),  no  matter  to  what  nation- 
ality it  may  belong,  and  . . . duties  so  leviable  shall 
be  collected  by  the  Chinese  government  ” ; and,  third. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT,  IO7 

“ it  will  levy  no  higher  harbour  dues  on  vessels  of 
another  nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such 
‘ sphere  ’ than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of  its  own  na- 
tionality, and  no  higher  railroad  charges  over  lines 
built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  ‘ sphere  ’ on 
merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other 
nationalities  transported  through  such  ‘ sphere  ’ than 
shall  be  levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its 
own  nationals  transported  over  like  distances.” 

In  brief,  this  statement  was  a pledge  by  the  Powers 
not  to  discriminate  against  each  other’s  business  inter- 
ests in  their  respective  “ spheres  and  was  a guaranty 
to  maintain  the  status  quo. 

The  various  infringements  of  Chinese  territory  and 
rights,  which  preceded  the  formation  of  this  agree- 
ment, had  naturally  had  a disturbing  effect  upon  the 
minds  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  government  of  China. 
This  found  expression  in  the  Boxer  outburst  in  1900 
in  which  a final  attempt  was  made  by  force  of  arms 
to  oust  the  dreaded  foreigner.  The  attempt  was  futile 
and  China  emerged  in  1901,  saddled  by  an  indemnity 
of  over  $300,000,000,  the  payment  of  which  was  se- 
cured by  pledges  of  the  customs  revenues,  the  native 
customs,  and  a portion  of  the  salt  revenues;  and  with 
the  loss  of  the  liberty  to  import  arms  for  a limited  pe- 
riod, to  maintain  jurisdiction  over  the  legation  quarter 


io8 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


in  Peking,  and  certain  other  national  rights.  No  more 
territory  was  given  up,  however;  the  open  door” 
principle  was  again  affirmed;  and  with  certain  excep- 
tions in  Manchuria,  due  to  the  action  of  Russia,  the 
status  quo  was  maintained  until  the  close  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War. 

New  changes  took  place  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war 
between  Japan  and  Russia  in  1905,  and  other  altera- 
tions in  the  Far  Eastern  situation  followed,  with 
China  again  as  the  victim.  By  the  terms  of  the  Ports- 
mouth Treaty  all  of  Russia’s  privileges  and  powers  in 
Southern  Manchuria,  including  Port  Arthur  and  the 
Russian  railways  section,  were  transferred  to  Japan; 
Japan’s  “ paramount  political,  military  and  economic 
interests  in  Korea  ” were  recognized  by  Russia.  Chi- 
nese sovereignty  in  Manchuria  was  nominally  recog- 
nized by  Russia,  but  it  soon  became  practically  non- 
existent. In  1910,  Korea  was  formally  annexed  by 
Japan.  Three  years  later,  as  a result  of  the  disturb- 
ances of  the  Republican  Revolution,  Mongolia  becom- 
ing temporarily  independent,  Russia  attempted  to  gain 
a protectorate  over  Outer  Mongolia,  and  China  was 
forced  to  acknowledge  Russia’s  extensive  commercial 
and  political  privileges  there  in  return  for  a nominal 
recognition  of  its  own  suzerainty  over  the  region. 
Japan  began  to  manoeuvre  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  IO9 

and,  in  1915,  attempted  to  clinch  its  activities  by  the 
Twenty-one  Demands,  in  which  it  afibrmed  that  China 
had  always  recognized  its  special  position  in  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  ” ; other  ambi- 
tions were  also  put  forth,  as  already  discussed  in  an- 
other chapter.  In  Manchuria,  further,  according  to 
consular  reports,  Japan  had  apparently  not  followed 
the  “ open  door  ” agreement  of  1899.  Such  was  the 
changed  situation  in  the  China  of  1915,  as  compared 
to  that  of  1899.  The  situation  was  summarized  by 
Dr.  Hornbeck,  as  follows: 

“ The  settlement  at  the  end  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  materially  altered  the  political  and  geographical 
alignment.  A new  status  was  created.  New  pledges 
were  made  for  the  maintaining  of  the  newly  created 
status  quo.  Japan’s  activities  in  Manchuria  during 
the  next  ten  years  further  modified  the  alignments. 
In  1914  Japan’s  conquest  of  the  German  possessions 
in  Shantung  again  abruptly  altered  the  situation. 
And,  finally,  Japan’s  demands  upon  China  in  January, 
1915,  and  the  granting  of  the  special  privileges  and 
concessions  which  China  has  been  forced  to  make  to 
Japan  constitute  a complete  upsetting  of  the  balance  of 
power  and  suggest  all  the  possibilities  of  a reversion, 
after  the  European  War  shall  have  been  concluded, 
to  speculation,  apprehensions,  competition,  and  conse- 


I lO 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


quent  developments  such  as  marked  the  years  1895- 
1898.”  1 

This  situation,  as  portrayed,  aroused  various  sus- 
picions of  Japan’s  ultimate  intentions  toward  China, 
and  there  seemed  a need  for  some  official  statement  to 
clear  the  air.  This  was  made  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment in  the  fall  of  1917  in  an  exchange  of  notes  signed 
in  Washington  by  Viscount  Ishii  and  Secretary  Lans- 
ing. 

There  were  three  general  reasons  for  the  formula- 
tion of  this  agreement.  The  first  was  the  apprehen- 
sion of  America  and  of  the  world  in  general  concern- 
ing  Japanese  intentions  in  China.  These  apprehen- 
sions were  mentioned  in  the  notes  exchanged  and  in  a 
supplementary  statement  issued  by  Secretary  Lansing. 
In  the  notes  appears  the  clause,  “ In  order  to  silence 
mischievous  reports  that  have  from  time  to  time  been 
circulated,  it  is  believed  by  us  that  a public  announce- 
ment once  more  of  the  desires  and  intentions  shared  by 
our  two  Governments  with  regard  to  China  is  advis- 
able ” ; and  in  Secretary  Lansing’s  statement,  he  said. 
There  had  unquestionably  been  growing  up  between 
the  peoples  of  the  two  countries  a feeling  of  suspicion 
as  to  the  motives  inducing  the  activities  of  the  other 
1 Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,  page  242. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 


III 


in  the  Far  East,  a feeling  which,  if  unchecked,  prom- 
ised to  develop  a serious  situation.  Rumours  and 
reports  of  improper  intentions  were  increasing  and 
were  more  and  more  believed.”  German  propaganda 
was  referred  to  as  having  a large  part  in  increasing 
this  suspicion.  This  apprehension  seemed  general  not 
only  in  America,  but  in  other  nations  as  well,  and  was 
one  of  the  reasons  for  the  drawing  up  of  the  new 
agreement. 

Another  reason,  which  was  not  so  generally  recog- 
nized, was  Japan’s  apprehension  concerning  America’s 
intentions  in  China.  Japan  had  long  cherished  the 
hope  of  becoming  the  recognized  leader  of  the  Orient. 
Especially  did  it  desire  unquestioned  supremacy  in  its 
leadership  over  China.  During  the  past  two  years  the 
United  States  had  taken  certain  action  which  seemed 
to  question  its  leadership.  At  the  time  of  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  as  already  stated,  America  was  the  only 
nation  to  protest  against  any  infringement  of  China’s 
rights.  In  the  summer  of  1917,  during  the  turmoil 
which  accompanied  the  attempt  to  overthrow  the  Re- 
public and  to  restore  the  Manchus,  the  United  States 
had  sent  definite  advice  to  China  concerning  the  situa- 
tion. Statements  were  made  by  experienced  Japanese 
journalists,  such  as,  “ In  the  Japanese-American  rela- 


1 12 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


tions,  the  powder-chest  has  ever  been  China  — not 
California  ” ; and  that  the  United  States  might  “ go  to 
Japan  and  tell  her  that  America  had  taken  upon  her- 
self the  role  of  the  guardian  and  guide  of  China,  that 
she  was  to  dictate  the  policy  of  the  Chinese  Republic 
according  to  what  America  thought  to  be  just  and 
righteous,  and  that  Japan’s  policies  and  actions  in  the 
Far  East,  and  more  especially  in  China,  were  to  be  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  United  States.”  ^ The 
formation  of  the  closest  possible  ties  with  China 
seemed  vital  to  the  future  greatness  of  Japan,  and  any 
interference  in  such  a program  was  looked  upon  with 
apprehension.  Accordingly  an  assurance  from  Amer- 
ica of  a continuation  of  its  present  relations  with  China 
was  much  desired. 

A third  factor  was  the  need  of  the  Allies  for  closer 
co-operation  as  a result  of  the  loss  of  Russia  from 
their  ranks.  There  was  a decided  need  of  unity  of 
counsel  and  of  effort,  if  the  handicap  of  this  loss  were 
to  be  overcome.  As  has  already  been  pointed  out, 
there  had  not  always  been  a clear  unity  of  understand- 
ing and  policy  between  Japan  and  the  Allies;  Japan 
had  special  aspirations  in  the  Orient;  and  there  seems 
reason  for  the  belief  that  a certain  amount  of  pressure 

1 Adachi  Kinnosuke,  in  Asia,  December,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT,  II3 

was  brought  to  bear  on  America  to  recognize  the  as- 
pirations of  Japan  in  China.  This  America  appar- 
ently attempted  to  do  with  justice  to  China  in  the 
Lansing-Ishii  Agreement. 

After  a series  of  conferences  in  Washington  be- 
tween Viscount  Ishii  and  Secretary  Lansing,  the  fol- 
lowing statement  was  issued  on  November  2 : 

“ Department  of  State, 

“ Washington,  Nov.  2,  1917. 

“ Excellency  : 

“ I have  the  honour  to  communicate  herein  my  un- 
derstanding of  the  agreement  reached  by  us  in  our 
recent  conversations  touching  the  questions  of  mutual 
interest  to  our  Governments  relating  to  the  Republic 
of  China. 

“ In  order  to  silence  mischievous  reports  that  have 
from  time  to  time  been  circulated,  it  is  believed  by  us 
that  a public  announcement  once  more  of  the  desires 
and  intentions  shared  by  our  two  Governments  with 
regard  to  China  is  advisable. 

“ The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan 
recognize  that  territorial  propinquity  creates  special 
relations  between  countries,  and,  consequently,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes  that 


I 14  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  particularly  in  the 
parts  to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous. 

“ The  territorial  sovereignty  of  China,  nevertheless, 
remains  unimpaired,  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  every  confidence  in  the  repeated  as- 
surances of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  that, 
while  geographical  position  gives  Japan  such  special 
interests,  they  have  no  desire  to  discriminate  against 
the  trade  of  other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  com- 
mercial rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in  treaties 
with  other  powers. 

“ The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan 
deny  that  they  have  any  purpose  to  infringe  in  any 
way  the  independence  or  territorial  integrity  of  China, 
and  they  declare,  furthermore,  that  they  always  ad- 
here to  the  principle  of  the  so-called  ‘ open  door,’  or 
equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 

“ Moreover,  they  mutually  declare  that  they  are  op- 
posed to  the  acquisition  by  any  government  of  any 
special  right  or  privileges  that  would  affect  the  inde- 
pendence or  territorial  integrity  of  China,  or  that 
would  deny  to  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  any  country 
the  full  enjoyment  of  equal  opportunity  in  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  China. 

''  I shall  be  glad  to  have  your  Excellency  confirm  this 
understanding  of  the  agreement  reached  by  us. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT,  II5 

“ Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

“ Robert  Lansing. 

His  Excellency,  Viscount  Ki- 
kujiro  Ishii,  Ambassador 
Extraordinary  and  Plenipo- 
tentiary of  Japan,  on  special 
mission.” 

“The  Special  Mission  of  Japan, 

“Washington,  Nov.  2,  1917. 

“ Sir: 

“ I have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  note  today,  communicating  to  me  your  under- 
standing of  the  agreement  reached  by  us  in  our  re- 
cent conversations  touching  the  questions  of  mutual 
interest  to  our  Governments  relating  to  the  Republic 
of  China. 

“ I am  happy  to  be  able  to  confirm  to  you,  under 
authorization  of  my  Government,  the  understanding 
in  questions  set  forth  in  the  following  terms : 

(Here  the  Special  Ambassador  repeats  the  language 
of  the  agreement  as  given  in  Secretary  Lansing’s  note.) 

“K.  Ishii, 

“ Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  of  Japan,  on 
special  mission. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  II7 

possessions.  It  was,  indeed,  a happy  result  that 
China’s  rights  were  thus  formally  recognized  and  that 
an  assurance  was  made  that  the  policy  of  the  “ open 
door  ” was  to  continue.  In  this  respect  the  agreement 
did  much  to  clear  away  the  clouds  of  suspicion  which 
had  been  long  gathering,  and  marked  a new  era  in  the 
good  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  were  four  main  lines  of 
criticism  directed  against  the  agreement.  In  the  first 
place,  its  terms  seemed  to  be  self-contradictory;  sec- 
ondly, the  phrase  “ special  interests  ” was  decidedly 
vague ; third,  the  principle  upon  which  these  “ special 
interests  ” was  built,  that  of  territorial  propinquity,  did 
not  seem  to  be  wholly  valid ; finally,  China  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  negotiations. 

By  reaffirming  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  ” 
and  of  China’s  territorial  integrity,  Japan  and  America 
seemed  to  guarantee  equal  opportunities  to  all  nations 
in  commerce,  agreeing  also  to  prohibit  any  country 
from  acquiring  political  rights  which  would  infringe 
China’s  sovereignty.  No  commercial  or  political  priv- 
ileges were  to  be  given  to  any  country.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  “ special  interests  ” imply  special  priv- 
ileges; these  privileges  must  be  either  commercial  or 
political ; and  at  once  a contradiction  of  meaning  seems 
to  arise.  The  same  sort  of  contradiction  had  seemed 


Il8  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  exist  in  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
made  in  1905,  concerning  Korea,  when  the  alliance 
between  the  two  nations  was  renewed.  Article  III 
of  this  treaty  said,  “ Japan  possessing  paramount  po- 
litical, military  and  economic  interests  in  Korea,  Great 
Britain  recognizes  the  right  of  Japan  to  take  such 
measures  ...  in  Korea  as  she  may  deem  proper  . . . 
provided  that  such  measures  are  not  contrary  to  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations.”  ^ If  the  phrase  “ special  in- 
terests ” were  substituted  for  the  one  “ paramount  in- 
terests,” the  two  affirmations  would  be  more  or  less 
similar.  Three  months  after  the  treaty  between  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  was  signed,  a Japanese  protector- 
ate was  established  over  Korea ; five  years  later  Korea 
was  formally  annexed.  After  the  publishing  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  treaty  with  these  similar  terms  there 
was  some  fear,  especially  on  the  part  of  China,  that 
history  would  repeat  itself. 

In  the  second  place,  the  phrase  “ special  interests  ” 
was  obviously  vague.  In  the  agreement  they  were 
not  defined  and  there  have  been  various  conjectures 
by  the  publicists  of  the  three  nations  involved  con- 
cerning their  meaning.  In  a magazine  published  in 
Japan  shortly  after  the  concluding  of  the  treaty  ap- 


1 See  Appendix  V. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  1 19 

peared  two  articles  which  attempted  to  define  these 

special  interests.”  The  first  article  maintained  that 
they  were  special  commercial  privileges  in  Japan’s  va- 
rious spheres  in  China;  the  second  insisted  that  polit- 
ical privileges  were  designated.  In  this  vagueness  of 
meaning  there  is  possibility  of  future  misunderstand- 
ing. 

In  the  third  place,  the  reason  for  the  recognition 
of  these  ‘‘  special  interests  ” was  found  in  Japan’s  ter- 
ritorial propinquity  to  China,  the  principle  being  stated 
in  the  agreement  that  “ territorial  propinquity  creates 
special  relations  between  countries  ” and  that  conse- 
quently Japan  was  entitled  to  the  “ special  privileges  ” 
named.  If  China  were  willing  to  enter  into  these 
special  relations  with  Japan,  resulting  from  the  terri- 
torial proximity  of  the  two  countries,  the  situation 
would  be  different.  But  any  one  who  has  lived  in 
China,  whatever  his  theoretical  views  may  be  of  the 
subject,  must  admit  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  as  a 
whole  do  not  wish  to  enter  into  these  closer  relations 
with  Japan.  They  are  not  afraid  of  loans  in  which 
the  United  States  or  the  other  Powers  as  a group  are 
represented,  but  they  do  object  to  transactions  of  a 
commercial  or  political  type  with  Japan  alone.  The 
matter  then  resolves  itself  into  the  question,  “ Is  ter- 
ritorial propinquity  a sufficient  reason  for  acquiring 


120 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


special  privileges  against  the  will  of  the  people  con- 
cerned ? ” The  answer  in  America  and  in  some  coun- 
tries of  Europe,  in  recent  years  at  least,  has  always 
been  in  the  negative.  Territorial  propinquity  exists 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada;  the  former 
desired  special  relations  of  reciprocity;  but,  when  Can- 
ada did  not  wish  to  enter  into  these  relations,  there 
was  no  question  of  using  force  to  accomplish  them. 
Germany,  on  account  of  its  territorial  proximity  to 
Belgium  and  Russia,  desires  its  special  commercial  re- 
lations with  them  to  be  recognized,  but  there  is  no 
expectation  of  this  being  done.  If  this  principle  of 
self-determination  as  to  special  relations,  whether 
commercial  or  political,  applies  in  America  and  Europe, 
why  should  it  not  apply  in  Asia?  Further,  if  terri- 
torial propinquity  were  generally  recognized  by  the 
other  powers  as  creating  special  relations,  the  results 
might  be  serious.  Russia’s  boundaries  are  contiguous 
with  those  in  China  for  hundreds  of  miles;  Great  Brit- 
ain could  logically  claim  “ special  interests  ” near  its 
port  at  Hongkong;  France  could  do  the  same  with 
Cochin  China ; and  America  would  have  a claim  in  the 
proximity  of  the  Philippines  to  the  Chinese  coast. 
The  Chinese  regions  implied  by  reason  of  their  prox- 
imity to  Japanese  possessions  would  seem  to  be  Man- 
churia, Mongolia,  Shantung,  and  Fukien;  but,  if 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 


I2I 


special  interests  and  privileges  were  to  be  conceded  in 
these  provinces  and  in  the  regions  bordering  the  hold- 
ings of  other  nations  as  well,  what  of  the  future  of 
the  policy  of  the  “ open  door  ” and  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity, which  originally  was  formulated  to  check  and 
control  just  such  spheres  of  interest? 

A fourth  objection  was  that  China  was  not  included 
in  the  negotiations.  Since  the  special  interests  ” 
mentioned  in  the  treaty  were  to  be  granted  to  Japan 
in  China,  it  would  seem  that  the  latter  had  a right  to 
a voice  in  the  matter ; otherwise  its  sovereignty  seemed 
to  be  ignored.  The  same  action  had  been  taken  by 
Japan  and  Russia  in  the  Portsmouth  treaty  when  a 
part  of  the  Chinese  province  of  Manchuria  was  divided 
between  them  and  China  was  not  notified  until  after 
the  decision  concerning  the  disposal  of  this  territory 
had  been  reached.  Although  later  they  ratified  this 
settlement,  the  Chinese  felt  that  at  that  time  their  rights 
as  a sovereign  nation  had  not  been  considered,  and  the 
repetition  of  this  act  continued  the  precedent  which 
seemed  harmful  to  their  national  interests  and  pride. 

These  were  some  of  the  objections  made  against  the 
terms  of  the  treaty.  Its  meaning  and  influence  were 
shown  more  clearly  by  its  reception  in  each  of  the  three 
nations  concerned. 

As  soon  as  the  Chinese  government  was  informed  of 


1 22 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


the  agreement  at  issue,  an  official  statement  “ in  order 
to  avoid  misunderstanding,”  addressed  to  both  the  Jap- 
anese and  American  Governments,  was  issued.  It 
stated  that  “ the  Chinese  government  had  in  its  rela- 
tions with  foreign  governments  always  followed  the 
principles  of  justice  and  equality;  that  the  rights  ex- 
tended to  friendly  nations  by  treaty  had  been  con- 
sistently respected ; that  the  special  relations  created  by 
territorial  contiguity  were  provided  for  in  the  treaties ; 
and  that  henceforth  as  formerly,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment would  adhere  to  these  principles,  but  that  it  could 
not  allow  itself  to  be  bound  by  any  agreement  entered 
into  by  other  nations.”  In  other  words,  China  recog- 
nized special  interests  only  in  so  far  as  they  existed  by 
virtue  of  treaties  and  agreements  to  which  she  was  a 
party. 

The  Chinese  as  a whole  seemed  to  appreciate  the 
promises  of  America  and  Japan  concerning  the  pro- 
tection of  their  territorial  rights ; but  they  were  in  doubt 
as  to  the  exact  meaning  of  the  agreement,  due  to  the 
double  interpretation  of  the  various  “ special  inter- 
ests.” An  American  authority  has  characterized  it  as 

a harmless  recognition  of  a simple  fact,  or  a cargo  of 
diplomatic  dynamite,  according  to  interpretation  and 
application.”  He  went  on  to  say:^  '‘There  is  no 

1 Article  on  “The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement,”  in  Asia,  Decem- 
ber, 1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  1 23 

question  but  that  for  a long  time  the  people  of  the 
United  States  and  the  people  of  Japan  did  not  under- 
stand the  term  ‘ open  door  ’ in  the  same  sense.  Do 
they  now?  Have  the  American  and  the  Japanese 
governments  achieved  a meeting  of  the  minds  as  to 
the  connotation  of  the  term  ‘ special  interests  ’ ? In 
case  of  disagreement  as  to  whether  a given  measure 
does  or  does  not  infringe  China’s  independence  or  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity,  who  is  to  decide?  . . . 
In  1915  the  Japanese  Government  insisted  that  its  de- 
mands upon  China  did  not  infringe  treaty  rights; 
China  insisted  that  they  did.  When  China,  under 
pressure  of  an  ultimatum,  agreed  to  some  fifteen  of 
the  things  demanded,  the  United  States,  without  com- 
mitting itself  as  to  whether  they  did  or  did  not  do  so, 
merely  went  on  record  to  the  effect  that  it  would  not 
recognize  any  agreement  impairing  the  rights  of  the 
United  States,  the  integrity  of  China,  or  the  principle 
of  the  ' open  door.’  ” 

Some  of  the  less  well-informed  Chinese  viewed  the 
agreement  as  a sign  of  America’s  tacit  approval  of 
Japan’s  recent  action  in  China.  The  general  attitude 
seemed  to  be  one  of  anxiety  as  to  the  eventual  meaning 
and  implications  of  the  agreement. 

Concerning  Japan’s  pledge  not  to  allow  any  attack 
upon  Chinese  territorial  integrity,  or  independence,  the 


124  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

China  Press,  as  quoted  in  Millard's  Review  of  Oct. 
6th,  said : 

“ Baron  Ishii  announces  that  Japan  is  ' prepared  to 
defend  the  independence  of  China  against  any  aggres- 
sion.’ This  is  all  to  the  good.  There  is  only  one  na- 
tion that  threatens  China,  and  if  Japan  will  defend 
China  against  the  aggression  of  that  nation,  China  will 
survive.  If  Japan,  to  put  it  plainly,  will  defend  China 
against  Japanese  aggressions,  all  will  be  well.” 

A final  comment  was  that  “ no  two  powers  could 
guarantee  between  themselves  a continuation  of 
China’s  independence  as  a sovereign  state,  or  could 
make  certain  a preservation  of  its  national  territorial 
integrity.  The  only  way  in  which  these  aims  could  be 
accomplished  seemed  to  be  in  a growth  of  power  on 
China’s  own  part,  which  would  enable  it  to  defend 
its  domains  from  any  aggressions  by  a foreign 
power.”  ^ 

The  Japanese,  although  there  were  some  who  criti- 
cized the  agreement  because  it  did  not  seem  definite 
enough  as  to  their  desired  powers  in  China,  were  gen- 
erally satisfied  with  the  agreement.  The  best  indica- 
tion of  their  approval  was  the  immediate  selection  of 
Viscount  Ishii  as  Ambassador  to  America.  They  be- 
lieved that  the  way  was  open  for  their  recognized 

1 In  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  quoted  above. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  1 25 

leadership  in  the  Orient.  One  of  their  publicists,  writ- 
ing in  an  American  magazine,  said : “ The  new  un- 

derstanding between  the  United  States  and  Japan  will 
be  held  in  Japan  as  the  greatest  piece  of  constructive 
achievement  of  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  Far 
East  for  many  a generation.  To  Japan  it  is  a double 
triumph.  . . . Japan  has  been  the  ally  of  the  British 
Empire  for  years.  That  the  greatest  power  in  the 
two  Americas  now  recognizes  her  leadership  of  the 
Ear  Eastern  states  must  mean  a good  deal  ...  to 
my  countrymen.  Besides  laying  a pretty  solid  founda- 
tion stone  of  the  future  peace  of  Japan,  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  Ishii  Mission  crowns  high  the  cup  of 
Japan’s  political  aspirations.”  ^ 

The  view  of  the  treaty  taken  in  the  United  States, 
followed  a middle  course,  as  compared  with  these  two 
estimates.  The  chief  criticism  was  along  the  lines  al- 
ready indicated,  but  America  was  hopeful  that  it  had 
solved  a difficult  situation  with  satisfaction  to  both 
China  and  Japan.  This  attitude  was  expressed  in  a 
statement  by  Secretary  Lansing,  accompanying  the 
publication  of  the  treaty.  He  said : “ By  openly  pro- 

claiming that  the  policy  of  Japan  is  not  one  of  aggres- 
sion, and  by  declaring  that  there  is  no  intention  to  take 
advantage  commercially  or  industrially  of  the  special 


1 Adachi  Kinnosuke,  in  Asia,  December,  1917. 


126 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


relations  to  China  created  by  geographical  position,  the 
representatives  of  Japan  have  cleared  the  diplomatic 
atmosphere  of  suspicion.  . . . The  principal  result  of 
the  negotiations  was  the  mutual  understanding  which 
was  reached  as  to  the  principles  governing  the  policies 
of  the  two  governments  in  relation  to  China.  This 
understanding  is  formally  set  forth  in  the  notes  ex- 
changed, and  now  made  public.  The  statements  in  the 
notes  require  no  explanation.  They  not  only  contain 
a reaffirmation  of  the  ' open  door  ’ policy,  but  intro- 
duce a principle  of  non-interference  with  the  sover- 
eignty and  territorial  integrity  of  China,  which,  gen- 
erally applied,  is  essential  to  perpetual  international 
peace,  as  clearly  declared  by  President  Wilson,  and 
which  is  the  very  foundation,  also,  of  Pan-American- 
ism, as  interpreted  by  this  government.” 

True  friends  of  China  and  Japan  warmly  hope  that 
this  estimate  of  the  outcome  of  the  agreement  will  be 
borne  out  by  future  events. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  CHINESE-JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT 
OF  1918 

The  situation  in  Russia  following  the  abdication 
of  the  Czar  in  March,  1917,  was  of  special  concern 
to  the  Allies.  It  was  of  vital  importance  to  the  two 
neighbouring  oriental  supporters  of  the  Allies,  Japan 
and  China.  The  northern  boundaries  of  the  Chinese 
Republic  are  contiguous  for  hundreds  of  miles  with  the 
boundaries  of  Siberia;  any  German  penetration  there 
would  be  felt  at  once  in  China.  Japanese  shipping, 
which  included  practically  all  of  the  vessels  on  the 
Pacific,  would  be  menaced  at  once  if  the  Germans 
should  gain  control  of  Vladivostok.  Further,  in  its 
larger  aspect  of  German  control  of  Russia’s  resources 
and  territory,  presaging  the  establishment  of  a vast 
empire  stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Pacific, 
the  Japanese  saw  a grave  menace.  The  military  dan- 
ger of  the  German  forces  in  Siberia  seems  to  have  been 
exaggerated,  but  there  was  every  probability  of  eco- 
nomic control  and  domination.  Japan  could  not  take 
military  measures  to  meet  this  situation  unless  it  had 

127 


128 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


the  consent  and  support  of  its  neighbour  on  the  main- 
land, and  consequently,  soon  after  the  revolution  in 
Russia,  negotiations  were  begun  leading  to  a military 
agreement  between  China  and  Japan.  The  military 
agreement  was  signed  May  i6,  1918;  the  naval  agree- 
ment, May  19th;  the  first  public  announcement  was 
made  in  Tokio,  May  30th.  The  whole  affair  was 
shrouded  in  much  secrecy,  and  was  the  cause  of  endless 
comment  and  even  suspicion  in  both  countries,  which 
was  not  wholly  dispelled  by  the  explanatory  statement 
finally  published. 

The  first  report  concerning  the  proposed  agreement 
became  current  in  China  in  the  Spring  of  1917.  Un- 
fortunately it  was  associated  in  the  minds  of  the  Chi- 
nese with  Group  Five  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
made  by  Japan  in  January,  1915.  These  demands 
were  forecasted  by  the  secret  statement  of  the  Black 
Dragon  Society,  already  mentioned,  which  spoke  of  a 
“ Defensive  Military  Alliance  ” between  China  and 
Japan  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  Japanese  foreign  policy. 
The  fifth  group  of  the  Demands,  it  may  be  remem- 
bered, was  the  most  severe,  involving  certain  rights 
which,  if  granted  to  Japan,  would  infringe  the  sov- 
ereignty of  China  and  make  it  practically  a vassal 
nation. 

In  its  ultimatum  of  May  7,  1915,  Japan,  under 


CHINESE- JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  I2Q 

threat  of  force,  demanded  the  acceptance  of  the  first 
four  groups  and  agreed  to  hold  the  fifth  group  in 
abeyance,  with  the  exception  of  the  article  in  relation 
to  Fukien  Provinces,  saying,  “ The  Japanese  Imperial 
Government  will  undertake  to  detach  the  Group  Five 
from  the  present  negotiations  and  discuss  it  separately 
in  the  future.”  Commenting  on  this  clause,  a leading 
journalist  in  the  Orient,  Mr.  Putnam-Weale,  had  said, 
“ It  is  this  fact  which  remains  the  sword  of  Damocles 
hanging  over  China’s  head;  and  until  this  sword  has 
been  flung  back  into  the  waters  of  the  Yellow  Sea  the 
Far-Eastern  situation  will  remain  perilous.”  ^ The 
Twenty-one  Demands  were  prefaced  by  the  statement 
that  they  were  being  made  for  the  purpose  “of  main- 
taining the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia,”  and  it  was 
not  surprising  that,  when  Japan  began  negotiations  for 
a military  alliance,  having  a similar  purpose,  last  year, 
many  Chinese  began  to  fear  that  the  long-dreaded 
“ sword  of  Damocles  ” was  about  to  fall. 

The  first  specific  mention  of  the  proposed  alliance 
was  made  in  the  Peking  Gazette,  the  most  influential 
native  newspaper,  on  May  i8,  1917.  The  editor, 
Eugene  Chen,  who  has  already  been  mentioned,  was  a 
fiery  supporter  of  the  Republic  and  an  opponent  of  the 
Japanese.  In  an  editorial  entitled  “ Selling  China,” 
The  Fight  for  the  Republic  m China,  page  117. 


130  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

he  asserted  that  the  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  was  con- 
templating making  an  agreement  with  Japan  which 
would  involve  practically  all  the  concessions  mentioned 
in  the  original  Group  Five.  Mr.  Chen  was  promptly 
arrested  and  thrown  into  prison  without  a trial;  later 
his  newspaper  was  suppressed  and  its  property  confis- 
cated. Subsequently  Mr.  Chen  was  pardoned  and 
made  his  escape  from  Peking;  but  his  accusation  lin- 
gered in  the  minds  of  the  Chinese  public  and  became 
associated  with  any  mention  of  a military  alliance  with 
Japan. 

Matters  remained  at  a standstill  until  the  early 
months  of  the  year  1918,  when  reports  again  began  to 
circulate,  saying  that  the  agreement  was  soon  to  be 
made.  The  wildest  and  most  extravagant  stories  be- 
came current.  The  statement  was  freely  made  that  the 
northern  officials  were  selling  China  for  their  own 
interests.  In  March  it  was  recorded  that  a preliminary 
agreement  had  been  signed,  and  protests  from  all  the 
country  were  sent  to  Peking. 

An  example  of  these  rumours  was  a letter  published 
in  the  China  Press  in  April.  It  was  written  by  a Chi- 
nese who  claimed  to  have  gained  his  information 
directly  from  one  of  the  high  officials  in  Peking.  The 
China  Press  published  it  with  the  following  com- 


ments : 


CHINESE-JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  I3I 

The  China  Press  some  weeks  ago  received  from  its 
Peking  correspondent  word  that  new  demands  or  ‘ re- 
quirements ’ had  been  presented  by  Japan.  Since 
then  Reuter's  Agency  has  also  carried  the  reports.  In 
the  light  of  those  facts,  the  following  letter,  although 
its  authority  cannot  be  vouched  for,  is  interesting ; 

“ ‘ I hope  you  have  perused  my  last  letter.  Since 
then  there  has  been  another  exceedingly  alarming  oc- 
currence. This  is  in  connection  with  the  revival  of  the 
negotiations  with  a certain  country  to  form  a certain 
alliance  for  participation  in  the  great  war.  Its  inside 
facts  are  as  follows: 

“ ‘ (i)  Warfare  alliance,  including  the  training  of 
soldiers  under  their  supervision. 

“ ‘ (2)  Arms  alliance,  including  the  organization 
of  arsenals  with  joint  Chinese  and  — interest. 

“ ‘ (3)  Industrial  alliance,  including  the  practical 
surrender  of  all  the  mines  of  the  republic. 

“ ‘ (4)  Financial  alliance,  including  a loan  to  China 
amounting  to  $60,000,000,  the  control  of  the  issue  of 
banknotes  and  the  reorganization  of  the  banks  of  China 
and  communications. 

'‘‘(5)  Educational  alliance. 

(6)  Diplomatic  alliance. 

“‘(7)  Transportation  alliance.’ 

“ This  is  certainly  more  alarming  than  Group  Five 


132 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  presented  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  Republic.  Another  demand  included  in 
the  present  negotiations  is  that  China  shall  not  sign 
any  treaty  or  agreement  with  any  foreign  power  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  government  in  question. 

“This  new  pact  went  into  force  on  May  i.  It  is 
learned  that  it  was  officially  signed  and  sealed.  The 
special  mission  of  the  Minister  of  the  nation  con- 
cerned was  solely  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  the  con- 
clusion of  the  alliance. 

“ Although  it  appears  on  the  surface  as  a document 
of  an  alliance  for  participation  in  the  war,  it  really 
amounts  to  a bill  of  sale  of  the  nation.  This  is  a con- 
tinuation of  what  was  intended  to  be  effected  in  the 
fourth  year  of  the  republic,  only  it  has  been  immensely 
enlarged  upon  and  is  a hundred  times  more  detri- 
mental. 

“ This  piece  of  news  is  obtained  through  Chow  Tse- 
chi  from  the  'Money  Joss.’  (Liang  Shih-yi.)” 

Finally,  on  May  i6th,  an  official  statement  from 
both  Peking  and  Tokyo  was  published,  stating  that  an 
agreement  had  been  reached.  The  fears  of  the  Chi- 
nese were  heightened  by  the  fact  that  the  officials  would 
not  publish  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  Similar  secrecy 
had  surrounded  the  serving  of  the  Twenty-one  De- 


CHINESE- JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  1 33 

mands  in  1915,  and  many  alarmists  recalled  this  fact. 
The  editor  of  the  chief  native  newspaper  in  Peking 
committed  suicide,  saying  that  he  would  not  live  to 
become  a slave  of  a foreign  country.  The  Chinese 
students  in  Japan  attacked  the  Chinese  embassy  in 
Tokyo  and  then  left  in  a body  for  China.  The  leaders 
of  the  Southern  party  in  China  telegraphed  Peking 
that  they  would  give  up  their  opposition  to  the  Central 
Government  if  it  would  cancel  the  agreement.  Even 
in  Japan  there  was  much  adverse  criticism  of  the  se- 
crecy maintained  by  the  Imperial  Government.  Fi- 
nally this  feeling  grew  so  strong  that  on  May  30th  an 
official  statement  was  made  concerning  the  agreement. 
It  took  the  form  of  a denial  of  the  many  rumours  which 
had  arisen,  rather  than  a clear  exposition  of  the  agree- 
ment itself.  It  mentioned  certain  notes  which  had 
been  exchanged  on  March  25th  between  the  Japanese 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Chinese  Minister 
in  Tokyo.  These  notes  were  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance, as  they  stated  that  the  military  agreement  had 
relation  only  to  the  hostile  penetration  into  Russian 
territory,  and  the  assurance  was  given  that  Japanese 
troops,  stationed  within  Chinese  territory  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defence,  would  be  completely  withdrawn  upon 
the  termination  of  the  war.  The  period  within  which 


134  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  notes  were  to  remain  in  force  was  to  be  determined 
by  the  military  and  naval  authorities  of  the  two 
powers.  The  notes  follow : 

Mr.  Chang  to  Viscount  Motono 

“Tokyo,  March  25,  1918. — I have  the  honour  to 
communicate  to  Your  Excellency  that  the  Government 
of  China,  believing  that  in  the  present  situation  co- 
operation with  the  Government  of  Japan  on  the  lines 
hereinafter  indicated  is  highly  important  in  the  interest 
of  both  countries,  have  authorized  me  to  approach 
your  Government  with  a view  to  arranging  for  such 
co-operation. 

“ I.  Having  regard  to  the  steady  penetration  of  hos- 
tile influence  into  Russian  territory,  threatening  the 
general  peace  and  security  of  the  Far  East,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  China  and  the  Government  of  Japan  shall 
promptly  consider  in  common  the  measures  to  be  taken 
in  order  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  situation,  and 
to  do  their  share  in  the  Allied  cause  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  present  war. 

“ 2.  The  methods  and  conditions  of  such  co-opera- 
tion between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  armed  forces  in 
the  joint  defensive  movements  against  the  enemy  for 
giving  effect  to  the  decision  which  may  be  arrived  at 
by  the  two  Governments  in  common  accord  under  the 


CHINESE-JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  1 35 

preceding  clause,  shall  be  arranged  by  the  competent 
authorities  of  the  two  powers  who  will  from  time  to 
time  consult  each  other  fully  and  freely  upon  all  ques- 
tions of  mutual  interest.  It  is  understood  that  the 
matters  thus  arranged  by  the  competent  authorities 
shall  be  confirmed  by  the  two  Governments  and  shall 
be  put  into  operation  at  such  time  as  may  be  deemed 
opportune.” 

Viscount  Motono  replied  on  the  same  day  with  an 
identic  note  recapitulating  Mr.  Chang’s  statements 
and  adding : 

“ The  Imperial  Government,  fully  sharing  the  views 
embodied  in  the  foregoing  proposals,  will  be  happy  to 
co-operate  with  the  Chinese  Government  on  the  lines 
above  indicated.” 

Viscount  Motono  to  Mr.  Chang 

“Tokyo,  March  25,  1918. — With  reference  to  the 
notes  exchanged  on  March  25  between  the  Govern- 
ments of  Japan  and  of  China  on  the  subject  of  their 
joint  defensive  movements  against  the  enemy,  I have 
the  honour  to  propose  on  behalf  of  my  Government 
that  the  period  within  which  the  said  notes  are  to  re- 
main in  force  shall  be  determined  by  the  competent 
military  and  naval  authorities  of  the  two  Powers. 
At  the  same  time  the  Imperial  government  are  happy 


136  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  declare  that  the  Japanese  troops  stationed  within 
Chinese  territory  for  the  purpose  of  such  defensive 
movements  against  the  enemy  shall  be  completely  with- 
drawn from  such  territory  upon  the  termination  of  the 
war.” 


Mr.  Chang  to  Viscount  Motono 

“Tokyo,  March  25,  1918. — I have  the  honour  to 
acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency’s  com- 
munication under  today’s  date,  proposing  on  behalf  of 
your  Government  that  the  period  within  which  the 
said  notes  are  to  remain  in  force  shall  be  determined 
by  the  competent  military  and  naval  authorities  of  the 
two  Powers.  I am  happy  to  state  in  reply  that  the 
foregoing  proposal  is  accepted  by  my  Government.  I 
am  further  gratified  to  take  note  of  the  declaration 
embodied  in  your  communication  under  acknowledg- 
ment, that  the  Japanese  troops  stationed  within  Chi- 
nese territory  for  the  purpose  of  defensive  movements 
against  the  enemy  shall  be  completely  withdrawn  from 
such  territory  upon  the  termination  of  the  war.” 

These  notes  were  apparently  the  foundation  of  the 
reports  current  during  the  last  of  March  in  China, 
although  there  is  evidence  for  the  view  that  the 
first  demands  of  the  Japanese  were  more  extreme  than 
these  notes  indicate.  In  addition  to  these  notes  the 


CHINESE-JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  1 37 

Japanese  government  issued  a supplementary  state- 
ment categorically  denying  all  such  interpretations  of 
the  agreement.  The  statement  follows : 

“ Having  regard  for  the  steady  penetration  of  hos- 
tile influence  into  Russian  territory,  jeopardizing  the 
peace  and  welfare  of  the  Far  East,  and  recognizing 
the  imperative  necessity  of  adequate  co-operation  be- 
tween Japan  and  China  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the 
case,  the  Governments  of  the  two  countries,  after 
frank  interchange  of  views,  caused  the  annexed  notes 
to  be  exchanged,  March  25,  between  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Chinese  Minister  in  Tokyo. 

“ In  pursuance  of  the  purport  of  the  notes  the  Im- 
perial Government  subsequently  sent  Commissioners 
representing  the  Imperial  Army  and  Navy  to  Peking, 
where  they  held  conferences  with  the  authorities  of  the 
Chinese  army  and  navy.  The  negotiations  progress- 
ing smoothly,  two  agreements  were  concluded,  one  re- 
lating to  the  army  being  signed  May  16,  and  the  other 
relating  to  the  navy.  May  19. 

These  agreements  only  embody  concrete  arrange- 
ments as  to  the  manner  and  conditions  under  which 
the  armies  and  navies  of  the  two  countries  are  to  co- 
operate in  common  defence  against  the  enemy,  on  the 
basis  of  the  above  mentioned  notes  exchanged  on 
March  25.  The  details  of  the  arrangements  consti- 


138  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tuting  as  they  do  a military  secret,  can  not  be  made 
public,  but  they  contain  no  provision  other  than  those 
pertaining  to  the  object  already  defined.  Currency 
has  been  given  to  various  rumours,  alleging  that  the 
agreements  contain  for  instance  such  stipulations  as 
that  a Chinese  Expedition  is  to  be  under  Japanese  com- 
mand, that  Japan  may  construct  forts  in  Chinese  terri- 
tory at  such  places  as  she  may  choose,  that  Japan  will 
assume  the  control  of  Chinese  railways,  shipyards,  and 
arsenals,  and  even  that  Japan  will  assume  the  control  of 
China’s  finances,  will  organize  China's  police  system, 
will  acquire  the  right  of  freely  operating  Chinese  mines 
producing  materials  for  the  use  of  the  arsenals,  etc. 
It  cannot  be  too  emphatically  stated  that  these  and 
similar  rumours  are  absolutely  unfounded. 

“ May  30,  the  7th  year  of  Taisho, 

“ Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 

‘‘  Tokyo,  Japan.” 

In  this  statement  there  is  no  definite  information 
given  concerning  the  details  of  the  arrangement. 
Considerable  speculation  has  taken  place  in  regard  to 
these  details.  President  Feng  was  rumoured  to  have 
shown  them  to  a delegation  of  students  who  came  to 
him  to  protest  against  the  agreement.  Various  ver- 
sions have  been  published  unofficially;  a translation  of 


CHINESE-JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  1 39 

one  of  them  which  comes  from  semi-official  sources, 
read  as  follows : 

“ Article  i.  In  view  of  the  penetration  of  enemy  in- 
fluence into  the  eastern  territory  of  Russia,  and  of  the 
likelihood  of  the  peace  of  the  two  contracting  parties 
being  disturbed  thereby,  China  and  Japan  mutually 
agree  actively  to  undertake  the  obligations  of  war-par- 
ticipation by  measures  designed  jointly  to  guard  against 
the  action  of  the  enemy. 

“ Article  2.  The  two  countries  shall  mutually  rec- 
ognize and  respect  the  equality  of  the  other  regarding 
position  and  interests  in  carrying  out  joint  military 
measures. 

‘‘  Article  3.  When  it  is  necessary  to  take  action 
based  on  this  agreement,  orders  will  be  issued  by  both 
China  and  Japan  to  their  troops  and  people,  calling 
on  them  to  be  frankly  sincere  in  dealing  with  each  other 
in  the  area  of  military  operations;  and  the  Chinese 
officials  shall  co-operate  and  assist  the  Japanese  troops 
in  the  area  involved  so  that  there  may  be  no  hindrance 
to  military  movements.  Japanese  troops  shall  on  their 
part  respect  Chinese  sovereignty  and  shall  not  cause 
any  inconvenience  to  the  Chinese  people  by  violating 
local  customs  and  traditions. 

“ Article  4.  Japanese  troops  in  Chinese  territory 
shall  withdraw  from  China  as  soon  as  war  is  ended. 


140 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


“ Article  5.  If  it  be  found  necessary  to  send  troops 
outside  of  Chinese  territory,  troops  will  be  jointly  sent 
by  the  two  countries. 

Article  6.  The  war  area  and  war  responsibilities 
shall  be  fixed  by  mutual  arrangement  of  the  military 
authorities  of  the  two  countries  as  and  when  occasion 
arises  in  accordance  with  their  respective  military  re- 
sources. 

Article  7.  In  the  interests  of  convenience,  the 
military  authorities  of  the  two  countries  shall  under- 
take the  following  affairs  during  the  period  necessary 
for  the  execution  of  joint  measures:  — 

“ I.  The  two  countries  shall  mutually  assist  and 
facilitate  each  other  in  extending  the  means  of  com- 
munications (post  and  telegraph)  in  connection  with 
military  movements  and  transportation. 

“ 2.  When  necessary  for  war  purposes  construction 
operations  may  be  carried  on  and  the  same  shall  be 
decided,  when  occasion  arises,  by  mutual  consent  of  the 
chief  commanders  of  the  two  countries.  The  said 
construction-operation  shall  be  removed  when  the  war 
is  ended. 

“ 3.  The  two  countries  shall  mutually  supply  each 
other  with  military  supplies  and  raw  materials  for  the 
purpose  of  jointly  guarding  against  the  enemy.  The 
quantity  to  be  supplied  shall  be  limited  to  the  extent 


Copyright  by  Underwood  & Underwood,  N.  Y. 


Japanese  Troops,  in  Allied  Expeditionary  Force  in  Siberia. 

Half  of  this  force  is  composed  of  troops  from  Japan;  General  K.  Otani  is  the 
Commander-in-Chief. 


CHINESE- JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  I4I 

of  not  interfering  with  the  necessary  requirements  of 
the  country  supplying  the  same. 

“ 4.  Regarding  questions  of  military  sanitation  in 
the  war  area  the  two  countries  shall  render  mutual 
assistance  to  each  other. 

''  5.  Officers  directly  concerned  with  war  operations 
shall  mutually  be  sent  by  the  two  countries  for  co- 
operation. If  one  party  should  ask  for  the  assistance 
of  technical  experts,  the  other  shall  supply  the  same. 

“ 6.  For  convenience,  military  maps  of  the  area  of 
war  operations  will  be  exchanged. 

“ Article  8.  When  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  is 
used  for  military  transportation,  the  provisions  of  the 
original  treaty  relating  to  the  management  and  protec- 
tion of  the  said  line  shall  be  respected.  The  method 
of  transportation  shall  be  decided  as  occasion  arises. 

“ Article  9.  Details  regarding  the  actual  perform- 
ance of  this  agreement  shall  be  discussed  by  mutual 
agreement  of  the  delegates  appointed  by  the  Military 
Authorities  of  the  two  countries  concerned. 

Article  10.  Neither  of  the  two  countries  shall  dis- 
close the  contents  of  the  agreement  and  its  appendix, 
and  the  same  shall  be  treated  as  military  secrets. 

“Article  ii.  This  Agreement  shall  become  valid 
when  it  is  approved  by  both  Governments  after  being 
signed  by  the  Military  representatives  of  the  two  coun- 


142 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


tries.  As  to  the  proper  moment  for  the  beginning  of 
war  operations,  the  same  shall  be  decided  by  the  highest 
military  organs  of  the  two  countries.  The  provisions 
of  this  agreement  and  the  detailed  steps  arising  there- 
from shall  become  null  and  void  on  the  day  the  joint 
war  measures  against  the  enemy  end. 

Article  12.  Two  copies  of  the  Chinese  and  of  the 
Japanese  text  of  this  agreement  shall  be  drawn; 
one  of  each  shall  be  kept  by  China  and  Japan.  The 
Chinese  and  Japanese  texts  shall  be  identical  in 
meaning.”  ^ 

The  main  feeling  in  the  Orient  concerning  the  alli- 
ance was  one  of  relief  and  of  surprise  at  the  long 
period  of  secrecy  that  shrouded  the  negotiations  — a 
secrecy  which  tended  to  increase  any  misunderstand- 
ing which  might  have  arisen.  A general  explanation 
of  this  secrecy  by  Japanese,  as  well  as  Chinese  writers, 
was  that  Japan  attempted  to  gain  more  than  was 
contained  in  the  final  agreement ; that  her  original  plan 
had  to  be  modified  by  the  counter-proposals  of  the  Pe- 
king Government.  There  was  also  a tendency  to  criti- 
cize the  statement  for  not  being  more  explicit.  Thus, 
according  to  the  Japan  Advertiser  of  May  31st,  “Mr. 
Yuko  Hamuguchi,  a prominent  member  of  the  Kensei- 
kai,  remarks  that  the  agreement  has  caused  misunder- 

1 Millard's  Review,  May  25,  1918. 


CHINESE- JAPANESE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT  1 43 

Standing  and  much  excitement  among  many  Chinese, 
and  though  an  official  statement  has  now  been  pub- 
lished the  agreement  will  remain  as  much  a conundrum 
as  ever,  inasmuch  as  the  important  clauses  are  kept 
secret.  It  seems  problematical  whether  the  official 
statement  just  published  will  have  the  desired  effect  in 
removing  the  suspicion  of  the  Chinese.” 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  a general  appreciation 
of  the  promises  of  Japan  to  retire  when  the  military 
necessity  permits,  and  a feeling  that,  because  of  the 
alliance,  Japan  and  China  were  the  better  prepared  to 
do  their  part  in  the  final  phases  of  the  great  war.  Thus 
the  Japan  Advertiser  commented  editorially  upon  the 
alliance;  its  views  were  seconded  by  the  hopeful- 
minded  press  of  the  Orient.  “ The  categorical  denial 
of  the  rumours  so  widely  current  in  China  is  a conclu- 
sive reply  to  the  sensation-mongers  who  have  been  so 
active.  The  present  emphatic  disclaimer  will  have 
great  value  in  restoring  China’s  confidence  in  Japan, 
and  may  mark  a turning  point  in  the  relations  of  the 
two  countries.  That  may  be  counted  positive  gain,  in 
addition  to  the  confounding  of  malicious  rumours. 
The  other  positive  gain  is  that  the  way  is  clear  for 
whatever  action  may  be  called  for  by  further  enemy 
penetration  of  Russian  territory.  . . . There  is  ample 
justification  for  the  agreement,  and  the  Allies  will  sin- 


144 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


cerely  rejoice  that  the  way  is  clear  for  action,  if  action 
should  be  necessary.” 

Since  these  words  were  written  an  Allied  force  has 
entered  Siberia.  After  a wise  and  prolonged  delibera- 
tion, the  United  States  government  decided  to  send  a 
military  force  to  join  with  troops  from  Japan  and 
China  and  others  of  the  Allied  nations,  in  the  attempt 
to  strengthen  the  Czecho-Slovaks  in  their  revolt 
against  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  Germans  in  Russia.^ 
Solemn  assurances  have  been  made  to  the  people  of 
Russia,  that  this  Allied  force  has  no  intention  of  in- 
fringing any  of  the  nation’s  rights,  but  that  its  presence 
is  merely  a guarantee  of  Allied  support  in  the  attempt 
of  Russia  to  free  itself  from  the  invader  and  the 
traitor.  The  ranking  officer  in  the  expeditionary  force 
of  the  Allies  is  the  Japanese  General,  K.  Otani ; Chinese 
troops  are  co-operating  under  his  command ; and  from 
elsewhere  along  the  frontier,  reports  have  come  of 
other  Chinese  soldiers  having  repulsed  forces  of  the 
Red  Guards.  Thus,  China  is  realizing  its  ambition  of 
assisting  in  a military  way,  as  well  as  industrially,  in 
the  world-war  for  international  justice  and  freedom. 

1 Note : The  Allied  Force  numbered  about  24,000  in  the  sum- 

mer of  1918.  Of  this  number  half  were  Japanese  and  the  bal- 
ance was  composed  of  American,  Chinese,  British,  French  and 
Italian  soldiers. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE 
AIMS  OF  THE  ALLIES 

When  the  American  Republic  joined  the  Allies  in 
the  Great  War,  President  Wilson  summarized  its  ideal 
and  purpose  in  so  doing,  by  the  sentence : “ The 

World  must  be  made  safe  for  Democracy.”  The  Al- 
lied Nations  have  generally  accepted  this  expression  of 
their  ideal  and  purpose.  When  President  Wilson’s 
words  were  cabled  to  the  Orient  they  produced  a pro- 
found impression  there.  At  once  observers  pointed 
out  that  the  President  had  not  limited  the  application 
of  this  ideal  to  Europe  or  to  America  alone,  but  that  it 
was  all-inclusive  and  was  to  apply  to  Asia  as  well.  At 
once  came  a realization  of  the  greatness  of  the  ideal 
and  of  its  possibilities  as  a solution  for  the  problems  of 
the  Orient.  Further,  the  view  was  widely  expressed 
that  these  Asiatic  problems  must  be  solved  if  the  cause 
of  the  Allies  was  to  be  permanently  successful. 

Many  considerations  seemed  to  point  to  that  conclu- 
sion. This  is  a world-war  and  nothing  less  than  a 
world-peace  would  seem  to  be  adequate.  From  this 

145 


146  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

world-peace,  Asia  cannot  be  excluded.  Half  of  the 
world’s  population  is  in  Asia ; in  India,  Asiatic  Russia, 
in  China,  and  Japan.  China  is  the  largest  and  oldest 
nation  in  the  world;  its  future  cannot  be  ignored.  A 
recent  writer  ^ has  pointed  out  that  after  the  war  there 
will  be  three  great  groups  of  world-races:  the  Anglo- 
Saxons,  the  Slavs  and  the  Mongolians.  The  first 
group  has  far  outdistanced  the  other  two  in  political 
development  and  progress;  it  has  bravely  taken  the 
stand  that  its  ideals  of  democracy  and  liberty  shall  be 
permitted  to  become  world-wide.  In  the  Orient,  the 
Chinese  people  have  thrown  off  the  restraints  of  an 
alien  autocratic  dynasty,  and  are  groping  unsteadily 
towards  the  light  of  democracy  in  the  form  of  a re- 
public. Russia  has  only  recently  taken  a similar  step ; 
in  both  lands  there  is  confusion  and  disorder;  but  both 
peoples  are  on  the  right  road,  and  if  given  time  and 
sympathetic  support,  they  will  reach  their  goal. 
America  and  the  Allied  nations  have  expressed  their 
faith  in  Russia,  and  have  pledged  themselves  to  stand 
by  her;  they  will  certainly  do  no  less  for  China.  In 
Japan,  as  well,  liberal  tendencies  are  appearing;  the 
country  is  at  the  cross-roads  of  its  history ; on  the  one 
hand,  facing  an  imperialistic  course  that  cannot  but 
mean  danger,  and  aggression  upon  its  neighbours;  on 
1 William  S.  Howe,  Asia,  July  18,  1918. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


147 


the  other  hand,  halting  before  the  decision  to  align 
itself  with  the  international  tendencies  of  the  age  in  a 
fair  and  friendly  national  policy  toward  all  the  world. 
These  aspirations  and  tendencies  in  Asia  must  be  con- 
sidered in  the  Peace  Conference.  The  writer  makes 
bold  to  say  that  unless  this  is  done,  the  consequences 
from  the  standpoint  of  a maintenance  of  the  world- 
peace  will  be  disastrous. 

Before  the  great  war  two  political  storm-centres 
were  recognized  in  the  world:  the  Balkans  in  the  Near 
East  and  China  in  the  Far  East.^  In  both  “ legitimate 
interests  ” of  the  various  nations  clashed  and  this  clash 
in  Europe  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  great  war.  It  is  hoped  that  the  Allied  peace 
terms  will  permanently  remove  the  causes  of  future 
conflict  in  the  Balkans  at  the  close  of  the  war;  they 
should  aim  at  no  less  satisfactory  a solution  of  the 
problems  in  China. 

A future  outbreak  in  the  Far  East  might  come  in 
one  of  two  ways : either  as  a result  of  international  fric- 
tion in  China;  or  through  a war  between  China  and 
Japan  which  would  involve  the  other  powers.  The 
story  of  the  growth  of  the  competitive  spheres  of  inter- 

1 “ China  will  become,  through  the  jealousy  and  the  indiffer- 
ence of  the  Western  Powers,  the  most  dangerous  storm-centre 
in  the  world  after  a European  peace  is  concluded.”  F.  W. 
Williams,  The  Nation,  November  22,  1917. 


148  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

est  in  China;  the  attempted  check  to  their  rivalry  and 
enforcement  of  the  status  quo  by  an  agreement  as 
to  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  ” and  equal  oppor- 
tunity; the  upsetting  of  this  situation  by  encroachments 
of  Russia  and  Japan;  has  already  been  told.  At  the 
close  of  the  great  war  there  will  be  a renewed  compe- 
tition for  China’s  trade  and  control  of  her  natural  re- 
sources and  the  means  of  transportation  and  produc- 
tion. Japan  has  tried  to  forestall  the  other  powers  by 
its  action  in  the  Twenty-one  Demands  and  the  Cheng- 
chiatung  affair.  Japanese  and  British  interests  as  a 
result  definitely  clash.  Russia,  France  and  Belgium 
are  also  involved.  If  no  clearly  recognized  principle 
of  justice  and  equity  is  to  be  enforced,  there  seems 
grave  probability  of  the  growth  of  friction  and  dissen- 
sion which  may  lead  to  future  armed  conflict. 

The  second  line  which  future  hostilities  might  take 
would  be  in  a clash  between  China  and  Japan  which 
would  eventually  involve  the  other  nations.  The  lack 
of  friendship  and  mutual  trust  between  the  Chinese 
and  the  Japanese  is  a disturbing  factor  in  the  Orient. 
These  feelings  of  ill-will  and  distrust  have  been  the 
outgrowth  of  a lack  of  justice  and  fair  play  in  their 
relations  with  each  other.  At  present  Japan  has  the 
ascendancy,  and  China  is  no  match  for  her  in  military 
power  or  national  strength;  but  if  China  goes  forward 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


149 


in  development,  as  it  would  seem  she  must,  an  armed 
struggle  in  the  future  seems  inevitable.  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  are  both  involved  in  defensive  alliances 
with  Japan,  but  they,  as  well  as  all  the  other  great  na- 
tions, have  relations  with  and  interests  in  China,  and 
it  would  seem  they  might  eventually  be  dragged  into 
such  a conflict. 

Such  possibilities  are  not  pleasant  to  contemplate ; the 
common-sense  view  would  seem  to  be,  not  to  ignore 
them,  but  to  take  action  at  the  close  of  the  war,  to  pre- 
vent their  development.  The  solution  would  seem  to 
lie  along  the  line  taken  in  the  adjusting  of  the  interna- 
tional difficulties  of  Europe. 

With  the  principles  of  this  adjustment,  China  is  in 
sympathy  and  although  hampered  by  internal  difficul- 
ties, she  has  made  what  contributions  she  could  to  the 
Allied  cause.  When  the  war  broke  out,  Germany’s 
commercial  interests  were  strongly  entrenched  through- 
out China;  Germany’s  trade  was  increasing  rapidly; 
German  interests  were  being  aggressively  and  success- 
fully pushed.  An  effort  had  been  made  to  secure  the 
adoption  in  the  higher  schools  of  China,  of  German 
as  the  only  foreign  language  to  be  taught  there;  and 
this  effort  very  nearly  succeeded.  Germany  had  seized 
and  fortified  an  important  military  and  naval  base  on 
the  Chinese  coast ; by  a widespread  campaign  of  propa- 


150  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

ganda,  German  victories  in  the  war  were  magnified 
and  Germany’s  future  importance  was  impressed  upon 
the  Chinese.  As  a result,  during  the  first  two  years  of 
the  war,  the  Chinese  were,  in  general,  mildly  pro-Ger- 
man. The  change  of  sentiment  expressed  by  the  sev- 
erance of  diplomatic  relations  and  the  declaration  of 
war,  was  great  indeed,  and  already  has  had  important 
effects  in  frustrating  Germany’s  hope  of  dominance  in 
the  Far  East.  German  and  Austrian  property  and 
banks  have  been  taken  into  custody  and  their  ships 
turned  over  to  the  Allies;  German  and  Austrian  sub- 
jects have  been  registered  and  interned.  In  the  sum- 
mer of  1918,  arrangements  were  made  in  compliance 
with  the  request  of  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  to 
transport  all  enemy  aliens  to  Australia.  This  step 
aroused  such  violent  threats  of  reprisals  by  Germany 
that  the  Allies,  led  by  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  re- 
quested China  not  to  carry  it  out.  The  desire  of  Ger- 
many to  keep  her  nationals  in  China,  reveals  her  esti- 
mate of  the  importance  of  her  interests  there,  and  it  is 
no  small  thing  from  the  standpoint  of  the  future  power 
of  Germany,  that  these  interests  have  been  virtually 
rendered  non-existent.^ 

In  the  second  place,  China  has  sent  large  forces  of 

1 The  Allies  in  October  made  a joint  statement  requesting 
more  stringent  control  over  German  activities  in  China. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  I5I 

labour  battalions  to  France  to  carry  on  work  behind 
the  lines  and  thus  relieve  soldiers  for  the  front.  They 
number  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand 
and  they  have  performed  very  efficient  service.^ 

In  a military  way,  Chinese  troops  are  co-operating 
with  the  Allied  force  which  has  entered  Siberia  and 
will  help  to  safeguard  the  long  boundaries  stretching 
from  the  coast  into  inner  Russia. 

Finally,  China  is  one  of  the  great  storehouses  of  the 
world’s  food  supply ; large  shipments  of  rice  and  eggs 
and  other  staples  have  been  made  to  the  Allies,  and 
these  shipments  will  increase  as  the  war  continues. 

On  August  19th,  announcement  was  made  that 
the  Chinese  Government  had  received  a thirty  million 
dollar  contract  for  building  ships  for  the  Allies  in  the 
shipyards  at  Shanghai. 

Concerning  China’s  future  contribution  to  the  Allies, 
if  a prolongation  of  the  war  should  make  this  neces- 
sary, Dr.  V.  K.  Wellington  Koo,  the  Chinese  Minister, 
speaking  on  Oct.  ist,  China  Day  of  the  fourth  Liberty 
Loan  Campaign,  in  New  York,  said  as  follows : 

“It  is  practical  to  say  that  with  a fair  supply  of 

1 The  distribution  of  these  labour-battalions,  according  to  a 
report  received  at  the  Chinese  Legation  in  Washington,  in  Oc- 
tober, 1918,  was  as  follows:  With  the  British  forces,  125,000; 

with  the  French,  40,000;  with  the  Americans,  6,000;  in  Meso- 
potamia and  Africa,  about  4,000.  Total,  175,000. 


152 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


equipment  in  ships,  not  only  labour  battalions,  but 
fighting  soldiers,  not  only  thousands  of  them  but  mil- 
lions of  them,  can  be  dispatched  to  Europe.  It  is 
equally  practical  to  say  that  with  a fair  amount  of  cap- 
ital the  natural  resources  of  China,  the  resources  of 
coal  and  iron,  of  copper  and  zinc,  of  antimony  and 
tungsten  — all  essential  articles  of  war, — can  be  devel- 
oped and  utilized  to  untold  advantage.  Even  produc- 
tion of  foodstuffs  can  be  so  increased  as  to  make  China 
the  world’s  great  granary  for  the  sustenance  of  the  En- 
tente troops.” 

After  China  entered  the  war,  the  Allies  granted  a 
temporary  suspension  of  the  payment  of  the  Boxer  In- 
demnity and  an  increase  in  the  tariff  rates  to  an  ef- 
fective 5 per  cent.  But  the  Chinese  feel  that  the  only 
ultimate  solution  for  their  national  difficulties  is  a 
recognition  by  the  other  powers  of  their  rights  as  a 
sovereign  nation,  with  all  that  this  implies  in  the  com- 
ing world-situation.  Their  deepest  hope  is  that  the 
principles  for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting  will  be  ap- 
plied to  the  Orient.  Thus  a prominent  Chinese  lawyer 
and  scholar.  Dr.  M.  T.  Z.  Tyau,  in  1917,  expressed  the 
national  attitude: 

For  the  great  powers  to  welcome  China  into  their 
charmed  circle  in  one  breath  and  in  the  next,  deny  her 
what  are  her  proper  attributes  and  prerogatives  as  an 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


153 


independent  sovereign  state  is  ingenious  and  disin- 
genuous. The  status  of  membership  in  the  Family 
of  Nations  having  been  acknowledged,  it  is  but  just 
that  all  her  sovereign  rights  should  be  completely 
restored  to  her.  Unless  this  is  done,  it  seems  that  this 
terrible  war  will  have  been  fought  in  vain.  We  are. 
however,  not  despondent  and  we  remain  confident  that 
at  the  post-bellum  peace  conference  full  justice  will  be 
done  to  her  rightful  claims,  because  out  of  this  ordeal 
of  fire  there  will  evolve  a world  in  which,  as  Lord  Grey 
said  on  March  22,  1915,  all  nations  will  be  ‘ free  to  live 
their  independent  lives,  working  out  their  form  of  gov- 
ernment for  themselves,  and  their  own  national  de- 
velopment, whether  they  be  great  nations  or  small 
states  — in  full  liberty.’  ” 

Dr.  Koo,  the  Chinese  minister  to  the  United  States, 
in  an  address  in  New  York  last  year,  expressed  the 
national  hope  of  the  present  time,  and  paid  a tribute 
to  the  example  America  had  set  in  its  relations  to  China 
which  might  be  prophetic  of  future  relations  with  the 
world  at  large.  He  said : 

In  the  first  place,  the  people  of  the  Far  East  feel 
that  in  any  reconstruction  which  may  take  place  after 
the  war,  the  Far  East  should  be  included;  that  the 
problems  of  the  Far  East  should  receive  due  consider- 
ation. ...  In  the  second  place,  the  reflective  minds  of 


154  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

the  Far  East  feel  that  not  only  the  problems  of  the  Far 
East  should  be  given  full  consideration,  but  also  the 
voices  of  the  Far  East  should  be  freely  heard  at  the 
council  board  of  nations.  . . . There  is,  in  the  third 
place,  yet  another  thought  which  is  quickening  the 
hearts  of  a very  large  portion  of  the  people  in  the  Far 
East,  particularly  of  the  people  in  China,  and  that  is, 
that  in  any  reconstruction  to  take  place  hereafter,  the 
base  of  the  foundation  should  be  built  upon  justice, — 
international  justice.  The  people  of  the  Far  East  in 
general  feel  that  every  act  of  aggression,  wherever 
arising,  should  be  a matter  of  concern,  not  only  of  the 
victim  and  oppressed,  but  should  also  be  of  serious 
interest  to  the  world  at  large;  for  every  act  of  aggres- 
sion or  oppression,  unchecked  and  uncondemned,  is 
sure  to  react  to  the  detriment  of  the  international  so- 
ciety. 

Here  between  China  and  the  United  States,  for  in- 
stance, we  have  a concrete  example  of  how  two  na- 
tions, always  basing  their  mutual  intercourse  on  jus- 
tice, could  get  along  in  cordial  relationship  and  in  per- 
fect understanding;  more  than  a century  of  trade  inter- 
course, eighty-seven  years  of  missionary  work,  seven 
decades  of  diplomatic  relations  and  nearly  half  a cen- 
tury of  educational  co-operation,  have  all  been  charac- 
terized by  a sustained  feeling  of  friendliness  and  cor- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


155 


diality,  so  that  Chinese  and  Americans,  wherever  they 
meet,  can  always  talk  to  each  other  without  hidden 
thoughts  and  with  perfect  confidence  in  the  good  will 
of  each  toward  the  other.  There  is  no  suspicion  or 
friction  between  them.  The  tw^o  countries  are  living 
in  a happy  state  of  friendship  that  grows  from  day  to 
day.  What  two  countries  have  done  can  be  accom- 
plished by  the  world  at  large.”  ^ 

The  problems  which  China  will  face  at  the  end  of  the 
war  will  be  many  and  various.  Most  of  them  come 
as  a result  of  the  attempts  to  adjust  a civilization  and 
political  organization,  which  have  come  down  practi- 
cally unchanged  from  past  centuries,  to  the  new  na- 
tional and  international  life  of  the  twentieth  century. 
Three  problems  especially  are  serious:  those  related 
to  the  political,  the  economic,  and  the  educational  con- 
ditions of  the  country. 

The  development  of  the  Republic  since  19 ii  has 
already  been  treated  in  some  detail.  At  present 
(October,  1918)  the  country  is  divided  into  a progres- 
sive South  with  headquarters  at  Canton;  a conserva- 
tive North  with  Peking  as  its  capital;  and  a more  or 
less  neutral  centre  situated  along  the  Yangtze  Valley, 
with  Nanking  as  its  chief  city.  Until  September  the 
administration  was  in  the  control  of  the  Northerners 
1 Current  History  Magazine,  November,  1917. 


156  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

and  the  neutrals,  with  Tuan  Chi-jui,  as  Premier,  rep- 
resenting the  first  group,  and  Feng  Kwo-chang,  from 
Nanking,  as  President,  representing  the  second.  On 
September  4th,  Hsu  Shih-chang,  a representative  of 
the  Northern  party,  was  elected  President  to  succeed 
Feng  Kwo-chang,  by  a Parliament  which  was  con- 
vened on  August  1 2th  in  Peking.  The  South  has  pro- 
tested against  the  Parliament  and  the  election  and  on 
October  6th  formally  declared  its  opposition  to  the 
President. 

The  development  of  this  unsatisfactory  situation 
followed  the  dissolution  of  Parliament,  on  June  12th, 
1917.  Later  a national  council  was  organized  by  the 
Northerners  which  revised  and  passed  laws  for  a new 
parliamentary  organization  and  election.  These  new 
laws  were  promulgated  in  February,  1918,  and  elec- 
tions were  held  in  the  spring  and  summer.  On  August 
1 2th,  the  new  parliament  was  convened  at  Peking. 
The  membership  of  the  former  assembly  had  been  870 ; 
that  of  the  new  one  was  reduced  to  573  (274  Senators 
and  405  representatives).  It  was  composed  largely  of 
former  officials  and  their  friends  and  relatives,  al- 
though there  was  a sprinkling  of  returned  students. 
The  two  speakers  elected,  Liang  Shih-yi  of  the  Senate, 
and  Wang  Yih-tang  of  the  House,  had  both  held  im- 
portant positions  under  Yuan  Shih-kai;  the  former  as 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


157 


his  chief  Secretary  and  Acting  Minister  of  Finance; 
and  the  latter  as  military  adviser  and  military  governor 
of  Kirin.  Liang  especially  was  associated  with  the 
movement  to  restore  the  Monarchy.  On  September 
4th,  in  accordance  with  the  new  election  law,  Parlia- 
ment elected  a president  to  succeed  Feng  Kwo-chang, 
who  had  followed  Li  Yuan-hung,  who  in  turn  had 
taken  office  at  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  The  new 
President’s  term  of  office  began  October  loth,  when 
the  first  presidential  term  dating  from  1913  was  held 
legally  to  have  expired.  Five  provinces  of  the  south 
and  southwest  abstained  from  any  participation  in  the 
preceding  events,  as  has  already  been  indicated. 

The  new  president  has  held  various  positions  of  im- 
portance under  the  Manchus,  being  Viceroy  of  Man- 
churia in  1907,  President  of  the  Privy  Council  under 
Prince  Ching,  and  one  of  the  two  guardians  of  the  Boy 
Emperor.  He  was  Secretary  of  State  of  the  Republic 
under  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  1915,  and  was  a close  friend, 
being  called  one  of  the  four  sworn  brothers,”  of 
Yuan.  At  the  time  of  his  election  to  the  presidency  he 
did  not  hold  an  official  position,  and  although  he  was 
the  candidate  of  the  military  party,  he  was  not  a mili- 
tary leader ; so  it  was  hoped  he  would  prove  acceptable 
to  the  Southern  Republicans.  After  his  election  he 
sent  out  a circular  telegram  calling  on  all  those  with 


158  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

administrative  experience  to  come  forward  to  assist  in 
solving  the  difficulties  confronting  the  country,  the 
chief  of  which  he  enumerated  as  the  unfinished  state  of 
the  constitution,  the  emptiness  of  the  treasury,  internal 
strife  and  brigandage,  and  the  certainty  that  after  the 
European  war,  China  would  be  the  centre  of  a vigorous 
commercial  contest. 

The  hope  that  the  new  President  would  command 
the  support  of  the  South  has  not  been  realized  and  the 
South  is  ranged  solidly  against  him.  Ever  since  the 
dissolution  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  the  coup 
d'etat  of  Chang  Hsun  in  July,  1917,  the  South  has  been 
in  a state  of  revolt,  its  two  chief  demands  being  the 
reconvening  of  the  dissolved  Parliament  and  the  return 
to  the  Provisional  Constitution  until  a permanent  one 
can  be  finally  drafted.  Among  the  Southern  leaders 
are  some  of  the  ablest  Chinese.  The  Administrative 
Council  includes  Sun  Yat-sen,  the  first  Provisional 
President  of  the  Republic;  Wu  Ting-fang,  former 
Minister  to  America;  Tang  Shao-yi,  former  Premier; 
Lu  Yung-ting,  formerly  military  Governor  of  Kwang- 
tung;  and  Tsen  Chun-hsuan,  President  of  the  Board  of 
Communications.  Members  of  the  former  Parliament 
had  gathered  at  Canton  and  on  August  8th  both  houses 
had  a quorum  and  set  about  completing  the  permanent 


Chinese  Labor  I)attalions  Ready  for  h'lnharkation  to  I^'rance. 

75jOoo  Chinese  have  been  sent  to  h ranee  for  work  l)eiiind  tlie  lines.  I liis  detachment  started  from  Tsinjitao,  formerly  a 

tJerman  stronghold  in  C'hina. 


1 


I 

I 


!| 

f: 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


159 


Constitution,  and  drafting  new  election  and  parliamen- 
tary-organization laws.  C.  T.  Wang,  formerly  vice- 
president  of  the  Senate,  and  chairman  of  the  committee 
for  drafting  the  permanent  constitution,  which  had 
practically  finished  its  work  before  the  dissolution  of 
Parliament  in  June,  1917,  is  acting  chairman  of  the 
new  Senate. 

Aside  from  this  direct  issue  between  the  North  and 
the  South,  the  chief  menace  to  a national  unity  has  been 
the  independent  control  of  the  various  provincial  gov- 
ernors over  large  bodies  of  troops  who  are  loyal  to 
them  rather  than  to  the  central  government,  and 
through  whose  support  the  governors  can  carry  out 
individual  policies  regardless  of  their  effect  upon  the 
welfare  of  the  nation  as  a whole.  The  leaders  in  the 
Northern  Government  have  also  adopted  a reckless 
course  of  borrowing  capital  from  Japan  in  order  to 
gain  support  for  their  military  operations  against  the 
South.  As  security,  they  have  apparently  mortgaged 
some  of  China’s  native  resources.  Further,  their  re- 
cent attempt  to  revive  the  opium  trade  has  called  forth 
a protest  from  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.^ 
But  despite  these  deficiencies  and  dissensions,  there  are 

1 On  November  20th  the  announcement  was  made  in  Peking 
that  the  government  had  purchased  and  would  destroy  the  entire 
stock  of  opium  remaining  in  China. 


i6o 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


grounds  for  hope  for  the  future.  The  Chinese  have 
shown  themselves  much  more  restrained  than  the 
Russians  in  their  attempt  to  set  up  a democracy  and 
should  gradually  achieve  national  unity  and  efficiency, 
even  though  allied  mediation  and  assistance  may  be- 
come a temporary  necessity  to  this  end. 

Economically,  China  is  in  a low  stage  of  develop- 
ment. She  has  not  passed  from  the  agricultural  and 
commercial  levels  to  the  industrial  and  manufacturing 
stages,  and  poverty  is  general  and  oppressive.  The 
standards  of  sanitation  and  public  health  are  among  the 
lowest  in  the  world.  There  is  a decided  lack  of  means 
of  transportation  by  road  or  by  rail.  There  is  no  ex- 
act system  of  coinage,  and  the  country  is  on  a silver 
basis,  and  is  subject  to  its  many  fluctuations.^  The 
governmental  resources,  such  as  the  maritime  tariff 
and  the  salt  customs,  are  under  the  control  of  foreign- 
ers, and  cannot  be  increased  without  their  consent. 
Further,  the  payment  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  has  taken 
much  of  these  revenues.  The  only  course  open  to  the 
government  has  been  to  borrow,  and  this  action  has 
saddled  upon  it  heavy  foreign  debts.  With  these  loans 
has  often  come  control  over  rights  within  the  country. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Japan  alone  has  loaned 

^ A hastily-devised  scheme  to  change  to  a gold  standard  simi- 
lar to  that  of  Japan,  which  was  announced  Aug.  loth,  1917,  was 
greeted  with  protests  by  the  international  interests  concerned. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


l6l 


to  China  over  $100,000,000/  thereby,  in  the  view  of 
the  Chinese,  increasing  its  hold  on  the  country.  On 
the  other  hand,  when  compared  to  the  enormous  war 
debts  which  the  other  nations  will  face  at  the  close 
of  the  present  struggle,  China  will  be  comparatively 
well  off,  its  total  foreign  debt  in  1917,  exclusive  of  rail- 
road debt,  being  about  $750,000,000,^  or  less  than 
$2.00  per  capita.  Already  attempts  are  being  made  to 
improve  the  hygienic  condition  of  the  cities,  and  to 
build  up  modern  industries.  Commerce  is  growing 
rapidly.^  The  Allies  have  granted  a temporary  sus- 
pension of  the  Boxer  indemnity  and  an  increase  in 
the  tariff;  and  a four-power  group,  consisting  of  Amer- 
ica, Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan,  is  contemplating, 
under  certain  conditions,  a loan  of  $50,000,000.^ 

1 The  exact  sum  was  198430,000  yen,  according  to  Millard's 
Review,  on  Aug.  10,  1918.  More  loans  have  been  made  since  then. 

(2  Putnam-Weale,  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,  p. 

379). 

^ Despite  the  most  adverse  conditions,  the  year  1917  was  a 
very  prosperous  one,  the  maritime  customs  collections  amount- 
ing to  over  $40,000,000,  an  increase  of  nearly  $10,000,000  over 
those  of  the  preceding  year.  The  foreign  trade  in  1917  totalled 
more  than  a billion  taels,  which  at  the  present  rate  of  exchange 
equalled  gold  $1,032,699,412. 

^ The  gravity  of  this  economic  situation  from  an  international 
standpoint  was  clearly  indicated  in  a recent  article  by  Dr.  Walter 
E.  Weyl  (Harper's  Magazine,  October,  1918)  ; 

“ The  urgent  and  increasing  need  of  industrial  progress 
renders  all  obstruction  unavailing.  The  world  is  pressing  in  on 


1 62  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

In  the  third  place,  the  educational  problem  is  a seri- 
ous one.  A comparatively  small  percentage  of  the 
Chinese  can  read  or  write  their  own  language.  The 
old  system  of  education  was  classical  and  literary,  and 
was  open  in  fact  only  to  a limited  number;  the  new  sys- 
tem will  be  practical  and  democratic,  available  for  the 
many.  In  1906,  the  first  step  was  taken  in  this  direc- 
tion; but  the  new  educational  movement  is  too  young 
to  have  attained  its  fullest  success.  Missionary  insti- 

China  and  the  Chinese  can  no  more  hold  off  this  advance  then 
they  can  withstand  modern  artillery  fire  with  their  ancient  city 
walls.  Year  by  year  the  European  nations  acquire  greater  rights 
and  wider  powers;  year  by  year  they  start  new  enterprises  and 
secure  new  concessions,  until  the  question  comes  to  be  not 
whether  China  will  be  developed,  but  merely  whether  the  Chinese 
themselves  will  do  the  job  or  step  aside  and  permit  strangers 
to  do  it.  Upon  the  answer  to  this  question,  upon  China’s  proved 
capacity  to  take  care  of  her  own  resources  and  utilize  them 
wisely,  hangs  the  immediate  independence  of  China  and  her 
whole  place  in  the  world.  China  will  either  grow  into  an  effec- 
tive and  capable  industrial  nation  or  will  be  held  subject,  at  least 
temporarily,  to  international  control  and  internatiqnal_exploita- 
tion.  She  will  develop  herself  or  be  developed  compulsorily  by 
other  nations  in  the  interest  of  other  nations.  , . . Imperialism, 
which  has  divided  up  Africa  and  much  of  western  Asia,  now 
knocks  at  China’s  door.  . . . How  it  will  all  end,  by  what  means, 
if  any,  China  will  be  enabled  to  hold  her  own,  to  develop  her- 
self and  take  her  equal  place  among  the  great  nations  — is  a 
baffling,  haunting  question,  a challenge  not  only  to  the  Chinese, 
but  to  those  friends  of  China  in  the  Western  World  who  wish 
this  problem  to  be  settled  justly  and  in  peace.” 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


163 


tutions,  staffed  and  financed  largely  by  foreigners,  have 
had  a large  share  in  the  awakening  of  the  people  to  the 
new  learning,  and  still  contribute  much  to  the  solving 
of  the  problem.  The  Central  Ministry  of  Education 
has  advised  the  teaching  in  all  the  schools  of  one  form 
of  the  Chinese  language  — mandarin, — instead  of  the 
various  dialects  now  prevalent.  As  in  Japan,  English 
is  the  best  known  foreign  tongue,  and  is  becoming  the 
general  language  of  the  educated  class,  as  French  was 
once  in  universal  use  in  Europe.  A republic  cannot 
exist  without  sufficient  means  of  transportation,  gen- 
eral education,  and  a strong  sentiment  of  national 
patriotism,  and  all  these  requisites  are  to  be  gained  only 
by  a solution  of  the  educational,  economic  and  political 
problems  of  the  nation. 

The  Chinese  are  among  the  first  to  admit  that  it  will 
take  a full  generation  to  solve  these  problems,  and  to 
bring  their  nation  within  measurable  distance  of  the 
present  stage  of  civilization  in  other  countries;  but  they 
believe  they  can  solve  them,  if  given  time,  and  if  freed 
from  the  menace  of  foreign  attack  or  invasion  of  their 
rights,  whether  military,  political  or  economic.  They 
hope  that  the  Peace  Conference  will  guarantee  them 
safety  and  freedom  to  work  out  their  destiny  unafraid. 
In  brief,  the  Chinese  feel  that  if  the  Allies  will  apply  to 
the  Orient  the  principles  for  which  they  are  fighting  in 


164  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  present  war,  the  future  of  their  Republic  will  be 
secured. 

Opposed  to  the  out-and-out  application  of  such  prin- 
ciples to  China,  there  have  been  suggested  two  alterna- 
tives, both  of  which  are  based  on  the  assumption  that 
the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Chinese  should  be  taken 
from  them  and  given  over  to  the  foreign  control,  either 
of  one,  or  of  a group,  of  nations,  which  would  under- 
take the  development  and  control  of  China’s  resources 
and  powers.  A temporary  supervision  of  her  finances 
might  be  justified,  but  in  general  these  alternatives  do 
not  seem  to  be  in  line  with  the  international  tendencies 
of  the  day ; they  would  open  the  way  for  an  imperialism 
which  in  turn  might  lead  to  new  discords  and  interna- 
tional rivalries,  as  already  indicated  in  an  earlier  por- 
tion of  this  chapter.  The  challenge  is  a direct  one  to 
the  Chinese  to  prove  by  their  unity  and  efficiency  that 
this  course  should  not  be  taken. 

Instead  of  a further  subtraction  of  the  sovereign 
rights  of  the  Chinese,  the  better  course  would  seem  to 
be  in  their  gradual  restoration  — with  possibly  tempo- 
rary assistance  and  regulation  in  an  economic  way, — 
somewhat  along  the  lines  indicated  by  Dr.  Wellington 
Koo,  the  Chinese  Minister,  in  his  speech  before  the 
National  Conference  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  165 

United  States  held  at  Long  Beach,  N.  Y.,  May  31st, 
1917: 

“ What  then  is  China’s  relation  to  the  world’s  fu- 
ture ? The  answer  really  depends  upon  what  policy  the 
other  nations  adopt  toward  China,  and  what  treatment 
they  accord  her.  To  be  more  definite,  it  depends  upon 
whether  they  continue  to  permit  themselves  or  any  one 
of  them,  to  commit  one  assault  after  another  on  her 
sovereignty;  or  seeing  the  injustice  of  these  acts,  ac- 
knowledge her  right  of  existence  and  extend  sympathy 
and  support  to  her  plans  for  progress.  It  depends 
upon  whether  they  continue  to  keep  the  shackles  of 
extra-territoriality,  treaty  tariffs,  leased  ports,  railway 
zones  and  the  like  around  her  body ; or,  recognizing  the 
unwisdom  of  such  a policy,  aid  her  to  remove  them  and 
restore  to  her  full  liberty  of  development.  It  depends 
upon  whether  they  remain  indifferent  to  attempts  on 
the  part  of  some  of  them  to  revive  the  doctrine  of  the 
spheres  of  influence  and  to  close  the  open  door  within 
her  borders ; or  appreciating  the  ultimate  consequences 
of  such  a course  and  the  desirability  of  keeping  the 
Chinese  market  open  to  international  trade  on  a footing 
of  equality,  help  China  batter  down  this  pernicious  doc- 
trine of  spheres  of  influence,  foil  these  selfish  attempts, 
and  maintain  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for 


1 66  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  trade  of  all  nations  in  all  parts  of  China.  It  de- 
pends upon  whether  they  permit  any  nation  to  wrest 
away  her  rich  resources  and  immense  man-power  from 
her  own  possession,  and  utilize  the  one  as  means  of 
aggrandizement  and  mould  the  other  into  instruments 
of  conquest;  or  realizing  the  possibilities  of  danger  to 
the  peace  of  the  Orient  and  the  world,  aid  China  to  con- 
serve these  resources  of  wealth  and  power  in  her  own 
hands  and  develop  them,  not  as  selfish  means  for  ag- 
gression, but  as  instruments  for  the  common  purposes 
of  peace.  In  short,  it  all  depends  upon  whether  they 
continue,  in  regard  to  China,  to  pursue  a selfish  policy 
of  obstruction,  interference  and  aggression,  hoping 
thereby  to  get  a share  in  whatever  spoils  may  come ; or 
whether  they  realize  that  such  a course  is  sure  to  lead 
to  conflicts,  rivalry  and  antagonism,  a disturbance  of 
the  peace  of  the  nations;  and  that  the  best  guarantee 
for  the  open-door  policy,  for  the  principle  of  equal  op- 
portunity and  impartial  trade  for  all,  and  for  the  devo- 
tion of  her  wonderful  resources  of  wealth  and  power 
to  peaceful  purposes,  lies  in  a strong  and  powerful 
China ; and  upon  whether,  realizing  all  this,  they  accord 
her  that  respect  for  her  rights  which  they  demand  of 
her  for  their  own  rights,  and  conscientiously  assist  her 
to  attain  the  end  which  is  to  be  desired  as  much  in  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  167 

common  interest  of  the  world  as  for  the  sake  of  her 
own  welfare.”  ^ 

An  out-and-out  application  of  the  principles  of  the 
Allies,  as  expressed  especially  by  recent  pronounce- 
ments of  their  statesmen,  would  seem  to  be  the  only 
course  consistent  with  this  point  of  view.  The  latest 
statements  of  the  aims  of  the  Allies  were  made  by 
President  Wilson  on  July  4,  and  on  September  27th, 
1918.  On  July  4th,  he  named  four  principles.  The 
first  was  : 

“ The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  any- 
where that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single 
choice  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world;  or,  if  it  cannot 
at  present  be  destroyed,  at  the  least  its  reduction  to 
virtual  impotence.” 

Ever  since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  China 
has  been  afraid  of  an  attack  by  a foreign  power;  she 
has  endeavoured  to  build  up  her  military  power;  over 
half  of  her  present  income  goes  to  the  support  of  her 
military  forces.  If  China  could  be  assured,  by  a joint 
agreement  of  the  nations,  that  the  peace  of  the  Far 
East  could  not  be  ‘‘  separately  and  secretly  disturbed  ” 
by  any  power,  it  could  turn  with  a free  mind  to  a solu- 
tion of  all  of  its  internal  problems  of  adjustment  to  the 

1 The  New  China  and  Her  Relation  to  the  World.  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Academy  of  Political  Science,  Volume  7,  No.  3. 


1 68  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD- WAR 

present  century.  The  money  which  is  now  being  spent 
to  maintain  its  army  could  be  invested  in  much  needed 
industrial  development  and  improvement,  and  the  prog- 
ress of  the  whole  country  would  be  greatly  accelerated. 

The  second  principle  enunciated  by  President  Wilson 
was : 

The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  ter- 
ritory, of  sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of 
political  relationship,  upon  the  basis  of  the  free  accept- 
ance of  that  settlement  by  the  people  immediately  con- 
cerned, and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  interests 
or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people  which  may 
desire  a different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own 
exterior  influence  or  mastery.” 

This  principle  would  have  a most  vital  effect  upon 
China’s  future.  Nearly  every  settlement,  of  territory, 
of  sovereignty,  or  of  economic  arrangement,  with  a 
foreign  power,  in  the  past,  with  the  exception  of  those 
concluded  with  the  United  States,  has  been  made  upon 
the  basis  of  the  material  interest  or  advantage  ” of 
that  power,  and  not  “ upon  the  basis  of  the  free  accept- 
ance of  that  settlement  ” by  China.  Practically  every 
settlement  has  been  made  on  an  exactly  opposite  princi- 
ple to  that  expressed  by  President  Wilson.  As  a re- 
sult, the  present  treaty-relations  between  China  and 
the  other  powers  are  distinctly  disadvantageous  to  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  169 

former.  A typical  Chinese  view  of  the  resulting  in- 
consistencies appeared  in  Millard’s  Reviezv  of  August 
24th,  1918,  written  by  Chuan  Chao: 

‘‘  Among  the  nations  China  has  been  least  understood 
and  most  criticized.  She  tried  to  adapt  herself  to  the 
western  civilization  by  adopting  the  republican  form  of 
government.  But  the  world  Powers  say  that  she  is 
unfit  because  in  the  period  of  her  reconstruction,  as  in 
that  of  France  and  of  the  United  States  after  their 
revolutions,  there  is  disorder.  She  attempted  to  live 
up  to  the  open-door  policy  of  John  Hay.  But  the 
United  States  recognizes  the  special  interests  of  Japan 
in  China,  especially  in  the  places  where  her  possessions 
are  contiguous.  After  the  foreign  Powers  have  pre- 
vented her  from  developing  her  resources  except  ac- 
cording to  their  dictation,  they  blame  her  for  industrial 
backwardness.  After  they  have  almost  deprived  her 
of  tarifT  revenue,  denied  her  the  right  of  tariff  legisla- 
tion, forced  her  to  lay  heavy  internal  taxes  on  necessi- 
ties, and  burdened  her  with  war  loans  for  wars  forced 
upon  her,  they  blame  her  for  financial  insolvency. 
After  they  have  negatived  her  territorial  jurisdiction 
in  the  extraterritorial  areas  by  lending  these  for  the 
refuge  of  revolutionists,  hot-beds  of  intrigue  and 
sources  of  vice,  they  blame  her  for  governmental  in- 
efficiency. After  they  have  forced  her  to  raze  all  forti- 


170 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


fications  between  the  capital  and  the  sea,  leased  the 
important  ports  for  their  naval  stations  and  stationed 
troops  constantly  on  Chinese  soil,  they  blame  her  for 
military  impotency.  As  a friendly  neighbour,  she  was 
presented  a series  of  twenty-one  demands.  As  a neu- 
tral, her  territory  was  invaded  in  spite  of  her  protest. 
As  an  ally  of  the  Entente,  her  alliance  has  been  util- 
ized for  the  consolidation  of  one  of  her  ally’s  position 
in  China.” 

This  viewpoint  is  perhaps  open  to  criticism,  as  many 
of  the  treaty  agreements  mentioned  were  the  result  of 
infringements  by  China  of  the  rights  of  other  nations. 
But  there  seems  to  be  little  question  of  the  necessity 
of  revising  the  treaties  if  justice  is  to  be  done.  This 
course  has  been  strongly  advocated  by  both  Chinese 
and  American  and  British  economists  and  writers. 
Thus  Dr.  M.  T.  Z.  Tyau,  writing  in  1917,  names  two 
reasons  for  this  revision ; first  because  of  the  vagueness 
of  the  wording  of  the  present  treaties  which  have 
caused  and  will  cause  serious  misunderstanding;  and 
secondly,  because  most  of  the  obligations  were  con- 
tracted half  a century  ago,  so  that  they  now  fetter  the 
free  growth  and  the  natural  development  of  the  new 
Republic,  to  the  serious  menace  of  even  its  self-preser- 
vation. ...  If  peace  in  the  Far  East,  as  well  as  the 
rest  of  the  world,  is  to  be  preserved,  the  contracting 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  I7I 

parties  will  have  to  treat  one  another  with  equal  respect 
and  consideration.  The  injustices,  the  inequalities, 
the  inconsistencies  of  the  past,  must  be  abolished,  and 
rational  bases  of  mutual  intercourse  substituted.”  ^ 
Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  writing  in  a similar  vein,  said: 
“ We  have  heard  the  public  pronouncements  of  the 
statesmen  of  the  powers,  that  after  the  war,  justice  and 
equality  will  rule  among  the  nations.  We  believe  in 
them,  and  have  great  hopes  of  them.  We  expect  that 
in  carrying  them  out  into  practice  in  China,  one  of  the 
first  things  that  will  be  done  will  be  a reasonable  and 
equitable  revision  of  our  treaties.”  ^ Doctor  S.  K. 
Hornbeck,  speaking  before  the  National  Conference 
on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  June  ist, 
1917,  said:  “Various  of  the  old  far-eastern  agree- 

ments should,  by  international  agreement,  be  legislated 
out  of  existence.  There  should  be  a cleaning  of  the 
old  slate,  with  its  entries  of  individualism.  There 
should  be  new  agreements,  entered  into  by  all  the  inter- 
ested powers,  drafted  on  the  principle  of  fair  play  for 
all,  with  full  respect  for  the  rights  of  all,  and  establish- 
ing effective  limitations  upon  the  hitherto  assumed 
right  of  each  state,  because  independent,  to  act  inde- 

Legal  Obligations  Arising  out  of  Treaty  Relations  between 
China  and  other  States,  pages  207-217. 

2 Introduction  to  above,  page  8. 


172 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


pendently  and  with  a view  to  its  own  peculiar  and 
selfish  interests.”  Mr.  B.  L.  Putnam-Weale,  a British 
writer,  has  asserted  that  the  entire  politico-economic 
relationship  between  the  Republic  and  the  world,  must 
be  remodelled  at  the  earliest  possible  opportunity ; every 
agreement  which  has  been  made  since  the  Treaties  of 
i860  being  carefully  and  completely  revised.”  ^ 

Finally,  the  friendship  between  China  and  Japan 
would  be  increased  if  their  economic  relations  were 
governed  by  the  principle  of  voluntary  mutual  agree- 
ment. There  has  been  growing  up  a cloud  of  sus- 
picion and  distrust  between  the  two  countries  which 
only  a recognition  of  such  a principle  can  clear  away. 
If  this  principle  were  recognized  and  upheld,  an  impor- 
tant step  forward  would  be  taken  toward  making  the 
peace  of  the  Orient  secure. 

President  Wilson’s  third  principle  was : 

“ The  consent  of  all  nations  to  be  governed  in  a con- 
duct toward  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of 
honour  and  of  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilized 
society  that  govern  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern 
States  in  their  relations  with  one  another;  to  the  end 
that  all  promises  and  covenants  may  be  sacredly  ob- 
served, no  private  plots  or  conspiracies  hatched,  no 

1 Putnam-Weale,  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,  page 
375- 


Copyright  by  Underwood  & Underwood,  N.  Y. 

Dr.  K.  Wellington  Koo,  Chinese  Minister  to  America,  after  receiv-  • 
ing  an  Honorary  Degree  from  Columbia  University  in  1917. 

Dr.  Koo  is  a graduate  of  Columbia  University  and  has  received  the  degree  of 
Doctor  of  Philosophy  from  that  institution.  He  is  the  youngest  member  of  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  at  Washington.  On  his  left  is  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore 
of  Columbia  University. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


173 


selfish  injuries  wrought  with  impunity,  and  a mutual 
trust  established  upon  the  handsome  foundation  of 
a mutual  respect  for  right.” 

The  present  situation  in  China  is  analogous  in  a 
lesser  degree  to  that  in  Russia;  both  countries  offer 
supreme  opportunities  for  exploitation,  or  for  disinter- 
ested assistance.  Like  Russia,  China  needs  help.  She 
needs  help  in  every  phase  of  her  new  life.  She  looks 
to  the  Occident  for  that  help;  and  if  this  principle  were 
applied,  she  would  not  look  in  vain.  The  definite  as- 
sistance which  other  countries,  and  especially  America, 
could  give  China,  was  outlined  by  C.  T.  Wang,  for- 
merly Vice  President  of  the  Senate,  in  a speech  made  in 
1917.  This  speech  was  delivered  before  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  Agreement  was  concluded.  Mr.  Wang  sug- 
gested political,  financial  and  industrial  assistance. 
His  remarks  were  made  just  after  the  attempted 
restoration  of  the  Manchus,  when  there  seemed  to  be 
doubt  as  to  the  ability  of  the  Republic  to  survive,  with- 
out external  assistance.  Mr.  Wang  said: 

‘‘  In  this  vital  struggle,  where  shall  America,  the 
champion  of  democracy,  stand?  We  entirely  agree 
with  Mr.  Millard  (an  eminent  journalist)  in  his  views 
expressed  through  the  editorial  columns  in  the  last  issue 
of  his  paper,  which  we  will  reproduce  here  for  em- 
phasis : 


174 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


''  ‘ A primary  requisite  is  that,  as  between  reversion 
to  an  archaic  monarchy,  or  the  retention  of  a military 
oligarchy,  or  a graduated  advance  toward  genuine  re- 
publicanism, the  influence  of  the  United  States  ought 
to  be  thrown  definitely  to  bring  about  the  latter  alter- 
native. If  this  leads  to  quasi-interference  in  Chinese 
politics,  then  that  responsibility  must  be  faced.  It  is 
becoming  rather  ridiculous,  at  a time  when  America  is 
engaged  in  a world- war,  when  the  whole  life  of  the 
American  people  is  being  readjusted  to  meet  these  war 
conditions,  and  with  the  avowed  principal  object  of 
saving  democratic  principle  of  government  from  being 
smothered  by  autocratic  militarism,  that  the  power  and 
influence  of  the  United  States  should  be  applied  in  one 
place  abroad,  and  should  not  be  applied  in  another  place 
abroad ; that  direct  American  assistance  should  be 
accorded  to  some  nations  that  are  trying  to  cast  off  the 
yoke  of  autocracy,  and  be  denied  to  other  nations  that 
are  making  the  same  effort.’ 

Besides  political  assistance  America  is  also  in  an 
excellent  position  to  aid  China  financially  — of  which 
she  stands  so  much  in  need. 

A third  way  in  which  America  can  help  China  is  to 
bring  into  China  a sufficient  number  of  experts  who  can 
aid  China  to  establish  and  develop  large  industrial 
plants  and  factories  and  to  train  and  bring  up  a large 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  1 75 

force  of  native  industrial  and  technical  leaders. 

“ We  beg  to  advance  these  three  ways  for  America 
to  aid  China.  The  political  assistance  aims  to  renew 
the  open  door  policy  and  to  influence  the  Entente  Pow- 
ers to  maintain  the  same  principles  of  liberty,  constitu- 
tionalism and  democracy  in  China  as  they  are  fighting 
to  maintain  on  the  battlefield  of  Europe.  The  financial 
aid  is  to  be  directed  at  the  industrial,  commercial  and 
other  productive  development  of  the  country.  The  in- 
troduction of  industrial  and  technical  experts  has  for 
its  objective  the  improved  methods  of  administration 
of  existing  revenue-producing  organs  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  establishment  of  other  productive  organiza- 
tions, and  the  training  of  Chinese  youths  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  direct,  maintain  and  develop  such  organiza- 
tions.” ^ 

1 Note  on  Investment  of  Foreign  Capital  in  China. 

The  following  extract  is  taken  from  an  address  by  Dr.  S.  K. 
Hornbeck  before  the  National  Conference  on  Foreign  Relations 
of  the  United  States  at  Long  Beach,  N.  Y.,  June  ist,  1917. 

“ China  needs  capital.  She  must  get  it,  she  is  eager  to  have 
it.  She  has  repeatedly  asked  it  of  us.  'Without  capital  she 
cannot  develop  her  resources.  Upon  the  development  of  her 
resources  depends  the  increasing  of  her  power  to  sell  and  to 
buy.  Upon  this  depends  her  economic  and  probably  her  po- 
litical salvation.  All  this  means  that  there  must  be  investments 
— capital  from  abroad.  But  investments  in  China  require,  un- 
der existing  conditions,  the  giving  and  taking  of  concessions, 
with  a certain  amount  of  foreign  supervision.  There  is  noth- 


176 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


The  final  principle  before  the  Allies  was : 

“ The  establishment  of  an  organization  of  peace 
which  shall  make  it  certain  that  the  combined  power  of 
free  nations  will  check  every  invasion  of  right,  and 
serve  to  make  peace  and  justice  the  more  secure,  by 

ing  inherently  evil  in  the  process.  The  thing  that  is  desirable 
is  that  investments  and  concessions  — those  on  a large  scale  at 
least  — be  subjected  to  regulation.  The  present  evil  lies  in  ab- 
sence of  regulations,  in  extreme  individualism.  There  should 
be  regulation  through  a group  of  governments  — including  the 
Chinese  — on  a basis  of  co-operation.  We  should  offer  our 
capital  only  where  we  are  assured  that  it  will  not  be  used  to 
further  political  ends  of  which  we  do  not  approve.  If  we  think 
to  avert  rather  than  to  precipitate  conflict,  if  we  are  seriously 
interested  in  the  problem  of  developing  China’s  resources  with 
a minimum  of  friction,  we  must  work  for  something  more 
promising  than  a new  application  of  the  old  individualistic  prin- 
ciple. . . . This  suggests  nothing  short  of  general,  that  is,  ex- 
tended, international  co-operation  for  the  placing  of  capital  in 
China.  ...  It  would  require  frank  co-operation  on  the  part  of 
the  governments  of  those  states  which  have  capital  for  foreign 
investment.  ...  As  a group,  the  co-operating  states,  including 
and  with  the  consent  of  China,  could  determine  the  distribution 
and  guarantee  the  security  of  capital  accepted  for  Chinese  en- 
terprises. . . . Administration  of  special  securities,  where  re- 
quired, should  be  subject  to  international  personnel,  after  the 
model  of  the  Chinese  Customs  Service.  It  should  be  under- 
stood that  no  concession  should  be  taken  and  no  investment 
be  made  which  had  not  the  approval  of  the  Chinese  government. 
...  If  there  is  any  region  in  the  world  today  in  which  it  is 
practicable  to  attempt  the  experiment  of  a league  of  forces, 
economic  and  political,  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace,  that 
region  is  to  be  found  in  the  field  which  has  long  been  a battle 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


177 


affording  a definite  tribunal  of  opinion  to  which  all 
must  submit,  and  by  which  every  international  read- 
justment that  cannot  be  amicably  agreed  upon  by  the 
peoples  directly  concerned,  shall  be  sanctioned.” 

Both  China  and  Japan  desire  inclusion  in  the  mem- 
bership of  this  “ league  of  nations.”  If  they  are  not 
thus  included,  a new  international  alignment  may 
occur,  which  would  have  potential  possibilities  for  a 
new  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  question  has  been  put 
directly  to  Japan  as  to  the  possibilities  of  an  alliance 
with  Germany,  after  the  war,  and  Premier  Terauchi 
answered  that  this  were  possible  only  if  Japan  found 
herself  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  powers.  In  a 
written  interview  published  in  the  Outlook  (New 
York)  of  May  ist,  1918,  in  reply  to  the  question  of 
i^Ir.  Mason,  a representative  of  the  Outlook,  “ What 
are  the  chances  for  an  alliance  between  Japan  and  Ger- 
many? ” Count  Terauchi  replied:  That  will  depend 

entirely  on  how  the  present  war  may  end.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  predict  the  changes  which  the  conclusion  of  the 

ground  of  trade,  concessions  and  investments  — the  Far  East.” 
F.  N.  {Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Political  Science  (N.  Y.), 
Vol.  VII,  No.  3,  PP.  92-98). 

The  announcement  made  on  July  29th  of  the  intention  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  support  bankers  in  joining  in  a 
loan  of  $50,000,000,  with  Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan,  seems 
to  be  in  line  with  these  principles. 


178  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

war  may  bring.  If  the  exigencies  of  international  re- 
lationships demand  it,  Japan,  being  unable  to  anoint ain 
a position  of  total  isolation,  may  be  induced  to  seek  an 
ally  in  Germany.  But,  as  far  as  I can  judge  from  the 
existing  conditions  of  affairs,  I see  no  such  danger. 
In  other  words,  I believe  that  Japan’s  relations  with  the 
Entente  Allies  will  continue  unaltered  after  the  present 
war.” 

This  statement  of  the  Premier  has  been  generally 
criticized  by  the  Japanese  press,  and  on  Sept.  30th  he 
was  succeeded  by  Kei  Kara,  a commoner,  and  the 
leader  of  the  Seiyukai  Party  (constitutionalists),  but 
it  indicates  a possibility  which  might  develop  in  the 
Orient  if  the  nations  there  are  not  included  in  a world- 
organization.  If  such  a world-league  and  a tribunal 
of  world  opinion  were  set  up,  it  would  at  once  prevent 
any  new  acts  of  aggression  against  either  Japan  or 
China.  Such  a solution  would  be  a welcome  one. 
China  especially  is  pacific,  and  its  ideals  are  in  line  with 
those  of  such  an  organization.  Dr.  W.  C.  Dennis,  the 
new  American  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, in  August,  voiced  the  approval  of  the  Chinese  of 
such  a proposed  league.  After  discussing  its  possi- 
bilities and  its  drawbacks,  he  said : 

“ The  proposed  plan,  if  practicable,  is  of  the  great- 
est possible  interest  to  those  nations  which,  like  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA 


179 


United  States  and  China,  have,  taking  their  history  as 
a whole,  consciously  sought  the  victories  of  peace 
rather  than  those  of  war.  It  is  in  accordance  with 
the  genius  of  their  institutions  and  the  desires  of  their 
peoples.”  ^ 

On  September  27th,  1918,  President  Wilson  again 
expressed  the  attitude  of  the  American  Government 
toward  Peace.  His  main  emphasis  was  upon  the 
necessity  of  absolute  justice  regardless  of  whom  this 
principle  might  affect;  upon  the  necessity  of  absolute 
publicity  of  all  treaties  and  agreements;  and  a decided 
opposition  to  any  special  alliances  or  economic  com- 
binations within  the  league  itself.  All  these  condi- 
tions have  a peculiar  applicability  to  the  situation  in 
the  Orient,  especially  in  reference  to  China.  At  times 
there  seems  to  be  a tendency  on  the  part  of  the  Amer- 
ican and  European  public  to  be  indifferent  to  the  fate 
of  the  Orientals,  but  President  Wilson’s  first  condition 
was  that  impartial  justice  which  is  meted  out  must 
involve  no  discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we 
wish  to  be  just  and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to 
be  just.  It  must  be  a justice  that  plays  no  favourites 
and  knows  no  standard  but  the  equal  rights  of  the  sev- 
eral peoples  concerned.”  Further,  there  has  seemed 

1 From  the  Chinese  Social  and  Political  Science  Review, 
quoted  in  Millard’s  Review,  Aug.  10,  1918. 


i8o 


CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 


to  be  a disposition  on  the  part  of  people  in  the  Occi- 
dental world  to  allow  Japan,  or  any  other  nation  or 
group  of  nations,  to  make  any  terms  which  they  could 
with  China,  but  President  Wilson’s  second  principle 
would  rule  this  out,  as  “ no  special  or  separate  inter- 
est of  any  single  nation  or  any  group  of  nations  can  be 
made  the  basis  of  any  part  of  the  settlement  which  is 
not  consistent  with  the  common  interests  of  all.”  The 
principle  of  the  open  door  ” and  equal  opportun- 
ity ” would  be  enforced  by  the  third  and  fourth  re- 
quirements of  this  Allied  peace  program;  namely,  that 
there  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliance  or  special  cove- 
nants and  understandings  within  the  general  and  com- 
mon family  by  the  league  of  nations;  or  specifically 
there  can  be  no  special,  selfish  economic  combinations 
within  the  league  and  no  employment  of  any  form  of 
economic  boycott  or  exclusion  except  as  the  power  of 
economic  penalty  by  exclusion  from  the  markets  of 
the  world  may  be  vested  in  the  league  of  nations  itself 
as  a means  of  discipline  and  control.”  Finally,  there 
are  to  be  no  more  secret  agreements,  as  ‘‘  all  interna- 
tional agreements  and  treaties  of  every  kind  must  be 
made  known  in  their  entirety  to  the  rest  of  the  world.” 
This  point  alone  would  free  the  relations  of  China  and 
Japan  from  much  of  the  suspicion  which  is  gathered 
about  the  secret  negotiations  following  the  Twenty- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  CHINA  l8l 

one  Demands,  the  Sino-Japanese  Military  Agreement, 
and  frequent  accusations  of  the  Chinese  press  that  their 
officials  were  about  to  “ sell  China  ” to  Japan. 

Summarizing  his  principles  in  the  form  of  questions. 
President  Wilson,  on  Sept.  27th,  said,  “ Shall  strong 
nations  be  free  to  wrong  weak  nations  and  make  them 
subject  to  their  purpose  and  interest?  Shall  there  be 
a common  standard  of  right  and  privilege  for  all  peo- 
ples and  nations,  or  shall  the  wrong  do  as  they  will  and 
the  weak  suffer  without  regrets?”  As  if  in  answer 
to  these  questions  comes  the  cry  of  Kang  Yu-wei  and 
his  countrymen  from  the  other  side  of  the  world : 
“ There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  army  of  righteousness 
which  will  come  to  the  assistance  of  weak  nations!  ” ^ 
The  issue  for  the  Orient  as  well  as  the  Occident  seems 
to  be  clear-cut.  The  President  has  said : “ These 

issues  must  be  settled  — by  no  arrangement  or  compro- 
mise or  adjustment  of  interests,  but  definitely  and 
once  for  all  and  with  a full  and  unequivocal  acceptance 
of  the  principle  that  the  interest  of  the  weakest  is  as 
sacred  as  the  interest  of  the  strongest.” 

No  human  being  can  view  the  incalculable  loss  of 
human  life  and  wealth  that  is  being  wrought  by  the 
Great  War,  and  remain  unmoved.  For  what  pur- 
pose is  this  waste  ? ” Only  in  the  achievement  of  some 


1 See  page  85. 


1 82  CHINA  AND  THE  WORLD-WAR 

such  principles  as  given  above  can  any  such  loss  be 
reconciled.  These  principles  must  be  no  less  than 
worldwide  in  their  application;  they  should  extend 
not  only  to  the  free  peoples  of  Europe  and  America, 
but  also  to  the  newborn  democracies  of  the  Mongol 
and  the  Slav.  Especially  do  they  concern  the  vast  re- 
public across  the  Pacific,  whose  future  relations  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  are  so  full  of  potential  possibili- 
ties for  discord  or  for  peace.  The  importance  of  these 
relations  was  summarized  twenty  years  ago  by  John 
Hay  in  two  sentences:  “The  storm-centre  of  the 

world  has  gradually  shifted  to  China.  . . . Whoever 
understands  that  mighty  Empire  socially,  politically, 
economically,  religiously,  has  a key  to  world-politics 
for  the  next  five  centuries.”  Against  the  background 
of  the  great  democratic  upheavals  in  the  East  that  are 
just  beginning  to  take  concrete  shape  and  expression, 
and  of  the  costly  cataclysm  in  the  West  which  seems 
at  last  to  be  nearing  its  concluding  phases,  these  state- 
ments have  a new  meaning,  both  as  a warning  and  a 
prophecy,  concerning  the  new  age  which  is  to  come. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDICES 


1.  The  “Black-Dragon’’  Statement  of  Japanese 

Policy  in  China  as  a result  of  the  European 
War.  (Written  in  1914.) 

2.  Documents  relating  to  the  Twenty-one^ Demands 

made  by  Japan  on  China,  in  1915. 

3.  Official  Statements  in  Relation  to  the  Lansing- 

Ishii  Agreement  between  America  and  Japan 
concerning  China,  in  1917. 

4.  Summary  of  Treaties  and  Agreements  with  Refer- 

ence to  the  Integrity  and  Sovereign  Rights  of 
China,  and  the  “ Open  Door  ” Policy  and 
“ Equality  of  Opportunities.” 

5.  Summary  of  Treaties  and  Agreements  with  Refer- 

ence to  Korea. 

An  Introductory  Bibliography  on  China. 


APPENDIX  I 


THE  “BLACK-DRAGON”  STATEMENT  OF  JAPANESE 
POLICY  IN  CHINA  AS  A RESULT  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  WAR.  (WRITTEN  IN  1914.) 

EXPLANATORY  NOTE 

The  following  statement  of  Japanese  foreign  policy 
was  surprisingly  accurate  in  its  forecasting  of  future 
events.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  these  events  are 
suggested  in  this  paper.  The  statement  is  made  that 
on  account  of  the  absorption  of  the  European  nations 
in  the  Great  Wd-v,  “ now  is  the  most  opportune  mo- 
ment for  Japan  to  quickly  solve  the  Chinese  question. 
We  should  by  all  means  decide  and  act  at  once.” 
Within  a month,  or  two  months  after  this  statement 
was  made,  the  Twenty-one  Demands  were  serv^ed  on 
China.  Most  of  their  terms  were  mentioned  in  the 
list  of  objections  under  the  Secret  Terms  of  the  De- 
fensive Alliance.”  This  Defensive  Alliance  was  even- 
tually concluded  three  years  later  in  May,  1918.  The 
share  of  Japan  in  assisting  the  revolutionists  to  stir 
up  trouble  in  China  was  also  mentioned.  “ We  should 
induce  the  Chinese  Revolutionists,  the  Imperialists  and 
other  Chinese  malcontents  to  create  trouble  all  over 
China.”  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  considered  an  avowed 
enemy  of  Japan;  and  the  Black  Dragon  Society  ad- 
vised his  overthrow.  “ The  whole  country  will  be 

i8s 


APPENDICES 


1 86 

thrown  into  disorder  and  Yuan’s  Government  will  con- 
sequently be  overthrown.”  The  Agreement  concluded 
with  Russia  in  1916  was  forecasted  in  the  statement: 
At  this  moment  it  is  of  paramount  importance  for 
Japan  to  come  to  a special  understanding  with  Russia 
to  define  our  respective  spheres  in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia so  that  the  two  countries  may  co-operate  with 
each  other  in  the  future.”  The  Lansing-Ishii  agree- 
ment in  1917  was  suggested  in  the  phrases:  “what 
Japan  must  now  somewhat  reckon  with  is  America; 
but  America  in  her  attitude  towards  us  regarding  our 
policy  toward  China  has  already  declared  the  principle 
of  maintaining  China’s  territorial  integrity  and  equal 
opportunity,  and  will  be  satisfied,  if  we  do  not  impair 
America’s  already  acquired  rights  and  privileges.” 
Even  the  very  phrases  which  Count  Terauchi  used  in 
May,  1918,  in  answer  to  the  question  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  a Japanese  alliance  with  Germany  appeared 
in  this  document.  “ Japan  will  he  isolated  from  the 
European  powers  after  the  war,  and  will  be  regarded 
by  them  with  envy  and  jealousy  just  as  Germany  is 
now  regarded.” 

Thus  practically  all  the  great  decisions  in  Japanese 
foreign  policy  since  the  Great  War,  as  they  affected 
her  relations  with  China,  with  Russia,  and  with  Amer- 
ica, were  forecasted  in  this  Black  Dragon  Memoran- 
dum. Consequently,  the  statement  as  a whole,  and  any 
objectives  it  mentions,  which  have  not  as  yet  been 
reached,  have  more  than  an  ordinary  interest. 


APPENDICES  187 

THE  BLACK  DRAGON  MEMORANDUM 

PART  I.  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR  AND  THE  CHINESE 
QUESTION 

The  present  gigantic  struggle  in  Europe  has  no 
parallel  in  history.  Not  only  will  the  equilibrium  of 
Europe  be  affected  and  its  effect  felt  all  over  the  globe, 
but  its  results  will  create  a New  Era  in  the  political 
and  social  world.  Therefore,  whether  or  not  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  can  settle  the  Far 
Eastern  Question  and  bring  to  realization  our  great 
Imperial  policy  depends  on  our  being  able  to  skilfully 
avail  ourselves  of  the  world’s  general  trend  of  affairs 
so  as  to  extend  our  influence  and  to  decide  upon  a 
course  of  action  towards  China  which  shall  be  prac- 
tical in  execution.  If  our  authorities  and  people  view 
the  present  European  War  with  indifference  and  with- 
out deep  concern,  merely  devoting  their  attention  to 
the  attack  on  Kiaochow,  neglecting  the  larger  issues 
of  the  war,  they  will  have  brought  to  naught  our 
great  Imperial  policy,  and  committed  a blunder  greater 
than  which  it  can  not  be  conceived.  We  are  con- 
strained to  submit  this  statement  of  policy  for  the 
consideration  of  our  authorities,  not  because  we  are 
fond  of  argument  but  because  we  are  deeply  anxious 
for  our  national  welfare. 

No  one  at  present  can  foretell  the  outcome  of  the 
European  War.  If  the  Allies  meet  with  reverses  and 
victory  shall  crown  the  arms  of  the  Germans  and 
Austrians,  German  militarism  will  undoubtedly  domin- 


APPENDICES 


1 88 

ate  the  European  Continent  and  extend  southward  and 
eastward  to  other  parts  of  the  world.  Should  such  a 
state  of  affairs  happen  to  take  place  the  consequences 
resulting  therefrom  will  be  indeed  great  and  exten- 
sive. On  this  account  we  must  devote  our  most  seri- 
ous attention  to  the  subject.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Germans  and  Austrians  should  be  crushed  by  the 
Allies,  Germany  will  be  deprived  of  her  present  status 
as  a Federated  State  under  a Kaiser.  The  Federa- 
tion will  be  disintegrated  into  separate  states  and 
Prussia  will  have  to  be  content  with  the  status  of  a 
second-rate  Power.  Austria  and  Hungary,  on  ac- 
count of  this  defeat,  wdll  consequently  be  divided. 
What  their  final  fate  will  be,  no  one  would  now  ven- 
ture to  predict.  In  the  meantime  Russia  will  annex 
Galicia  and  the  Austrian  Poland;  France  will  repossess 
Alsace  and  Lorraine;  Great  Britain  will  occupy  the 
German  Colonies  in  Africa  and  the  South  Pacific: 
Servia  and  Montenegro  will  take  Bosnia,  Herzegovina 
and  a certain  portion  of  Austrian  territory;  thus  mak- 
ing such  great  changes  in  the  map  of  Europe  that 
even  the  Napoleonic  War  in  1815  could  not  find  a 
parallel. 

When  these  events  take  place,  not  only  will  Europe 
experience  great  changes,  but  we  should  not  ignore  the 
fact  that  they  will  occur  also  in  China  and  in  the  South 
Pacific.  After  Russia  has  replaced  Germany  in  the 
territories  lost  by  Germany  and  Austria,  she  will  hold 
a controlling  influence  in  Europe,  and,  for  a long 
time  to  come,  will  have  nothing  to  fear  from  her  west- 


APPENDICES 


189 


ern  frontier.  Immediately  after  the  war  she  will  make 
an  effort  to  carry  out  her  policy  of  expansion  in  the 
East  and  will  not  relax  her  effort  until  she  has  acquired 
a controlling  influence  in  China.  At  the  same  time, 
Great  Britain  will  strengthen  her  position  in  the 
Yangtze  V'alley  and  prohibit  any  other  country  from 
getting  a footing  there.  France  will  do  likewise  in 
Yunnan  province,  using  it  as  her  base  of  operations 
for  further  encroachments  upon  China  and  never  hesi- 
tate to  extend  her  advantages.  We  must  therefore 
seriously  study  the  situation,  remembering  always  that 
the  combined  action  of  Great  Britain,  Russia  and 
France  will  not  only  affect  Europe  but  that  we  can 
even  foresee  that  it  will  also  affect  China. 

Whether  this  combined  action  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land, France  and  Russia  is  to  terminate  at  the  end  of 
the  war  or  to  continue  to  operate,  we  can  not  now 
predict.  But  after  peace  in  Europe  is  restored,  these 
Powers  will  certainly  turn  their  attention  to  the  ex- 
pansion of  their  several  spheres  of  interest  in  China, 
and,  in  the  adjustment,  their  interests  will  most  likely 
conflict  with  one  another.  If  their  interests  do  not 
conflict,  they  will  work  jointly  to  solve  the  Chinese 
Question.  On  this  point  we  have  not  the  least  doubt. 
If  England,  France  and  Russia  are  actually  to  com- 
bine for  the  coercion  of  China,  what  course  is  to  be 
adopted  by  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  to  meet 
the  situation?  What  proper  means  shall  we  employ 
to  maintain  our  influence  and  extend  our  interests 
within  this  ring  of  rivalry  and  competition?  It  is 


190 


APPENDICES 


necessary  that  we  bear  in  mind  the  final  results  of 
the  European  War  and  forestall  the  trend  of  events 
succeeding  it  so  as  to  be  able  to  decide  upon  a policy 
towards  China  and  determine  the  action  to  be  ulti- 
mately taken.  If  we  remain  passive,  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government’s  policy  towards  China  will  lose 
that  subjective  influence  and  our  diplomacy  will  be 
checked  forever  by  the  combined  force  of  the  other 
Powers.  The  peace  of  the  Far  East  will  be  thus 
endangered  and  even  the  existence  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  as  a nation  will  no  doubt  be  imperiled.  It 
is  therefore  our  first  important  duty  at  this  moment 
to  enquire  of  our  Government  what  course  is  to  be 
adopted  to  face  that  general  situation  after  the  war. 
What  preparations  are  being  made  to  meet  the  com- 
bined pressure  of  the  Allies  upon  China?  What 
policy  has  been  followed  to  solve  the  Chinese  Ques- 
tion? When  the  European  War  is  terminated  and 
peace  restored  we  are  not  concerned  so  much  with  the 
question  whether  it  be  the  Dual  Monarchies  or  the 
Triple  Entente  which  emerge  victorious,  but  whether, 
in  anticipation  of  the  future  expansion  of  European 
influence  in  the  Continents  of  Europe  and  Asia,  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  should  or  should  not 
hesitate  to  employ  force  to  check  the  movement  be- 
fore this  occurrence.  Now  is  the  most  opportune 
moment  for  Japan  to  quickly  solve  the  Chinese  Ques- 
tion. Such  an  opportunity  will  not  occur  for  hun- 
dreds of  years  to  come.  Not  only  is  it  Japan’s  divine 
duty  to  act  now,  but  present  conditions  in  China  favour 


APPENDICES 


I9I 

the  execution  of  such  a plan.  We  should  by  all 
means  decide  and  act  at  once.  If  our  authorities  do 
not  avail  themselves  of  this  rare  opportunity,  great 
duty  will  surely  be  encountered  in  future  in  the  settle- 
ment of  this  Chinese  question.  Japan  will  he  isolated 
from  the  European  Powers  after  the  war,  and  will  be 
regarded  by  them  with  envy  and  jealousy  just  as 
Germany  is  now  regarded.  Is  it  not  then  a vital  neces- 
sity for  Japan  to  solve  at  this  very  moment  the  Chi- 
nese Question? 

PART  II.  THE  CHINESE  QUESTION  AND  THE 
DEFENSIVE  ALLIANCE 

It  is  a very  important  matter  of  policy  whether  the 
Japanese  Government,  in  obedience  to  its  divine  mis- 
sion, shall  solve  the  Chinese  Question  in  a heroic  man- 
ner by  making  China  voluntarily  rely  upon  Japan. 
To  force  China  to  such  a position  there  is  nothing 
else  for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  to  do  but 
to  take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity  to  seize 
the  reins  of  political  and  financial  power  and  to  enter 
by  all  means  into  a defensive  alliance  with  her  under 
secret  terms  as  enumerated  below: 

The  Secret  Terms  of  the  Defensive  Alliance 
The  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  with  due  re- 
spect for  the  Sovereignty  and  Integrity  of  China  and 
with  the  object  and  hope  of  maintaining  the  peace  of 
the  Far  East,  undertakes  to  share  the  responsibility  of 
co-operating  with  China  to  guard  her  against  internal 
trouble  and  foreign  invasion  and  China  shall  accord  to 


192 


APPENDICES 


Japan  special  facilities  in  the  matter  of  China’s  Na- 
tional Defence,  or  the  protection  of  Japan’s  special 
rights  and  privileges  and  for  these  objects  the  follow- 
ing treaty  of  Alliance  is  to  be  entered  into  between 
the  two  contracting  parties : 

1.  When  there  is  internal  trouble  in  China  or  when 
she  is  at  war  with  another  nation  or  nations,  Japan 
shall  send  her  army  to  render  assistance,  to  assume 
the  responsibility  of  guarding  Chinese  territory  and 
to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  China. 

2.  China  agrees  to  recognize  Japan’s  privileged  po- 
sition in  South  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  and 
to  cede  the  sovereign  rights  of  these  regions  to  Japan 
to  enable  her  to  carry  out  a scheme  of  local  defence 
on  a permanent  basis. 

3.  After  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Kiaochow, 
Japan  shall  acquire  all  the  rights  and  privileges  here- 
tofore enjoyed  by  the  Germans  in  regard  to  railways, 
mines  and  all  other  interests,  and  after  peace  and 
order  is  restored  in  Tsingtao,  the  place  shall  be 
handed  back  to  China  to  be  opened  as  an  International 
Treaty  port. 

4.  For  the  maritime  defence  of  China  and  Japan, 
China  shall  lease  strategic  harbours  along  the  coast 
of  the  Fukien  province  to  Japan  to  be  converted  into 
naval  bases  and  grant  to  Japan  in  the  said  province 
all  railway  and  mining  rights. 

5.  For  the  reorganization  of  the  Chinese  army 
China  shall  entrust  the  training  and  drilling  of  the 
army  to  Japan. 


APPENDICES 


193 


6.  For  the  unification  of  China’s  firearms  and  muni- 
tions of  war,  China  shall  adopt  firearms  of  Japanese 
pattern,  and  at  the  same  time  establish  arsenals  (with 
the  help  of  Japan)  in  different  strategic  points. 

7.  With  the  object  of  creating  and  maintaining  a 
Chinese  Xavy,  China  shall  entrust  the  training  of  her 
navy  to  Japan. 

8.  With  the  object  of  reorganizing  her  finances  and 
improving  the  methods  of  taxation,  China  shall  en- 
trust the  work  to  Japan,  and  the  latter  shall  elect  com- 
petent financial  experts  who  shall  act  as  first-class  ad- 
visers to  the  Chinese  Government. 

9.  China  shall  engage  Japanese  educational  experts 
as  educational  advisers  and  extensively  establish 
schools  in  different  parts  of  the  country  to  teach  Japa- 
nese so  as  to  raise  the  educational  standard  of  the 
country. 

10.  China  shall  first  consult  with  and  obtain  the 
consent  of  Japan  before  she  can  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment with  another  Power  for  making  loans,  the  leas- 
ing of  territory,  or  the  cession  of  the  same. 

From  the  date  of  the  signing  of  this  Defensive 
Alliance,  Japan  and  China  shall  work  together  hand- 
in-hand.  Japan  will  assume  the  responsibility  of  safe- 
guarding Chinese  territory'  and  maintaining  the  peace 
and  order  in  China.  This  will  relieve  China  of  all 
future  anxieties  and  enable  her  to  proceed  energetically 
with  her  reforms,  and,  with  a sense  of  territorial  se- 
curity, she  may  wait  for  her  national  development  and 
regeneration.  Even  after  the  present  European  War 


T94 


APPENDICES 


is  over  and  peace  is  restored  China  will  absolutely 
have  nothing  to  fear  in  the  future  of  having  pressure 
brought  against  her  by  the  foreign  powers.  It  is 
only  thus  that  permanent  peace  can  be  secured  in  the 
Far  East. 

But  before  concluding  this  Defensive  Alliance,  two 
points  must  first  be  ascertained  and  settled,  (i)  Its 
bearing  on  the  Chinese  Government.  (2)  Its  bear- 
ing on  those  Powers  having  intimate  relations  with, 
and  great  interests  in,  China. 

In  considering  its  effect  on  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, Japan  must  try  to  foresee  whether  the  position 
of  China’s  present  ruler  Yuan  Shih-kai  shall  be  perma- 
nent or  not;  whether  the  present  Government’s  policy 
will  enjoy  the  confidence  of  a large  section  of  the 
Chinese  people;  whether  Yuan  Shih-kai  will  readily 
agree  to  the  Japanese  Government’s  proposal  to  en- 
ter into  a treaty  of  alliance  with  us.  These  are  points 
to  which  we  are  bound  to  give  a thorough  considera- 
tion. Judging  by  the  attitude  hitherto  adopted  by 
Yuan  Shih-kai  we  know  he  has  always  resorted  to 
the  policy  of  expediency  in  his  diplomatic  dealings, 
and  although  he  may  outwardly  show  friendliness 
towards  us,  he  will  in  fact  rely  upon  the  influence  of 
the  different  Powers  as  the  easiest  check  against  us 
and  refuse  to  accede  to  our  demands.  Take  for  a 
single  instance,  his  conduct  towards  us  since  the  Im- 
perial Government  declared  war  against  Germany  and 
his  action  will  then  be  clear  to  all.  Whether  we  can 
rely  upon  the  ordinary  friendly  methods  of  diplomacy 


APPENDICES 


195 


to  gain  our  object  or  not  it  does  not  require  much 
wisdom  to ‘decide.  After  the  gigantic  struggle  in  Eu- 
rope is  over,  leaving  aside  America,  which  will  not 
press  for  advantage,  China  will  not  be  able  to  obtain 
any  loans  from  the  other  Powers.  With  a depleted 
treasury,  without  means  to  pay  the  officials  and  the 
army,  with  local  bandits  inciting  the  poverty-stricken 
populace  to  trouble,  with  the  revolutionists  waiting 
for  opportunities  to  rise,  should  an  insurrection  actu- 
ally occur  while  no  outside  assistance  can  be  rendered 
to  quell  it  we  are  certain  it  will  be  impossible  for 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  single-handed,  to  restore  order  and  con- 
solidate the  country.  The  result  will  be  that  the  na- 
tion will  be  cut  up  into  many  parts  beyond  all  hope 
of  remedy.  That  this  state  of  affairs  will  come  is 
not  difficult  to  foresee.  When  this  occurs,  shall  we 
uphold  Yuan’s  Government  and  assist  him  to  suppress 
the  internal  insurrection  with  the  certain  assurance 
that  we  could  influence  him  to  agree  to  our  demands, 
or  shall  we  help  the  revolutionists  to  achieve  a suc- 
cess and  realize  our  object  through  them?  This  ques- 
tion must  be  definitely  decided  upon  this  very  mo- 
ment so  that  we  may  put  it  into  practical  execution. 
If  we  do  not  look  into  the  future  fate  of  China  but 
go  blindly  to  uphold  Yuan’s  Government,  to  enter  into 
a Defensive  Alliance  with  China,  hoping  thus  to  secure 
a complete  realization  of  our  object  by  assisting  him 
to  suppress  the  revolutionists,  it  is  obviously  a wrong 
policy.  Why?  Because  the  majority  of  the  Chinese 
people  have  lost  all  faith  in  the  tottering  Yuan  Shih- 


196 


APPENDICES 


kai  who  is  discredited  and  attacked  by  the  whole  na- 
tion for  having  sold  his  country.  If  Japan  gives  Yuan 
the  support,  his  Government,  though  in  a yery  pre- 
carious state,  may  possibly  avoid  destruction.  Yuan 
Shih-kai  belongs  to  that  school  of  politicians  who  are 
fond  of  employing  craftiness  and  cunning.  He  may 
be  friendly  to  us  for  a time,  but  he  will  certainly  aban- 
don us  and  again  befriend  the  other  Powers  when  the 
European  war  is  at  an  end.  Judging  by  his  past  we 
have  no  doubt  as  to  what  he  will  do  in  the  future.  For 
Japan  to  ignore  the  general  sentiment  of  the  Chinese 
people  and  support  Yuan  Shih-kai  with  the  hope  that 
we  can  settle  with  him  the  Chinese  Question  is  a blun- 
der indeed.  Therefore,  in  order  to  secure  the  perma- 
nent peace  of  the  Far  East,  instead  of  supporting  a 
Chinese  Government  which  can  neither  be  long  con- 
tinued in  power  nor  assist  in  the  attainment  of  our  ob- 
ject, we  should  rather  support  the  400,000,000  Chi- 
nese people  to  renovate  their  corrupt  Government,  to 
change  its  present  form,  to  maintain  peace  and  order 
in  the  land  and  to  usher  into  China  a new  era  of  pros- 
perity so  that  China  and  Japan  may  in  fact  as  well  as 
in  name  be  brought  into  the  most  intimate  and  vital 
relations  with  each  other.  China’s  era  of  prosperity 
is  based  on  the  Chino-Japanese  Alliance  and  this  Alli- 
ance is  the  foundational  power  for  the  repelling  of 
the  foreign  aggression  that  is  to  be  directed  against 
the  Far  East  at  the  conclusion  of  the  European  War. 
This  Alliance  is  also  the  foundation-stone  of  the  peace 
of  the  world.  Japan  therefore  should  take  this  as  the 


APPENDICES 


197 


last  warning  and  immediately  solve  this  question. 
Since  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  has  con- 
sidered it  imperative  to  support  the  Chinese  people, 
we  should  induce  the  Chinese  revolutionists,  the  Imper- 
ialists and  other  Chinese  malcontents  to  create  trouble 
all  over  China.  The  whole  country  will  be  thrown 
into  disorder  and  Yuan’s  Government  will  consequently 
be  overthrown.  We  shall  then  select  a man  from 
amongst  the  most  influential  and  most  noted  of  the 
400,000,000  of  Chinese  and  help  him  to  organize  a 
new  form  of  Government  and  to  consolidate  the  whole 
country.  In  the  meantime  our  army  must  assist  in 
the  restoration  of  peace  and  order  in  the  country,  and 
in  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  properties  of  the 
people,  so  that  they  may  gladly  tender  their  allegiance 
to  the  new  Government  which  will  then  naturally  con- 
fide in  and  rely  upon  Japan.  It  is  after  the  accom- 
plishment of  only  these  things  that  we  shall  without 
difficulty  gain  our  object  by  the  conclusion  of  a De- 
fensive Alliance  with  China. 

For  us  to  incite  the  Chinese  revolutionists  and  mal- 
contents to  rise  in  China  we  consider  the  present  to 
be  the  most  opportune  moment.  The  reason  why 
these  men  can  not  now  carry  on  an  active  campaign 
is  because  they  are  insufficiently  provided  with  funds. 
If  the  Imperial  Government  can  take  advantage  of 
this  fact  to  make  them  a loan  and  instruct  them  to 
rise  simultaneously,  great  commotion  and  disorder 
will  surely  prevail  all  over  China.  We  can  inten-ene 
and  easily  adjust  matters. 


198 


APPENDICES 


The  progress  of  the  European  War  warns  Japan 
with  greater  urgency  of  the  imperative  necessity  of 
solving  this  most  vital  of  questions.  The  Imperial 
Government  can  not  be  considered  as  embarking  on  a 
rash  project.  This  opportunity  will  not  repeat  it- 
self for  our  benefit.  We  must  avail  ourselves  of  this 
chance  and  under  no  circumstances  hesitate.  Why 
should  we  wait  for  the  spontaneous  uprising  of  the 
revolutionists  and  malcontents?  Why  should  we  not 
think  out  and  lay  down  a plan  beforehand?  When  we 
examine  into  the  form  of  government  in  China,  we 
must  ask  whether  the  existing  Republic  is  well  suited 
to  the  national  temperament  and  well  adapted  to  the 
thoughts  and  aspirations  of  the  Chinese  people.  From 
the  time  the  Republic  of  China  was  established  up  to 
the  present  moment,  if  what  it  has  passed  through  is 
to  be  compared  to  what  it  ought  to  be  in  the  matter 
of  administration  and  unification,  we  find  disappoint- 
ment everywhere.  Even  the  revolutionists  themselves, 
the  very  ones  who  first  advocated  the  Republican  form 
of  government,  acknowledge  that  they  have  made  a 
mistake.  The  retention  of  the  Republican  form  of 
Government  in  China  will  be  a great  future  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  a Chino-Japanese  alliance.  And  why 
must  it  be  so?  Because,  in  a Republic  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  government  as  well  as  the  social 
and  moral  aims  of  the  people  are  distinctly  different 
from  that  of  a Constitutional  Monarchy.  Their  laws 
and  administration  also  conflict.  If  Japan  act  as  a 
guide  to  China  and  China  model  herself  after  Japan, 


APPENDICES 


199 


it  will  only  then  be  possible  for  the  two  nations  to 
solve  by  mutual  effort  the  Far  East  Question  without 
differences  and  disagreements.  Therefore,  to  start 
from  the  foundation  for  the  purpose  of  reconstnict- 
ing  the  Chinese  Government,  of  establishing  a Chino- 
Japanese  Alliance,  of  maintaining  the  permanent  peace 
of  the  Far  East  and  of  realizing  the  consummation 
of  Japan’s  Imperial  policy,  we  must  take  advantage 
of  the  present  opportunity  to  alter  China’s  Republican 
form  of  Government  into  a Constitutional  Monarchy 
which  shall  necessarily  be  identical,  in  all  its  details, 
to  the  Constitutional  Monarchy  of  Japan,  and  to  no 
other.  This  is  really  the  key  and  first  principle  to  be 
firmly  held  for  the  actual  reconstruction  of  the  form 
of  Government  in  China.  If  China  changes  her  Re- 
publican form  of  Government  to  that  of  a Constitu- 
tional Monarchy,  shall  we,  in  the  selection  of  a new 
ruler,  restore  the  Emperor  Hsuan  T’ung  to  his  throne 
or  choose  the  most  capable  man  from  the  Monarchists 
or  select  the  most  worthy  member  from  among  the 
revolutionists?  We  think,  however,  that  it  is  -ad- 
visable at  present  to  leave  this  question  to  the  exigency 
of  the  future  when  the  matter  is  brought  up  for  de- 
cision. But  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
to  actually  put  into  execution  this  policy  of  a Chino- 
Japanese  Alliance  and  the  transformation  of  the  Re- 
public of  China  into  a Constitutional  Monarchy,  is,  in 
reality,  the  fundamental  principle  to  be  adopted  for 
the  reconstruction  of  China. 

We  shall  now  consider  the  bearing  of  this  Defensive 


200 


APPENDICES 


Alliance  on  the  other  Powers.  Needless  to  say,  Japan 
and  China  will  in  no  way  impair  the  rights  and  in- 
terests already  acquired  by  the  Powers.  At  this  mo- 
ment it  is  of  paramount  importance  for  Japan  to  come 
to  a special  understanding  with  Russia  to  define  our 
respective  spheres  in  ‘Manchuria  and  Mongolia  so 
that  the  two  countries  may  co-operate  with  each  other 
in  the  future.  This  means  that  Japan  after  the  acqui- 
sition of  sovereign  rights  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Inner  Mongolia  will  work  together  with  Russia  after 
her  acquisition  of  sovereign  rights  in  North  Manchuria 
and  Outer  Mongolia  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  and 
endeavour  by  every  effort  to  protect  the  peace  of 
the  Far  East.  Russia,  since  the  outbreak  of  the  Eu- 
ropean War,  has  not  only  laid  aside  all  ill-feelings 
against  Japan,  but  has  adopted  the  same  attitude  as 
her  Allies  and  shown  warm  friendship  for  us.  No 
matter  how  we  regard  the  Manchurian  and  Mongolian 
Questions  in  the  future  she  is  anxious  that  we  find 
some  way  of  settlement.  Therefore  we  need  not 
doubt  but  that  Russia,  in  her  attitude  towards  this 
Chinese  Question,  will  be  able  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  us  for  mutual  co-operation. 

The  British  sphere  of  influence  and  interest  in 
China  is  centred  in  Tibet  and  the  Yangtsze  Valley. 
Therefore,  if  Japan  can  come  to  some  satisfactory 
arrangement  with  China  in  regard  to  Tibet  and  also 
give  certain  privileges  to  Great  Britain  in  the  Yangtze 
Valley,  with  an  assurance  to  protect  those  privileges, 
no  matter  how  powerful  Great  Britain  might  be,  she 


APPENDICES 


201 


will  surely  not  oppose  Japan’s  policy  in  regard  to  this 
Chinese  Question.  While  this  present  European  War 
is  going  on  Great  Britain  has  never  asked  Japan  to 
render  her  assistance.  That  her  strength  will  cer- 
tainly not  enable  her  to  oppose  us  in  the  future  need 
not  be  doubted  in  the  least. 

Since  Great  Britain  and  Russia  will  not  oppose 
Japan’s  policy  towards  China,  it  can  readily  be  seen 
what  attitude  France  will  adopt  in  regard  to  the  sub- 
ject. What  Japan  must  now  somewhat  reckon  with 
is  America.  But  America  in  her  attitude  towards 
us  regarding  our  policy  towards  China  has  already 
declared  the  principle  of  maintaining  China’s  terri- 
torial integrity  and  equal  opportunity  and  will  be 
satisfied,  if  we  do  not  impair  America’s  already  ac- 
quired rights  and  privileges.  We  think  America  will 
also  have  no  cause  for  complaint.  Nevertheless  Amer- 
ica has  in  the  East  a naval  force  which  can  be  fairly 
relied  upon,  though  not  sufficiently  strong  to  be  feared. 
Therefore  in  Japan’s  attitude  towards  America  there 
is  nothing  really  for  us  to  be  afraid  of. 

Since  China’s  condition  is  such  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  Powers’  relation  towards  China  is  such  on 
the  other  hand,  Japan  should  avail  herself  in  the  mean- 
time of  the  European  War  to  definitely  decide  upon 
a policy  towards  China,  the  most  important  move 
being  the  transformation  of  the  Chinese  Government 
to  be  followed  up  by  preparing  for  the  conclusion  of 
the  Defensive  Alliance.  The  precipitate  action  on 
the  part  of  our  present  Cabinet  in  acceding  to  the  re- 


202 


APPENDICES 


quest  of  Great  Britain  to  declare  war  against  Ger- 
many without  having  definitely  settled  our  policy  to- 
wards China  has  no  real  connection  with  our  future 
negotiations  with  China  or  affects  the  political  condi- 
tion in  the  Far  East.  Consequently,  all  intelligent 
Japanese,  of  every  walk  of  life  throughout  the  land, 
are  very  deeply  concerned  about  the  matter. 

Our  Imperial  Government  should  now  definitely 
change  our  dependent  foreign  policy  which  is  being 
directed  by  others  into  an  independent  foreign  policy 
which  shall  direct  others,  proclaiming  the  same  with 
solemn  sincerity  to  the  world  and  carrying  it  out 
with  determination.  If  we  do  so,  even  the  gods  and 
spirits  will  give  way.  These  are  important  points 
in  our  policy  towards  China  and  the  result  depends 
on  how  we.  carry  them  out.  Can  our  authorities 
firmly  make  up  their  mind  to  solve  this  Chinese  Ques- 
tion by  the  actual  carrying  out  of  this  fundamental 
principle?  If  they  show  irresolution  while  we  have 
this  heaven-conferred  chance  and  merely  depend  on 
the  good  will  of  the  other  Powers,  we  shall  eventually 
have  greater  pressure  to  be  brought  against  the  Far 
East  after  the  European  War  is  over,  when  the  pres- 
ent equilibrium  will  be  destroyed.  That  day  will  then 
be  too  late  for  us  to  repent  our  folly.  We  are  there- 
fore impelled  by  force  of  circumstances  to  urge  our 
authorities  to  a quicker  sense  of  the  situation  and  to 
come  to  a determination. 

Translation  from  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,  by 
B.  L.  Putnam-Weale.  (Copyright  1917  by  Dodd,  Mead  & Com- 
pany, Inc.) 


APPENDIX  II 


DOCUMENTS  RELATING  TO  THE  TWENTY-ONE  DE- 
MANDS MADE  BY  JAPAN  ON  CHINA  IN  1915. 

(a)  japan’s  revised  demands  on  china 
Presented  April  26,  1915 

Following  the  original  Twenty-one  Demands  on  China 
presented  Jan.  18,  1915 

NOTE  ON  ORIGINAL  TEXT 

(The  revised  list  of  articles  is  a Chinese  translation 
of  the  Japanese  text.  It  is  hereby  declared  that  when 
a final  decision  is  reached,  there  shall  be  a revision  of 
the  wording  of  the  text.) 

Group  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace 
in  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friendly 
relations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing  between  the 
two  nations,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Art.  I.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give 
full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese 
Government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the  German 
Government,  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all  rights, 

203 


204 


APPENDICES 


interests  and  concessions,  which  Germany,  by  virtue 
of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the 
Province  of  Shantung. 

Art.  2.  (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory 
or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  under 
any  pretext. 

Art.  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  that  as 
regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from 
Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow- 
Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Germany  is  willing  to  abandon 
the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  line, 
China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate 
for  a loan. 

Art.  4.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  China  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain 
suitable  places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Com- 
mercial Ports. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the 
Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must 
be  consulted  before  making  a decision. 

Group  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, with  a view  to  developing  their  economic  rela- 


APPENDICES 


205 


tions  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 
agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Art.  I.  The  two  contracting  Powers  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  and  the  terms  of  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  be  ex- 
tended to  99  years. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes) 

The  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall 
expire  in  the  86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  1997. 
The  date  for  restoring  the  South  Manchurian  Railway 
to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the  91st  year  of  the  Republic 
or  2002.  Article  12  in  the  original  South  Manchur- 
ian Railway  Agreement  stating  that  it  may  be  re- 
deemed by  China  after  36  years  after  the  traffic  is 
opened  is  hereby  cancelled.  The  term  of  the  Antung- 
Mukden  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of 
the  Republic  or  2007. 

Art.  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may 
lease  or  purchase  the  necessary  land  for  erecting  suit- 
able buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  prose- 
cuting agricultural  enterprises. 

Art.  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside 
and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  busi- 
ness and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Art.  3-a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the 
preceding  two  articles,  besides  being  required  to  regis- 
ter with  the  local  authorities  pass-ports  which  they 
must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations,  shall  also 


206 


APPENDICES 


submit  to  police  laws  and  ordinances  and  tax  regula- 
tions, which  are  approved  by  the  Japanese  consul. 
Civil  and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants  are 
Japanese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Japa- 
nese consul;  those  in  which  the  defendants  are  Chi- 
nese shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authori- 
ties. In  either  case  an  officer  can  be  deputed  to  the 
court  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  mixed  civil  cases 
between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to  land  shall 
be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates  of  both  nations 
conjointly  in  accordance  with  Chinese  law  and  local 
usage.  When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region 
is  completely  reformed,  all  civil  and  criminal  cases 
concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  tried  entirely 
by  Chinese  law  courts. 

Art.  4.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  be  permitted  forthwith  to  investigate,  select, 
and  then  prospect  for  and  open  mines  at  the  follow- 
ing places  in  South  Manchuria,  apart  from  those  min- 
ing areas  in  which  mines  are  being  prospected  for  or 
worked;  until  the  Mining  Ordinance  is  definitely 
settled  methods  at  present  in  force  shall  be  followed. 


PROVINCE  OF  FENG-TIEN 


Locality 

District 

Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T’ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

• Coal 

Theh  Ch’ang 

Tung-hua 

Coal 

Nuan  Ti  Tang 

Chin 

Coal 

APPENDICES 


207 


An  Shan  Chan  region 
hsi 


From  Liao-yang  to  Pen- 
Iron 


PROVINCE  OF  KIRIN 

(Southern  Portion) 

Sha  Sung  Kang  Ho-lung  Coal  and  Iron 

Kang  Yao  Chi-lin  (Kirin)  Coal 

Chia  P’i  Kou  Hua-tien  Gold 

Art.  5.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  China  will 
hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  railways  in  South 
Manchuria;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  the  Chinese 
Government  agrees  to  negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japa> 
nese  capitalists  first. 

Art.  5-a.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter,  when 
a foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of  the 
taxes  of  South  Manchuria  (not  including  customs  and 
salt  revenue  on  the  security  of  which  loans  have  al- 
ready been  made  by  the  Central  Government),  it  will 
negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Art.  6.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  hereafter  if 
foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial, 
military  or  police  matters,  are  to  be  employed  in  South 
Manchuria,  Japanese  will  be  employed  first. 

Art.  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agree  speedily 
to  make  a fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Chang- 
chun  Railway  Loan  Agreement,  taking  as  a standard 


208 


APPENDICES 


the  provisions  in  railroad  loan  agreements  made  here- 
tofore between  China  and  foreign  financiers.  If,  in 
future,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in  exist- 
ing railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign 
financiers,  in  connection  with  railway  loans,  the  above 
agreement  shall  again  be  revised  in  accordance  with 
Japan’s  wishes. 

All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  re- 
lating to  Manchuria  shall,  except  where  otherwise  pro- 
vided for  by  this  Convention,  remain  in  force. 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter 
when  a foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security 
of  the  taxes  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  China  must 
negotiate  with  the  Japanese  Government  first. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  China  will 
herself  provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in  East- 
tern  Inner  Mongolia;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  she 
must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese  Government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest 
of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open 
by  China  herself,  as  soon  as  possible,  certain  suitable 
places  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as  Commercial  Ports. 
The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be  chosen, 
and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese 
Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must  be  con- 
sulted before  making  a decision. 

4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring 
jointly  to  undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  in- 
dustries incidental  thereto,  the  Chinese  Government 
shall  give  its  permission. 


APPENDICES 


209 


Group  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping 
Company  being  very  intimate,  if  those  interested  in 
the  said  Company  come  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Japanese  capitalists  for  co-operation,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment shall  forthwith  give  its  consent  thereto.  The 
Chinese  Government  further  agrees  that,  without  the 
consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists,  China  will  not  con- 
vert the  Company  into  a state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate 
it,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other 
than  Japanese. 

Group  IV 

China  is  to  give  pronouncement  by  herself  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  following  principle: 

No  bay,  harbour,  or  island  along  the  coast  of  China 
may  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power. 

Notes  to  be  exchanged. 

A 

As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a railway  from 
Wuchang  to  connect  with  the  Kiu-kiang-Nanchang 
line,  the  Nanchang-Hangchow  railway,  and  the  Nan- 
chang-Chaochow  railway,  if  it  is  clearly  ascertained 
that  other  Powers  have  no  objection,  China  shall  grant 
the  said  right  to  Japan. 

B 

As  regards  the  rights  of  financing  a railway  from 
Wuchang  to  connect  with  the  Kiu-kiang-Nanchang 
railway,  a railway  from  Nanchang  to  Hangchow  and 


210 


APPENDICES 


another  from  Nanchang  to  Chaochow,  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  not  grant  the  said  right  to  any 
foreign  Power  before  Japan  comes  to  an  understand- 
ing with  the  other  Power  which  is  heretofore  inter- 
ested therein. 


NOTES  TO  BE  EXCHANGED 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  no  nation  what- 
ever is  to  be  permitted  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of 
Fukien  Province,  a dockyard,  a coaling  station  for 
military  use,  or  a naval  base;  nor  to  be  authorized 
to  set  up  any  other  military  establishment.  The  Chi- 
nese Government  further  agrees  not  to  use  foreign 
capital  for  setting  up  the  above  mentioned  construc- 
tion or  establishment. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  as 
follows : 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  shall,  whenever,  in  fu- 
ture, it  considers  this  step  necessary,  engage  numerous 
Japanese  advisers. 

2.  Whenever,  in  future,  Japanese  subjects  desire 
to  lease  or  purchase  land  in  the  interior  of  China  for 
establishing  schools  or  hospitals,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment shall  forthwith  give  its  consent  thereto. 

3.  When  a suitable  opportunity  arises  in  future, 
the  Chinese  Government  will  send  military  officers  to 
Japan  to  negotiate  with  Japanese  military  authorities 
the  matter  of  purchasing  arms  or  that  of  establishing 
a joint  arsenal. 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  stated  as  follows: 


APPENDICES 


2II 


As  relates  to  the  question  of  the  right  of  missionary 
propaganda  the  same  shall  be  taken  up  again  for  ne- 
gotiation in  future. 

(b)  china’s  reply  to  japan’s  revised  demands 
China’s  Reply  of  May  i,  1915,  to  the  Japanese  Revised 
Demands  of  April  26,  1915. 

Group  I 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace 
in  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friendly 
relations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing  between 
the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  i.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that 
they  will  give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which 
the  Japanese  and  German  Governments  may  hereafter 
mutually  agree,  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all  in- 
terests which  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  re- 
corded cases,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of 
Shantung. 

The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  when  the 
Chinese  Government  give  their  assent  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  interests  above  referred  to,  Japan  will  restore 
the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  to  China;  and  fur- 
ther recognize  the  right  of  the  Chinese  Government 
to  participate  in  the  negotiations  referred  to  above 
between  Japan  and  Germany. 

Article  2.  The  Japanese  Government  consent  to  be 
responsible  for  the  indemnification  of  all  losses  occa- 


212 


APPENDICES 


sioned  by  Japan’s  military  operation  around  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow  shall,  prior  to  the  restoration 
of  the  said  leased  territory  to  China,  be  administered 
as  heretofore,  for  the  time  being.  The  railways  and 
telegraph  lines  erected  by  Japan  for  military  purposes 
are  to  be  removed  forthwith.  The  Japanese  troops 
now  stationed  outside  the  original  leased  territory  of 
Kiaochow  are  now  to  be  withdrawn  first,  those  within 
the  original  leased  territory  are  to  be  withdrawn  on 
the  restoration  of  the  said  leased  territory  to  China. 

Article  3.  (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  terri- 
tory or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  un- 
der any  pretext. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  consent  that 
as  regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself 
from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  with  the  Kiao- 
chow-Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Germany  is  willing  to  aban- 
don the  privilege  of  financing  the  Che-foo-Weihsien 
line,  China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  for  a 
loan. 

Article  5.  The  Chinese  Government  engage,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable 
places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Commercial 
Ports. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the 


APPENDICES  213 

Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must 
be  consulted  before  making  a decision. 

Article  6.  If  the  Japanese  and  German  Govern- 
ments are  not  able  to  come  to  a definite  agreement 
in  future  in  their  negotiations  respecting  transfer,  etc., 
this  provisional  agreement  contained  in  the  foregoing 
articles  shall  be  void. 


Group  II 

The  six  articles  which  are  found  in  Japan’s  Re- 
vised Demands  of  April  26,  1915,  but  omitted  herein, 
are  those  already  initialed  by  the  Chinese  Foreign 
Minister  and  the  Japanese  Minister. 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, with  a view  to  developing  their  economic  rela- 
tions in  South  Manchuria,  agree  to  the  following  arti- 
cles : 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria 
may,  by  arrangement  with  the  owners,  lease  land  re- 
quired for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and 
manufacture  or  for  agricultural  enterprises. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  re- 
side and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in 
business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  3 a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in 
the  preceding  two  articles,  besides  being  required  to 
register  with  the  local  authorities  passports,  which  they 
must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations,  shall  also 
observe  police  rules  and  regulations  and  pay  taxes  in 
the  same  manner  as  Chinese.  Civil  and  criminal  cases 


214 


APPENDICES 


shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  authorities  of 
the  defendant’s  nationality  and  an  officer  can  be  de- 
puted to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  all  cases  purely 
between  Japanese  subjects,  and  mixed  cases  between 
Japanese  and  Chinese,  relating  to  land  or  disputes 
arising  from  lease  contracts,  shall  be  tried  and  adjudi- 
cated by  Chinese  Authorities  and  the  Japanese  Con- 
sul may  also  depute  an  officer  to  attend  the  proceed- 
ings. 

When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  Province  is 
completely  reformed,  all  the  civil  and  criminal  cases 
concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  tried  entirely  by 
Chinese  law  courts. 

RELATING  TO  EASTERN  INNER  MONGOLIA 

(To  be  exchanged  by  notes) 

Article  i.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that 
China  will  not  in  future  pledge  the  taxes,  other  than 
customs  and  salt  revenue,  of  that  part  of  Eastern  In- 
ner Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Man- 
churia and  Jehol  Intendency,  as  security  for  raising 
loans. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that 
China  will  herself  provide  funds  for  building  the  rail- 
ways in  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol 
Intendency;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  China  will 
negotiate  with  Japanese  capitalists  first,  provided  this 
does  not  conflict  with  agreements  already  concluded 
with  other  Powers. 


APPENDICES 


215 


Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  China  herself  certain  suitable  places  in  that 
part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency,  as 
Commercial  Marts. 

The  regulations  for  the  said  Commercial  Marts  will 
be  made  in  accordance  with  those  of  other  Commercial 
Marts  opened  by  China  herself. 

Group  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping 
Company  being  very  intimate,  if  the  said  Company 
comes  to  an  agreement  with  the  Japanese  capitalists 
for  co-operation,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  forth- 
with give  their  consent  thereto.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment further  declare  that  China  will  not  convert 
the  Company  into  a state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it 
nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other 
than  Japanese. 

Letter  to  he  Addressed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to 
the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Adairs 
Excellency : 

I have  the  honour  to  state  that  a report  has  reached 
me  that  the  Chinese  Government  have  given  permis- 
sion to  foreign  nations  to  construct  on  the  coast  of 
Fukien  Province  dock-yards,  coaling  stations  for  mili- 
tary use,  naval  bases  and  other  establishments  for  mili- 
tary purposes  and  further  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 


2i6 


APPENDICES 


ment  are  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  putting  up  the 
above-mentioned  construction  or  establishments.  I 
shall  be  much  obliged  if  the  Chinese  Government  will 
inform  me  whether  )r  not  these  reports  are  well 
founded  in  fact. 

Reply  to  be  Addressed  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Japanese  Minister 
Excellency : 

I have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 

Excellency’s  Note  of . In  reply  I beg  to 

state  that  the  Chinese  Government  have  not  given 
permission  to  foreign  Powers  to  construct,  on  the  coast 
of  Fukien  Province,  dock-yards,  coaling  stations  for 
military  use,  naval  bases  or  other  establishments  for 
military  purposes ; nor  do  they  contemplate  borrowing 
foreign  capital  for  putting  up  such  constructions  or 
establishments. 

(c)  MEMORANDUM  READ  BY  THE  MINISTER  OF  FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS  TO  MR.  HICKI,  THE  JAPANESE  MINIS- 
TER, AT  A CONFERENCE  HELD  AT  WAICHIAOPU, 
MAY  I,  1915 

The  list  of  demands  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment first  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  con- 
sists of  five  groups,  the  first  relating  to  Shantung, 
the  second  relating  to  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia,  the  third  relating  to  the  Hanyehping 
Company,  the  fourth  asking  for  non-alienation  of 
the  coast  of  the  country,  and  the  fifth  relating  to  the 
questions  of  national  advisers,  national  police,  national 


APPENDICES 


217 


arms,  missionary  propaganda,  Yangtze  Valley  rail- 
ways, and  Fukien  Province.  Out  of  profound  regard 
for  the  intentions  entertained  by  Japan,  the  Chinese 
Government  took  these  momentous  demands  into  grave 
and  careful  consideration  and  decided  to  negotiate  with 
the  Japanese  Government  frankly  and  sincerely  what 
were  possible  to  negotiate.  This  is  a manifestation 
to  Japan  of  the  most  profound  regard  which  the  Chi- 
nese Government  entertains  for  the  relations  between 
the  two  nations. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  China 
has  been  doing  her  best  to  hasten  their  progress,  hold- 
ing as  many  as  three  conferences  a week.  As  regards 
the  articles  in  the  second  group,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, being  disposed  to  allow  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  develop  the  economic  relations  of  the  two 
countries  in  South  Manchuria,  realizing  that  the  Japa- 
nese Government  attaches  importance  to  its  interests 
in  that  region,  and  wishing  to  meet  the  hopes  of  Japan, 
made  a painful  effort,  without  hesitation,  to  agree  to 
the  extension  of  the  25-year  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny,  the  36-year  period  of  the  South  Manchuria 
railway  and  the  15-year  period  of  the  Antung-Mukden 
railway,  all  to  99  years ; and  to  abandon  its  own  cher- 
ished hopes  to  regain  control  of  these  places  and  prop- 
erties at  the  expiration  of  their  respective  original 
terms  of  lease.  It  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  this  is 
a most  genuine  proof  of  China’s  friendship  for  Japan. 
As  to  the  rights  of  opening  mines  in  South  Man- 


2i8 


APPENDICES 


churia,  the  Chinese  Government  has  already  agreed 
to  permit  Japanese  to  work  mines  within  the  mining 
areas  designated  by  Japan.  China  has  further  agreed 
to  give  Japan  a right  of  preference  in  the  event  of  bor- 
rowing foreign  capital  for  building  railways  or  of  mak- 
ing a loan  on  the  security  of  the  local  taxes  in  South 
Manchuria.  The  question  of  revising  the  arrange- 
ment for  the  Kirin-Changchun  railway  has  been  settled 
in  accordance  with  the  proposal  made  by  Japan.  The 
Chinese  Government  has  further  agreed  to  employ 
Japanese  first  in  the  event  of  employing  foreign  ad- 
visers on  political,  militar}q  financial  and  police  mat- 
ters. 

Furthermore,  the  provision  about  the  repurchase 
period  in  the  South  Manchurian  railway  was  not  men- 
tioned in  Japan’s  original  proposal.  Subsequently, 
the  Japanese  Government  alleging  that  its  meaning 
was  not  clear,  asked  China  to  cancel  the  provision  alto- 
gether. Again,  Japan  at  first  demanded  the  right  of 
Japanese  to  carry  on  farming  in  South  Manchuria,  but 
subsequently  she  considered  the  word  farming  ” was 
not  broad  enough  and  asked  to  replace  it  with  the 
phrase  “ agricultural  enterprises.”  To  these  requests 
the  Chinese  Government,  though  well  aware  that  the 
proposed  changes  could  only  benefit  Japan,  still  ac- 
ceded without  delay.  This,  too,  is  a proof  of  China’s 
frankness  and  sincerity  toward  Japan. 

As  regards  matters  relating  to  Shantung,  the  Chi- 
nese Government  has  agreed  to  a majority  of  the  de- 
mands. 


APPENDICES 


219 


The  question  of  inland  residence  in  South  Manchuria 
is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  incom- 
patible with  the  treaties  China  has  entered  into  with 
Japan  and  other  Powers,  still  the  Chinese  Government 
did  its  best  to  consider  how  it  was  possible  to  avoid 
that  incompatibility.  At  first,  China  suggested  that 
the  Chinese  Authorities  should  have  full  rights  of  jur- 
isdiction over  Japanese  settlers.  Japan  declined  to 
agree  to  it.  Thereupon  China  reconsidered  the  ques- 
tion and  revised  her  counter-proposal  five  or  six  times, 
each  time  making  some  definite  concession,  and  went  so 
far  as  to  agree  that  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  between 
Chinese  and  Japanese  should  be  arranged  according 
to  existing  treaties.  Only  cases  relating  to  land  or 
lease  contracts  were  reserved  to  be  adjudicated  by 
Chinese  Courts,  as  a mark  of  China’s  sovereignty  over 
the  region.  This  is  another  proof  of  China’s  readi- 
ness to  concede  as  much  as  possible. 

Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  not  an  enlightened  region 
as  yet  and  the  conditions  existing  there  are  entirely 
different  from  those  prevailing  in  South  Manchuria. 
The  two  places,  therefore,  cannot  be  considered  in  the 
same  light.  Accordingly,  China  agreed  to  open  com- 
mercial marts  first,  in  the  interests  of  foreign  trade. 

The  Hanyehping  Company  mentioned  in  the  third 
group  is  entirely  a private  company,  and  the  Chinese 
Government  is  precluded  from  interfering  with  it 
and  negotiating  with  another  government  to  make 
any  disposal  of  the  same  as  the  Government  likes,  but 
having  regard  for  the  interests  of  the  Japanese  capital- 


220 


APPENDICES 


ists,  the  Chinese  Government  agreed  that  whenever, 
in  future,  the  said  company  and  the  Japanese  capital- 
ists should  arrive  at  a satisfactory  arrangement  for 
co-operation,  China  will  give  her  assent  thereto.  Thus 
the  interests  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  are  amply 
safeguarded. 

Although  the  demand  in  the  fourth  group  asking  for 
a declaration  not  to  alienate  China’s  coast  is  an  in- 
fringement of  her  sovereign  rights,  yet  the  Chinese 
Government  offered  to  make  a voluntary  pronounce- 
ment so  far  as  it  comports  with  China’s  sovereign 
rights.  Thus,  it  is  seen  that  the  Chinese  Government, 
in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  Japan,  gave  a most  serious 
consideration  even  to  those  demands  which  gravely  af- 
fect the  sovereignty  and  territorial  rights  of  China  as 
well  as  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  the  trea- 
ties with  foreign  Powers.  All  this  was  a painful  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  meet  the 
situation  — a fact  of  which  the  Japanese  Government 
must  be  aware. 

As  regards  the  demands  in  the  fifth  group,  they  all 
infringe  China’s  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of 
other  Powers  or  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity. 
Although  Japan  did  not  indicate  any  difference  be- 
tween this  group  and  the  preceding  four  in  the  list 
which  she  presented  to  China  in  respect  of  their  char- 
acter, the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  their  pal- 
pably objectionable  features,  persuaded  itself  that  these 
could  not  have  been  intended  by  Japan  as  anything 
other  than  Japan’s  mere  advice  to  China.  Accordingly 


APPENDICES 


221 


China  has  declared  from  the  very  beginning  that  while 
she  entertains  the  most  profound  regard  for  Japan’s 
wishes,  she  was  unable  to  admit  that  any  of  these 
matters  could  be  made  the  subject  of  an  understand- 
ing with  Japan.  Much  as  she  desired  to  pay  regard  to 
Japan’s  wishes,  China  cannot  but  respect  her  own  sover- 
eign rights  and  the  existing  treaties  with  other  Powers. 
In  order  to  be  rid  of  the  seed  for  future  misunderstand- 
ing and  to  strengthen  the  basis  of  friendship,  China 
was  constrained  to  iterate  the  reasons  for  refusing 
to  negotiate  on  any  of  the  articles  in  the  fifth  group, 
yet  in  view  of  Japan’s  wishes  China  has  expressed  her 
readiness  to  state  that  no  foreign  money  was  borrowed 
to  construct  harbour  works  in  Fukien  Province.  Thus 
it  is  clear  that  China  went  so  far  as  to  seek  a solu- 
tion for  Japan  of  a question  that  really  did  not  admit 
of  negotiation.  Was  there,  then,  evasion  on  the  part 
of  China? 

Now,  since  the  Japanese  Government  has  presented 
a revised  list  of  demands  and  declared  at  the  same  time 
that  it  will  restore  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  the 
Chinese  Government  reconsiders  the  whole  question 
and  herewith  submits  a new  reply  to  the  friendly  Japa- 
nese Government. 

In  this  reply  the  unsettled  articles  in  the  first  group 
are  stated  again  for  discussion.  As  regards  the  sec- 
ond group,  those  articles  which  have  already  been 
initialed  are  omitted.  In  connection  with  the  ques- 
tion of  inland  residence  the  police  regulation  clause 
has  been  revised  in  a more  restrictive  sense.  As  for 


222 


APPENDICES 


the  trial  of  cases  relating  to  land  and  lease  contracts 
the  Chinese  Government  now  permits  the  Japanese 
Consul  to  send  an  officer  to  attend  the  proceedings. 
Of  the  four  demands  in  connection  with  that  part  of 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  which  is  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency, 
China  agrees  to  three.  China,  also,  agrees  to  the 
article  relating  to  the  Hanyehping  Company  as  re- 
vised by  Japan. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  Japanese  Government  will  appre- 
ciate the  conciliatory  spirit  of  the  Chinese  Government 
in  making  this  final  concession  and  forthwith  give  her 
assent  thereto. 

There  is  one  more  point.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
present  negotiations  it  was  mutually  agreed  to  observe 
secrecy,  but  unfortunately  a few  days  after  the  pres- 
entation of  the  demands  by  Japan  an  Osaka  newspaper 
published  an  “ Extra  ” giving  the  text  of  the  de- 
mands. The  foreign  and  the  Chinese  press  has  since 
been  paying  considerable  attention  to  this  question  and 
frequently  publishing  pro-Chinese  or  pro-Japanese 
comments  in  order  to  call  forth  the  world’s  conjecture, 
a matter  which  the  Chinese  Government  deeply  re- 
grets. The  Chinese  Government  has  never  carried  on 
any  newspaper  campaign  and  the  Chinese  Minister  of 
Eoreign  Affairs  has  repeatedly  declared  it  to  the  Japa- 
nese Minister. 

In  conclusion,  the  Chinese  Government  wishes  to 
express  its  hope  that  the  negotiations  now  pending  be- 
tween the  two  countries  will  soon  come  to  an  end  and 


APPENDICES 


223 


whatever  misgivings  foreign  countries  entertain  to- 
ward the  present  situation  may  be  quickly  dispelled. 

(d)  japan’s  ultimatum  to  china 
Japan’s  Ultimatum  delivered  by  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister to  the  Chinese  Government,  on  May  7th,  1915. 

The  reason  why  the  Imperial  Government  opened 
the  present  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Government 
is  first  to  endeavour  to  dispose  of  the  complications 
arising  out  of  the  war  between  Japan  and  China, 
and  secondly  to  attempt  to  solve  those  various  ques- 
tions which  are  detrimental  to  the  intimate  relations 
of  China  and  Japan  with  a view  to  solidifying  the 
foundation  of  cordial  friendship  subsisting  between 
the  two  countries  to  the  end  that  the  peace  of  the  Far 
East  may  be  effectually  and  permanently  preserved. 
With  this  object  in  view,  definite  proposals  were  pre- 
sented to  the  Chinese  Government  in  January  of  this 
year,  and  up  to  today  as  many  as  twenty-five  confer- 
ences have  been  held  with  the  Chinese  Government  in 
perfect  sincerity  and  frankness. 

In  the  course  of  negotiations  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment have  consistently  explained  the  aims  and  objects 
of  the  proposals  in  a conciliatory  spirit,  while  on  the 
other  hand  the  proposals  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
whether  important  or  unimportant,  have  been  at- 
tended to  without  any  reserve. 

It  may  be  stated  with  confidence  that  no  effort 
has  been  spared  to  arrive  at  a satisfactory  and  amicable 
settlement  of  those  questions. 


224 


APPENDICES 


The  discussion  of  the  entire  corpus  of  the  proposals 
was  practically  at  an  end  at  the  twenty-fourth  con- 
ference; that  is  on  the  17th  of  the  last  month.  The 
Imperial  Government,  taking  a broad  view  of  the 
negotiation  and  in  consideration  of  the  points  raised 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  modified  the  original  pro- 
posals with  considerable  concessions  and  presented  to 
the  Chinese  Government  on  the  26th  of  the  same  month 
the  revised  proposals  for  agreement,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  was  offered  that,  on  the  acceptance  of  the  re- 
vised proposals,  the  Imperial  Government  would,  at  a 
suitable  opportunity,  restore,  with  fair  and  proper  con- 
ditions, to  the  Chinese  Government  the  Kiaochow  ter- 
ritory, in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment had  made  a great  sacrifice. 

On  the  first  of  May,  the  Chinese  Government  de- 
livered the  reply  to  the  revised  proposals  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government,  which  is  contrary  to  the  expectations 
of  the  Imperial  Government.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment not  only  did  not  give  a careful  consideration 
to  the  revised  proposals  but  even  with  regard  to  the 
offer  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiaochow 
to  the  Chinese  Government  the  latter  did  not  manifest 
the  least  appreciation  for  Japan’s  good  will  and  diffi- 
culties. 

From  the  commercial  and  military  point  of  view 
Kiaochow  is  an  important  place,  in  the  acquisition  of 
which  the  Japanese  Empire  sacrificed  much  blood  and 
money,  and,  after  the  acquisition  the  Empire  incurs  no 
obligation  to  restore  it  to  China.  But  with  the  ob- 


APPENDICES 


225 


ject  of  increasing  the  future  friendly  relations  of 
the  two  countries,  they  went  to  the  extent  of  proposing 
its  restoration,  yet  to  her  great  regret,  the  Chinese 
Government  did  not  take  into  consideration  the  good 
intention  of  Japan  and  manifest  appreciation  of  her 
difficulties,  Furthennore,  the  Chinese  Government 
not  only  ignored  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial 
Government  in  offering  the  restoration  of  Kiaochow 
Bay,  but  also  in  replying  to  the  revised  proposals  they 
even  demanded  its  unconditional  restoration ; and 
again  China  demanded  that  Japan  should  bear  the  re- 
sponsibility of  paying  indemnity  for  all  the  unavoid- 
able losses  and  damages  resulting  from  Japan’s  mili- 
tary operations  at  Kiaochow ; and  still  further  in  con- 
nection with  the  territory  of  Kiaochow  China  ad- 
vanced other  demands  and  declared  that  she  has  the 
right  of  participation  at  the  future  peace  conference 
to  be  held  between  Japan  and  Germany.  Although 
China  is  fully  aware  that  the  unconditional  restora- 
tion of  Kiaochow  and  Japan’s  responsibility  of  in- 
demnification for  the  unavoidable  losses  and  damages 
can  never  be  tolerated  by  Japan,  yet  she  purposely 
advanced  these  demands  and  declared  that  this  reply 
was  final  and  decisive. 

Since  Japan  could  not  tolerate  such  demands  the 
settlement  of  the  other  questions,  however  compromis- 
ing it  may  be,  would  not  be  to  her  interest.  The  con- 
sequence is  that  the  present  reply  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment is,  on  the  whole,  vague  and  meaningless. 

Furthermore,  in  the  reply  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 


226 


APPENDICES 


ment  to  the  other  proposals  in  the  revised  list  of  the 
Imperial  Government,  such  as  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  where  Japan  particularly  has 
geographical,  commercial,  industrial  and  strategic  re- 
lations, as  recognized  by  all  nations,  and  made  more 
remarkable  in  consequence  of  the  two  wars  in  which 
Japan  was  engaged,  the  Chinese  Government  overlooks 
these  facts  and  does  not  respect  Japan’s  position  in 
that  place.  The  Chinese  Government  even  freely  al- 
tered those  articles  which  the  Imperial  Government, 
in  a compromising  spirit,  have  formulated  in  accord- 
ance with  the  statement  of  the  Chinese  Representa- 
tives, thereby  making  the  statements  of  the  Representa- 
tives an  empty  talk ; and  on  seeing  them  conceding  with 
the  one  hand  and  withholding  with  the  other  it  is 
very  difficult  to  attribute  faithfulness  and  sincerity  to 
the  Chinese  authorities. 

As  regards  the  articles  relating  to  the  employment 
of  advisers,  the  establishment  of  schools  and  hospitals, 
the  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition  and  the  establish- 
ment of  arsenals  and  railway  concessions  in  South 
China  in  the  revised  proposals,  they  were  either  pro- 
posed with  the  proviso  that  the  consent  of  the  Power 
concerned  must  be  obtained,  or  they  are  merely  to 
be  recorded  in  the  minutes  in  accordance  with  the  state- 
ments of  the  Chinese  delegates,  and  thus  they  are  not 
in  the  least  in  conflict  either  with  Chinese  sovereignty 
or  her  treaties  with  the  Foreign  Powers,  yet  the 
Chinese  Government  in  their  reply  to  the  proposals, 
alleging  that  these  proposals  are  incompatible  with 


APPENDICES 


227 


their  sovereign  rights  and  treaties  with  Foreign  Pow- 
ers, defeat  the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment. However,  in  spite  of  such  attitude  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  the  Imperial  Government,  though 
regretting  to  see  that  there  is  no  room  for  further  nego- 
tiations, yet  warmly  attached  to  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  is  still  hoping  for  a satis- 
factory settlement  in  order  to  avoid  the  disturbance  of 
the  relations. 

So  in  spite  of  the  circumstances  which  admitted  no 
patience,  they  have  reconsidered  the  feelings  of  the 
Government  of  their  neighbouring  country  and,  with 
the  exception  of  the  article  relating  to  Fukien  which 
is  to  be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes  as  has  al- 
ready been  agreed  upon  by  the  Representatives  of 
both  nations,  will  undertake  to  detach  the  Group  V 
from  the  present  negotiations  and  discuss  it  sepa- 
rately in  the  future.  Therefore,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment should  appreciate  the  friendly  feelings  of  the 
Imperial  Government  by  immediately  accepting  with- 
out any  alteration  all  the  articles  of  Groups  I,  II,  III, 
and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection  with 
Fukien  province  in  Group  V as  contained  in  the  re- 
vised proposals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April. 

The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  offer  their 
advice  and  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government,  upon 
this  advice,  will  give  a satisfactory  reply  by  6 o’clock 
p.  M.  on  the  9th  day  of  May.  It  is  hereby  declared 
that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at 


228 


APPENDICES 


the  specified  time,  the  Imperial  Government  will  take 
steps  they  may  deem  necessary. 

EXPLANATORY  NOTE 

Accompanying  Ultimatum  delivered  to  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  by  the  Japanese  Minister,  May  7th, 

1915- 

1.  With  the  exception  of  the  question  of  Fukien  to 
be  arranged  by  an  exchange  of  notes,  the  five  articles 
postponed  for  later  negotiation  refer  to  (a)  the  em- 
ployment of  advisers,  (b)  the  establishment  of  schools 
and  hospitals,  (c)  the  railway  concessions  in  South 
China,  (d)  the  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition  and 
the  establishment  of  arsenals  and  (e)  right  of  mis- 
sionary propaganda. 

2.  The  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of 
the  article  relating  to  Fukien  may  be  either  in  the 
form  as  proposed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  on  the 
26th  of  April  or  in  that  contained  in  the  Reply  of  the 
Chinese  Government  of  May  ist.  Although  the  Ul- 
timatum calls  for  the  immediate  acceptance  by  China 
of  the  modified  proposals  presented  on  April  26th, 
without  alteration,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  it  merely 
states  the  principle  and  does  not  apply  to  this  article 
and  articles  4 and  5 of  this  note. 

3.  If  the  Chinese  Government  accept  all  the  articles 
as  demanded  in  the  Ultimatum  the  offer  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  to  restore  Kiaochow  to  China,  made 
on  the  26th  of  April,  will  still  hold  good. 

4.  Article  2 of  Group  II  relating  to  the  lease  or 


APPENDICES 


229 


purchase  of  land,  the  terms  “ lease  ” and  “ purchase 
may  be  replaced  by  the  terms  temporary  lease  ” and 

perpetual  lease  ” or  “ lease  on  consultation,”  which 
means  a long-term  lease  with  its  unconditional  re- 
newal. 

Article  IV  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  approval  of 
police  laws  and  Ordinances  and  local  taxes  by  the 
Japanese  Council  may  form  the  subject  of  a secret 
agreement. 

5.  The  phrase  “ to  consult  with  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment ” in  connection  with  questions  of  pledging  the 
local  taxes  for  raising  loans  and  the  loans  for  the  con- 
struction of  railways,  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 
which  is  similar  to  the  agreement  in  Manchuria  re- 
lating to  the  matters  of  the  same  kind,  may  be  re- 
placed by  the  phrase  “ to  consult  with  the  Japanese 
capitalists.” 

The  article  relating  to  the  opening  of  trade  marts 
in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  in  respect  to  location  and 
regulations,  may,  following  their  precedent  set  in  Shan- 
tung, be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes. 

6.  Erom  the  phrase  “ those  interested  in  the  Com- 
pany ” in  Group  III  of  the  revised  list  of  demands, 
the  words  “ those  interested  in  ” may  be  deleted. 

7.  The  Japanese  version  of  the  Eormal  Agreement 
and  its  annexes  shall  be  the  official  text  or  both  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  shall  be  the  official  texts. 

(e)  reply  of  the  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  TO  THE 
ULTIMATUM  OF  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERNMENT, 


230 


APPENDICES 


DELIVERED  TO  THE  JAPANESE  MINISTER  BY  THE 
MINISTER  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  ON  THE  8tH  OF 
MAY,  1915 

On  the  7th  of  this  month,  at  three  o’clock  p.  m., 
the  Chinese  Government  received  an  Ultimatum  from 
the  Japanese  Government  together  with  an  Explana- 
tory Note  of  seven  articles.  The  Ultimatum  con- 
cluded with  the  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  by 
six  o’clock  p.  M.  on  the  9th  of  May  will  give  a satis- 
factory reply,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  sat- 
isfactory reply  is  received  before  or  at  the  specified 
time,  the  Japanese  Government  will  take  steps  she 
may  deem  necessary. 

“ The  Chinese  Government  with  a view  to  preserving 
the  peace  of  the  Far  East  hereby  accepts,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  those  five  articles  of  Group  V postponed 
for  later  negotiations,  all  the  articles  of  Groups  I,  II, 
III,  and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection 
with  Fukien  Province  in  Group  V as  contained  in  the 
revised  proposals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  Explanatory  Note  of  seven 
articles  accompanying  the  Ultimatum  of  the  Japanese 
Government  with  the  hope  that  thereby  all  the  out- 
standing questions  are  settled,  so  that  the  cordial  rela- 
tionship between  the  two  countries  may  be  further  con- 
solidated. The  Japanese  Minister  is  hereby  requested 
to  appoint  a day  to  call  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs to  make  the  literary  improvement  of  the  text 
and  sign  the  Agreement  as  soon  as  possible.” 


APPENDICES 


231 


(f)  extract  from  official  statement  issued  by 

THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  AFTER  THE  ACCEPT- 
ANCE OF  THE  JAPANESE  ULTIMATUM,  MAY  8tH, 

1915 

“ In  considering  the  nature  of  the  course  they  should 
take  with  reference  to  the  Ultimatum  the  Chinese 
Government  was  influenced  by  a desire  to  preserve  the 
Chinese  people,  as  well  as  the  large  number  of  foreign 
residents  in  China,  from  unnecessary  suffering,  and 
also  to  prevent  the  interests  of  friendly  Powers  from 
being  imperiled.  For  these  reasons  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment were  constrained  to  comply  in  full  with  the 
terms  of  the  Ultimatum,  but  in  complying  the  Chinese 
disclaim  any  desire  to  associate  themselves  with  any  re- 
vision, which  may  thus  be  effected,  of  the  various  con- 
ventions and  agreements  concluded  between  other 
Powers  in  respect  of  the  maintenance  of  China’s  terri- 
torial independence  and  integrity,  the  preservation  of 
the  status  quo,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity 
for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
China.”  1 

1 For  the  full  text  of  this  statement,  see  Our  Eastern  Ques- 
tion, by  T.  F.  Millard.  The  texts  of  the  treaties  concluded  be- 
tween China  and  Japan  as  a result  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
is  contained  in  that  volume,  and  also  in  Contemporary  Politics 
in  the  Far  East  by  S.  K.  Hornbeck;  and  The  Fight  for  the  Re- 
public in  China,  by  B.  L,  Putnam-Weale. 


1 


I 

I 

i 

APPENDIX  III  I 

OFFICIAL  STATEMENTS  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  LAN-  | 

SING-ISHII  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  AMERICA  ^ 

AND  JAPAN  CONCERNING  CHINA,  IN  1917.  1 

(a)  statement  by  secretary  LANSING  AFTER 
PUBLICATION  OF  THE  ISHII  AGREEMENT 

Viscount  Ishii  and  the  other  Japanese  commis- 
sioners who  are  now  on  their  way  back  to  their  coun- 
try have  performed  a service  to  the  United  States 
as  well  as  to  Japan  which  is  of  the  highest  value. 

“ There  had  unquestionably  been  growing  up  be-  | 

tween  the  peoples  of  the  two  countries  a feeling  of  J 

suspicion  as  to  the  motives  inducing  the  activities  of 
the  other  in  the  Far  East,  a feeling  which,  if  unchecked,  : 

promised  to  develop  a serious  situation.  Rumours 
and  reports  of  improper  intentions  were  increasing  and 
were  more  and  more  believed.  Legitimate  commer- 
cial and  industrial  enterprises  without  ulterior  motive 
were  presumed  to  have  political  significance,  with  the 
result  that  opposition  to  those  enterprises  were  aroused 
in  the  other  country. 

“ The  attitude  of  constraint  and  doubt  thus  created 
was  fostered  and  encouraged  by  the  campaign  of 
falsehood,  which  for  a long  time  had  been  adroitly 
and  secretly  carried  on  by  Germans,  whose  government, 
as  a part  of  its  foreign  policy,  desired  especially  to 
so  alienate  this  country  and  Japan  that  it  would  be 
at  the  chosen  time  no  difficult  task  to  cause  a rupture 

232 


APPENDICES 


233 


of  their  good  relations.  Unfortunately,  there  were 
people  in  both  countries,  many  of  whom  were  entirely 
honest  in  their  beliefs,  who  accepted  every  false  rumour 
as  true,  and  aided  the  German  propaganda  by  declar- 
ing that  their  own  government  should  prepare  for  the 
conflict,  which,  they  asserted,  was  inevitable,  that  the 
interests  of  the  two  nations  in  the  Far  East  were 
hostile,  and  that  every  activity  of  the  other  country 
in  the  Pacific  had  a sinister  purpose. 

“ Fortunately,  this  distrust  was  not  so  general  in 
either  the  United  States  or  Japan  as  to  affect  the 
friendly  relations  of  the  two  governments,  but  there 
is  no  doubt  that  the  feeling  of  suspicion  was  increas- 
ing, and  the  untrue  reports  were  receiving  more  and 
more  credence  in  spite  of  the  earnest  efforts  which 
were  made  on  both  sides  of  the  Pacific  to  counteract 
a movement  which  would  jeopardize  the  ancient 
friendship  of  the  two  nations. 

The  visit  of  Viscount  Ishii  and  his  colleagues  has 
accomplished  a great  change  of  opinion  in  this  country. 
By  frankly  denouncing  the  evil  influences  which  have 
been  at  work,  by  openly  proclaiming  that  the  policy 
of  Japan  is  not  one  of  aggression,  and  by  declaring 
that  there  is  no  intention  to  take  advantage  commer- 
cially or  industrially  of  the  special  relations  to  China 
created  by  geographical  position,  the  representatives 
of  Japan  have  cleared  the  diplomatic  atmosphere  of 
the  suspicions  which  had  been  so  carefully  spread 
by  our  enemies  and  by  misguided  or  overzealous  peo- 
ple in  both  countries.  In  a few  days  the  propaganda 


234 


APPENDICES 


of  years  has  been  undone,  and  both  nations  are  now 
able  to  see  how  near  they  came  to  being  led  into  the 
trap  which  had  been  skilfully  set  for  them. 

Throughout  the  conferences  which  have  taken 
place,  Viscount  Ishii  has  shown  a sincerity  and  candour 
which  dispelled  every  doubt  as  to  his  purpose,  and 
brought  the  two  governments  into  an  attitude  of  con- 
fidence toward  each  other  which  made  it  possible  to 
discuss  every  question  with  frankness  and  cordiality. 
Approaching  the  subjects  in  such  a spirit  and  with  the 
mutual  desire  to  remove  every  possible  cause  of  con- 
troversy, the  negotiations  were  marked  by  a sincerity 
and  good  will  which  from  the  first  ensured  their  suc- 
cess. 

“ The  principal  result  of  the  negotiations  was  the 
mutual  understanding  which  was  reached  as  to  the 
principles  governing  the  policies  of  the  two  govern- 
ments in  relation  to  China.  This  understanding  is 
formally  set  forth  in  the  notes  exchanged,  and  now 
made  public.  The  statements  in  the  notes  require  no 
explanation.  They  not  only  contain  a reaffirmation 
of  the  ' open  door  ’ policy,  but  introduce  a principle 
of  non-interference  with  the  sovereignty  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China  which,  generally  applied,  is 
essential  to  perpetual  international  peace,  as  clearly 
declared  by  President  Wilson,  and  which  is  the  very 
foundation,  also,  of  Pan-Americanism,  as  interpreted 
by  this  government. 

The  removal  of  doubts  and  suspicions  and  the 
mutual  declaration  of  the  new  doctrine  as  to  the  Far 


APPENDICES 


235 


East  would  be  enough  to  make  the  visit  of  the  Japanese 
commission  to  the  United  States  historic  and  memor- 
able, but  it  accomplished  a further  purpose,  which  is 
of  special  interest  to  the  world  at  this  time,  in  ex- 
pressing Japan’s  earnest  desire  to  co-operate  with  this 
country  in  waging  war  against  the  German  govern- 
ment. The  discussions,  which  covered  the  military, 
naval  and  economic  activities  to  be  employed  with 
due  regard  to  relative  resources  and  ability,  showed 
the  same  spirit  of  sincerity  and  candour  which  char- 
acterized the  negotiations  resulting  in  the  exchange 
of  notes. 

“ At  the  present  time  it  is  inexpedient  to  make 
public  the  details  of  these  conversations,  but  it  may 
be  said  that  this  government  has  been  gratified  by 
the  assertions  of  Viscount  Ishii  and  his  colleagues 
that  their  government  desired  to  do  their  part  in  the 
suppression  of  Prussian  militarism  and  were  eager  to 
co-operate  in  every  practical  way  to  that  end.  It 
might  be  added,  however,  that  complete  and  satisfac- 
tory understandings  upon  the  matter  of  naval  co- 
operation in  the  Pacific  for  the  purpose  of  attaining 
the  common  object  against  Germany  and  her  allies 
have  been  reached  between  the  representative  of  the 
imperial  Japanese  navy,  who  is  attached  to  the  special 
mission  of  Japan,  and  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  Navy. 

“ It  is  only  just  to  say  that  success  which  has  at- 
tended the  intercourse  of  the  Japanese  commission 
with  American  officials,  and  with  private  persons  as 


236 


APPENDICES 


well,  is  due  in  large  measure  to  the  personality  of 
Viscount  Ishii,  the  head  of  the  mission.  The  natural 
reserve  and  hesitation,  which  are  not  unusual  in  nego- 
tiations of  a delicate  nature,  disappeared  under  the 
influence  of  his  open  friendliness,  while  his  frankness 
won  the  confidence  and  good  will  of  all.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  a representative  of  a different  temper  could  in 
so  short  a time  have  done  as  much  as  Viscount  Ishii 
to  place  on  a better  and  firmer  basis  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan.  Through  him 
the  American  people  have  gained  a new  and  higher 
conception  of  the  reality  of  Japan’s  friendship  for 
the  United  States  which  will  be  mutually  beneficial 
in  the  future. 

Viscount  Ishii  will  be  remembered  in  this  country 
as  a statesman  of  high  attainments,  as  a diplomat 
with  a true  vision  of  international  affairs,  and  as  a 
genuine  and  outspoken  friend  of  America.” 

(b)  statement  of  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  CONCERN- 
ING THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 

Washington,  November  12,  1917 
“ The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Government  of  Japan  have  recently,  in  order  to  silence 
mischievous  reports,  effected  an  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  concerning  their  desires  and  intentions 
with  regard  to  China.  Copies  of  the  said  notes  have 
been  communicated  to  the  Chinese  Government  by 
the  Japanese  Minister  at  Peking,  and  the  Chinese 
Government,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding. 


APPENDICES 


237 


hastens  to  make  the  following  declaration  so  as  to 
make  known  the  views  of  the  Government. 

The  principle  adopted  by  the  Chinese  Government 
toward  the  friendly  nations  has  always  been  one  of 
justice  and  equality,  and  consequently  the  rights  en- 
joyed by  the  friendly  nations  derived  from  the  treaties 
have  been  constantly  respected,  and  so  even  with  the 
special  relations  between  countries  created  by  the  fact 
of  territorial  contiguity  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  they  have 
already  been  provided  for  in  her  existing  treaties. 

Hereafter  the  Chinese  Government  will  still  adhere 
to  the  principles  hitherto  adopted,  and  hereby  it  is 
again  declared  that  the  Chinese  Government  will  not 
allow  itself  to  be  bound  by  any  agreement  entered 
into  by  other  nations.” 


APPENDIX  IV 


TREATIES  AND  AGREEMENTS  WITH  REFERENCE 
TO  THE  INTEGRITY  AND  SOVEREIGN  RIGHTS 
OF  CHINA,  THE  “OPEN  DOOR”  POLICY 
AND  “EQUALITY  OF  OPPORTUNITIES” 

I.  Circular  Note  of  Secretary  of  State  John  Hay, 
for  the  United  States,  sent  on  Sept.  6,  1899,  to  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United  States  at 
London,  Paris,  Berlin,  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  in 
November  to  Rome  and  Tokyo,  asking  the  govern- 
ments of  the  countries  to  which  they  were  respectively 
accredited  to  make  a ''  formal  declaration  of  an  ‘ open 
door  policy  ’ in  the  territories  held  by  them  in  China.” 
The  request  made  of  each  government  was  that  it: 
“ First.  Will  in  no  way  interfere  with  any  treaty 
port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  so-called  ' sphere 
of  interest  ’ or  leased  territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second.  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the 
time  being  shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or 
shipped  to  all  such  ports  . . . (unless  they  be  ‘ free 
ports’),  . . . and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  col- 
lected by  the  Chinese  Government. 

“ Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbour  dues 
on  vessels  of  another  nationality  frequenting  any  port 
in  such  ‘ sphere  ’ than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of 
its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad  charges 

238 


APPENDICES 


239 


over  lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its 
' sphere  ’ on  merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  sub- 
jects of  other  nationalities  transported  through  such 
‘ sphere  ’ than  shall  be  levied  on  similar  merchandise 
belonging  to  its  own  nationals  transported  over  equal 
distances/’ 

Each  of  the  governments  so  addressed  gave  its  assent 
to  the  principles  suggested,  whereupon  Secretary  Hay, 
having  in  hand  and  having  compared  the  replies,  sent, 
on  March  20,  1900,  instructions  mutatis  mutandis,  to 
the  ambassadors  to  inform  the  governments  to  which 
they  were  respectively  accredited  that  in  his  opinion  the 
six  powers  in  question  and  the  United  States  were  mu- 
tually pledged  to  the  policy  of  maintaining  the  commer- 
cial status  quo  in  China,  and  of  refraining  each  within 
what  might  be  considered  its  “ sphere  of  influence  ” 
from  measures  “ calculated  to  destroy  equality  of 
opportunity.”  The  seven  powers  thus  mutually 
pledged  were  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United  States.  (The  United 
States  had,  however,  no  special  “ sphere  of  influence.”) 

II.  Circular  Telegram  sent  by  Mr.  Hay  to  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United  States  at 
Berlin,  Brussels,  The  Hague,  Lisbon,  London,  Madrid, 
Paris,  Rome,  St.  Petersburg,  Tokyo,  and  Vienna,  July 
3,  1900. 

'U  . . the  policy  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  to  seek  a solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve  China’s 
territorial  and  administrative  entity,  protect  all  rights 


240 


APPENDICES 


guaranteed  to  friendly  powers  by  treaty  and  inter- 
national laws,  and  safeguard  for  the  world  the  princi- 
ple of  equal  and  impartial  trade  with  all  parts  of  the 
Chinese  Empire.” 

III.  Lord  Salisbury,  English  Prime  Minister,  in  an 
interview  with  the  United  States  Ambassador  to  Eng- 
land, July  7,  1900,  “ expressed  himself  most  emphat- 
ically as  concurring  ” in  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
as  set  forth  in  the  above  telegram. 

In  a statement  made  in  the  English  House  of  Com- 
mons, Aug.  2,  1900,  regarding  the  policy  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  it  was  declared : 

‘‘  Her  Majesty’s  Government  are  opposed  to  any 
partition  of  China,  and  believe  that  they  are  in  accord 
with  other  powers  in  this  declaration.” 

IV.  Agreement,  Great  Britain-Germany  — Oct.  16, 
1900. 

“ I.  It  is  a matter  of  joint  and  permanent  inter- 
national interest  that  the  ports  on  the  rivers  and  the 
littoral  of  China  should  remain  free  and  open  to  trade 
and  to  every  other  legitimate  form  of  economic  ac- 
tivity for  the  nationals  of  all  countries  without  dis- 
tinction, and  the  two  agree  on  their  part  to  uphold  the 
same  for  all  Chinese  territory  so  far  as  they  can 
exercise  influence. 

‘'2.  Her  Britannic  Majesty’s  Government  and  the 
Imperial  German  Government  will  not  on  their  part 
make  use  of  the  present  complication  to  obtain  for 
themselves  any  territorial  advantages  in  Chinese 
dominions  and  will  direct  their  policy  toward  main- 


APPENDICES 


241 


taining  undiminished  the  territorial  conditions  of  the 
Chinese  Empire.” 

V.  Mr.  Hay,  Oct.  29,  1900. 

, “ When  the  recent  troubles  were  at  their  height  this 
government,  on  the  3d  of  July,  once  more  made  an 
announcement  of  its  policy  regarding  impartial  trade 
and  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  had  the 
gratification  of  learning  that  all  the  powers  held  simi- 
lar views.” 

As  the  above  Note  indicates,  the  eleven  countries 
addressed  by  Secretary  Hay  in  his  telegram  of  July 
3 had  all  signified  in  one  way  or  another  their  approval 
of  the  principles  to  which  he  asked  attention  in  that 
telegram. 

VI.  For  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  Aug.  12, 
1902,  see  Appendix  V,  under  Treaties  . . . Korea,” 

V. 

VII.  Mr.  Hay  to  United  States  Ambassadors  to 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  and  Portugal,  Jan.  13,  1905.  (During 
the  Russo-Japanese  war.) 

‘A  . . the  United  States  has  repeatedly  made  its 
position  well  known  and  has  been  gratified  at  the 
cordial  welcome  accorded  to  its  efforts  to  strengthen 
and  perpetuate  the  broad  policy  of  maintaining  the 
integrity  of  China  and  the  ' open  door  ’ in  the  Orient. 
. . . Holding  these  views,  the  United  States  disclaims 
any  sort  of  reserved  territorial  rights  or  control  in 
the  Chinese  Empire,  and  it  is  deemed  fitting  to  make 
this  purpose  frankly  known  and  to  remove  all  appre- 


242 


APPENDICES 


hension  on  this  score  so  far  as  concerns  the  policy  of 
this  nation.  ...  You  will  bring  this  matter  to  the 
notice  of  the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited, 
and  you  will  invite  the  expression  of  its  views  thereon.” 

By  Jan.  23  replies  had  been  received  from  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy,  entirely  agreeing  with  the 
position  taken  by  the  United  States  and  declaring 
their  constant  adhesion  to  the  policy  of  the  integrity 
of  China  and  the  open  door  in  the  Orient. 

VIII.  Treaty,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  — Aug.  12, 
1905.  (Renewing  the  Alliance.)  " 

Preamble.  “ The  Governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  . . . have  agreed  upon  the  following  ar- 
ticles, which  have  for  their  objects: 

“ (a)  The  consolidation  and  maintainance  of  the 
general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of 
India. 

'‘(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of 
all  the  powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence 
and  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  in  China.” 

For  reference  in  this  treaty  to  Korea,  see  Appendix 
V,  under  “Treaties  . . . Korea,”  IX. 

IX.  Dispatch  (Accompanying  a copy  of  the  fore- 
going) from  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne  to  his  Ma- 
jesty’s Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  Sept.  6,  1905. 

“ Sir : I enclose  ...  a copy  of  a new  Agreement. 

. . . The  Russian  Government  will,  I trust,  recognize 


APPENDICES 


243 


that  the  new  Agreement  is  an  international  instrument 
to  which  no  exception  can  be  taken  by  any  of  the 
powers  interested  in  the  affairs  of  the  Far  East.  You 
should  call  special  attention  to  the  objects  mentioned 
in  the  Preamble  as  those  by  which  the  policy  of  the 
contracting  parties  is  inspired.  His  Majesty’s  Gov- 
ernment believe  that  they  may  count  upon  the  good 
will  and  support  of  all  the  powers  in  endeavouring 
to  maintain  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  in  seeking  to 
uphold  the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for 
the  commerce  and  the  industry  of  all  nations  in  that 
country.” 

X.  Treaty  (of  Portsmouth),  Russia-Japan  — Sept. 
5,  1905.  (At  the  end  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.) 

Article  3.  “ Japan  and  Russia  mutually  engage 

. . . 2.  To  restore  entirely  and  completely  to  the 
exclusive  administration  of  China  all  portions  of  Man- 
churia now  in  the  occupation  or  under  the  control  of 
(their  troops),  with  the  exception  of  the  territory 
above  mentioned  (the  Liaotung  peninsula). 

The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  declare  that 
they  have  not  in  Manchuria  any  territorial  advantage 
or  exclusive  concessions  in  impairment  of  Chinese 
sovereignty  or  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity.” 

Article  4.  “ Japan  and  Russia  reciprocally  engage 

not  to  obstruct  any  general  measures  common  to  all 
countries  which  China  may  take  for  the  development 
of  the  commerce  and  industry  of-  Manchuria.” 


244 


APPENDICES 


XL  Treaty,  China-Japan  — Dec.  22,  1905. 

(Confirming  arrangements  made  in  the  Portsmouth 
T reaty . ) 

Article  1 2.  The  two  governments  engage  that  in 
all  matters  dealt  with  in  the  treaty  signed  this  day 
or  in  the  present  Agreement  the  most  favourable  treat- 
ment shall  be  reciprocally  extended.” 

XII.  Convention,  France-Japan  — June  10,  1907. 

The  Governments  of  Japan  and  France,  being 

agreed  to  respect  the  independence  and  integrity  of 
China,  as  well  as  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  in 
that  country.  . . 

XIII.  Convention,  Japan-Russia  — July  30,  1907. 

Article  2.  The  two  High  Contracting  Parties 

recognize  the  independence  and  the  territorial  integrity 
of  China  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  in 
whatever  concerns  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
nations  in  that  Empire,  and  engage  to  sustain  and 
defend  the  status  quo  and  respect  for  this  principle 
by  all  the  pacific  means  within  their  reach.” 

XIV.  Exchange  of  Notes,  Japan  and  the  United 
States  — November,  1908. 

1.  It  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  . . . 

2.  ‘‘  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the  com- 
mon interests  of  all  powers  in  China  by  supporting 
by  all  pacific  means  at  their  disposal  the  independence 
and  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity  ...  in  that  Empire.” 

XV.  Convention,  Japan-Russia  — July  4,  1910. 

The  two  governments,  sincerely  attached  to  the 


APPENDICES  245 

principles  established  by  the  convention  concluded  be- 
tween them  on  July  30,  1907,  ...” 

Article  2.  “ Each  . . . engages  to  maintain  and 

respect  the  status  quo  in  Manchuria  resulting  from 
the  treaties,  conventions  and  other  arrangements  con- 
cluded up  to  this  day  between  Japan  and  Russia,  or 
between  either  of  those  two  Powers  and  China.” 

XVI.  Treaty,  Great  Britain-Japan  — July  13,  1911. 
( Renewing  the  alliance  for  the  second  time. ) 

Preamble:  (The  two  governments  declare  as 

among  their  objects)  : “ The  preservation  of  the  com- 

mon interests  of  all  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China.” 

XVII.  Agreement,  United  States-Japan  — Nov.  2, 
1917. 

“ The  Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes 
that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  particularly 
in  the  parts  to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous. 

. . . The  territorial  sovereignty  of  China,  neverthe- 
less, remains  unimpaired  . . . and  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment . . . has  no  desire  to  discriminate  against 
the  trade  of  other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  com- 
mercial rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in  treaties 
with  other  Powers.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  Japan  deny  that  they  have  any  purpose 
to  infringe  in  any  way  the  independence  or  territorial 
integrity  of  China,  and  they  declare  furthermore,  that 


246 


APPENDICES 


they  always  adhere  to  the  principle  of  the  so-called 
' open  door/  or  equal  opportunities  for  commerce  and 
industry  in  China.” 

With  the  exception  of  Clause  XVII,  this  summary  appears 
in  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,  by  S.  K.  Hornbeck, 
copyrighted  by  D.  Appleton  & Co.,  and  is  here  used  by  permission 
of  authors  and  publishers. 


APPENDIX  V 


TREATIES  AND  AGREEMENTS  WITH  REEER- 
ENCE  TO  KOREA 

I.  Treaty,  Japan-Korea  — August  26,  1894.  (At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  between  Japan  and  China.) 

Article  i.  “The  object  of  the  alliance  is  to  main- 
tain the  independence  of  Korea  on  a firm  footing 
and  ...” 

II.  Treaty  (of  Shimonoseki) , Japan-China  — xA.pril 
17,  1895.  (At  the  end  of  the  war.) 

Article  i.  “ China  recognizes  definitely  the  full  and 
complete  independence  and  autonomy  of  Korea.” 

III.  Agreement,  Japan-Russia  — April  25,  1898. 
Article  i.  “The  (two  governments)  recognize 

definitely  the  sovereignty  and  entire  independence  of 
Korea  and  pledge  themselves  mutually  to  abstain  from 
all  direct  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that 
country.” 

IV.  Treaty,  Korea-China  — Sept,  ii,  1899. 

Article  i.  “There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  and 

friendship  between  the  Empire  of  Korea  and  the 
Empire  of  China.  ...” 

V.  Treaty,  England-Japan.  (Making  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance)  — Jan.  30,  1902. 

Preamble.  “ The  Governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  Japan,  actuated  solely  by  a desire  to  maintain 

247 


248 


APPENDICES 


the  status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the  Extreme  East, 
being,  moreover,  specially  interested  in  maintaining 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and 
the  Empire  of  Korea,  and  in  securing  equal  oppor- 
tunities in  those  countries  for  the  commerce  and  in- 
dustry of  all  nations,  hereby  agree  ...” 

Article  i.  “ The  High  Contracting  Parties,  having 
mutually  recognized  the  independence  of  China  and 
Korea,  declare  themselves  to  be  entirely  uninfluenced 
by  any  aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country.” 

VI.  Convention,  Erance-Russia  — March  3,  1902. 

The  two  governments  “ have  received  a copy  of  the 

Anglo- Japanese  agreement  of  Jan.  30,  1902,  concluded 
with  the  object  of  maintaining  the  status  quo  and 
the  general  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  preserving  the 
independence  of  China  and  Korea,  which  are  to  remain 
open  to  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  . . . 

“ The  two  Governments  consider  that  the  observance 
of  these  principles  is  at  the  same  time  a guarantee  of 
their  special  interests  in  the  Far  East.” 

VII.  Rescript,  by  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  Feb.  10, 

1904  (declaring  war  against  Russia). 

(( 

“ The  integrity  of  Korea  is  a matter  of  gravest 
concern  to  this  Empire,  . . . the  separate  existence  of 
Korea  is  essential  to  the  safety  of  our  realm. 

it 

“ . . . the  absorption  of  Manchuria  by  Russia 
would  render  it  impossible  to  maintain  the  integrity 
of  China,  and  would,  in  addition,  compel  the  aban- 


APPENDICES  249 

donment  of  all  hope  for  peace  in  the  Extreme 
East  ...” 

VIII.  Protocol,  Japan-Korea  — Feb.  23,  1904. 

Article  i.  “For  the  purpose  of  maintaining  a 

permanent  and  solid  friendship  between  Japan  and 
Korea  and  firmly  establishing  peace  in  the  Far  East, 
the  Imperial  Government  of  Korea  shall  place  full 
confidence  in  the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan,  and 
adopt  the  advice  of  the  latter  in  regard  to  improve- 
ments in  administration.” 

Article  2.  “ The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan 

shall  in  a spirit  of  firm  friendship  insure  the  safety 
and  repose  of  the  Imperial  House  of  Korea.” 

Article  3.  “ The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan 

definitely  guarantee  the  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire.” 

IX.  Treaty,  Great  Britain-Japan  — August  12, 
1905.  (Renewing  the  Alliance.) 

Article  3.  “ Japan  possessing  paramount  political, 

military  and  economic  interests  in  Korea,  Great  Britain 
recognizes  the  right  of  Japan  to  take  such  measures 
...  in  Korea  as  she  may  deem  proper  . . . provided 
that  such  measures  are  not  contrary  to  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations.” 

X.  Treaty  (of  Portsmouth),  Japan-Russia  — Sept. 
5.  1905- 

Article  2.  “ The  Imperial  Russian  Government, 

acknowledging  that  Japan  possesses  in  Korea  para- 
mount political,  military,  and  economic  interests,  en- 


250 


APPENDICES 


gage  neither  to  obstruct  nor  to  interfere  with  the 
measures  . . . which  the  Imperial  Japanese  Govern- 
ment may  find  it  necessary  to  take  in  Korea.” 

XL  Convention,  Japan-Korea  — Nov.  17,  1905. 
Preamble.  The  two  governments,  desiring  to 
strengthen  the  principle  of  solidarity  which  unites  the 
two  Empires,  have  . . . concluded: 

Article  i.  “The  Government  of  Japan  . . . will 
hereafter  have  control  and  direction  of  the  external 
relations  and  affairs  of  Korea  ...” 

In  1906  Marquis  Ito  was  made  (Japanese)  Resi- 
dent-General in  Korea. 

In  1907  Japan  prevented  the  representatives  of  the 
Korean  Emperor  from  being  given  a hearing  at  The 
Hague  Conference. 

XII.  Convention,  Japan-Korea  — July  24,  1907. 

“ The  Governments  of  Japan  and  Korea,  desiring 
speedily  to  promote  the  wealth  and  strength  of  Korea 
and  with  the  object  of  promoting  the  prosperity  of 
the  Korean  nation,  have  agreed.  . . ” 

“ I.  In  all  matters  relating  to  the  reform  of  the 
Korean  administration  the  Korean  Government  shall 
receive  instructions  and  guidance  from  the  (Japanese) 
Resident-General  . . . 

“ 4.  In  all  appointments  and  removals  of  high 
officials  the  Korean  Government  must  obtain  the  con- 
sent of  the  Resident-General. 

“ 5.  The  Korean  Government  shall  appoint  to  be 
officials  of  Korea  any  Japanese  subjects  recommended 
by  the  Resident-General. 


APPENDICES 


251 


“ 6.  The  Korean  Government  shall  not  appoint  any 
foreigners  to  be  officials  of  Korea  without  consulting 
the  Resident-General.” 

In  1908  Prince  Ito  declared  publicly  that  it  was  no 
part  of  Japan’s  purpose  to  annex  Korea. 

In  1909  Prince  Ito  declared  that  Korea  must  be 
“ amalgamated  ” with  Japan. 

XIII.  Treaty,  Japan-Korea  — Aug.  22,  1910. 

Article  i.  “ His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Korea 
makes  complete  and  permanent  cession  to  his  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Japan  of  all  rights  of  sovereignty 
over  the  whole  of  Korea.” 

Article  2.  “ His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan 

accepts  the  cession  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article, 
and  consents  to  the  complete  annexation  of  Korea 
to  the  Empire  of  Japan.” 

On  August  29,  1910,  Japan  formally  declared 
Korea  annexed  to  the  dominions  of  his  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Japanese  Emperor. 

(This  summary  appears  in  Contetnporary  Politics  in  the  Far 
East,  by  S.  K.  Hornbeck,  copyrighted  by  D.  Appleton  & Co., 
and  is  here  used  by  permission  of  author  and  publishers.) 


AN  INTRODUCTORY  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ON  CHINA 

(THE  SO-CALLED  “FIVE-FOOT  SHELF”  OF  BOOKS 
ON  CHINA.) 

The  list  of  books  given  below,  with  one  exception,^ 
is  that  which  was  awarded  the  first-prize  in  a com- 
petition conducted  in  China  for  the  selection  of  a 
limited  list  of  the  best  books  on  China  and  its  various 
phases  of  life  and  development.  The  competition  was 
under  the  direction  of  an  American  periodical  of  the 
Orient,  Millard’s  Review  of  the  Far  East,  Shanghai, 
which  announced  several  prizes  for  an  “ authoritative 
list  of  books  which  might  serve  as  a foundation  for 
a library  dealing  with  all  phases  of  Chinese  life,  art, 
trade,  finance,  customs,  politics,  international  relations 
and  history.”  Later  this  list  was  called  a “ five-foot 
shelf  ” of  books  on  China.  The  competition  was 
judged  by  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  former  Chinese  Min- 
ister to  America,  and  Premier  of  China  under  Presi- 
dent Li;  Mr.  Julean  Arnold,  American  Commercial 
Attache,  American  Legation,  Peking;  and  Dr.  F.  L. 
Hawks-Pott,  President  of  St.  John’s  University  of 
Shanghai.  On  Oct.  27,  1917,  the  following  list  sub- 

1 Village  Life  in  China,  by  A.  H.  Smith,  substituted  for  Village 
and  Tozrni  Life  in  China,  by  Y.  K.  Leong  and  L.  K.  Tao. 

252 


APPENDICES 


253 


mitted  by  the  writer  was  awarded  first  prize.  This 
list  is  obviously  an  introductory  one ; it  could  be  easily 
expanded  to  twice  its  present  proportions ; on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  reduce  it  without  losing 
valuable  information  and  a balanced  perspective. 

GENERAL  AND  INTRODUCTORY 

1.  An  Official  Guide  to  Eastern  Asia.  Vol  IV.  China:  Im- 

perial Japanese  Government,  Rwys.,  Tokio  — 1915-  Al- 
though inaccurate  in  certain  respects,  at  present  the  best 
“ Baedeker  ” of  China. 

2.  The  Changing  Chinese.  “The  Conflict  of  Oriental  and 
Western  Cultures  in  China.”  E.  A.  Ross.  Century  Co.,  N. 
Y.,  1912.  A scientific,  sociological  view  of  China  and  its 
changes  during  the  past  decade.  The  East  as  it  appears  to 
the  Western  student. 

3.  China:  An  Interpretation.  James  W.  Bashford.  Abing- 
don Press,  N.  Y.,  1916.  A general  view  of  present-day  China 
by  a competent  observer  and  a missionary-statesman. 

4.  The  Middle  Kingdom.  S.  Wells  Williams.  2 Vols.  Chas. 
Scribner’s  Sons,  N.  Y.,  1882.  Revised  edition,  1907.  A 
standard  work  which  still  holds  an  authoritative  place. 

MANNERS  AND  CUSTOMS 

5.  Chinese  Characteristics.  A.  H.  Smith.  Fleming  H.  Revell 
Co.,  N.  Y.  Fifteenth  edition.  First  published,  1894.  An  in- 
teresting, though  not  very  complimentary,  description  by  a 
missionary  author  long  resident  in  China. 

6.  Village  Life  in  China.  A.  H.  Smith.  Fleming  H.  Revell 
Co.,  N.  Y.,  1899.  A more  detailed  account  of  village  cus- 
toms by  the  same  author.  A standard  work,  which  has 
passed  the  “ thirteenth  thousand  ” mark. 


254 


APPENDICES 


HISTORY 

7.  The  Ancient  History  of  China,  to ^ the  end  of  the  Chou 
Dynasty,  24Q  B.  C.  Frederich  Hirth,  Columbia  Univ.  Press, 
N.  Y.,  1908.  Reprinted  1911.  The  best  ancient  history  of 
China. 

8.  A Sketch  of  Chinese  History.  F.  L.  Hawks-Pott.  Revised 
edition,  1915.  Kelly  & Walsh,  Shanghai.  The  best  con- 
densed outline  for  an  introductory  study,  for  one  familiar 
with  Chinese  names. 

9.  Outlines  of  Chinese  History.  Li  Ung-bing.  Commercial 
Press,  Shanghai,  1914.  A fuller  treatment  from  the  view- 
point of  a Chinese  writer;  slightly  inaccurate  but  interest- 
ing. 

10.  China  Under  the  Empress  Dowager.  J.  O.  P.  Bland  and  E. 
Backhouse.  Wm.  Heineman,  London,  1910.  Revised  edition, 
1914.  A fascinating  description  of  life  in  Peking  before  the 
days  of  the  Republic,  compiled  from  original  documents.  The 
authenticity  of  one  of  these  documents  has  of  late  been  ques- 
tioned, but  the  book  is  nevertheless  typical  and  of  interest. 

POLITICAL  RELATIONS 

11.  Intellectual  and  Political  Currents  in  the  Far  East.  Paul 

S.  Reinsch.  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  N.  Y.,  1911.  A balanced 

discussion  of  the  subject  by  the  present  American  Minister. 

12.  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East.  Stanley  K.  Horn- 

beck.  D.  Appleton  & Co.,  N.  Y.,  1916.  The  clearest  and 

fairest  statement  of  the  present  situation. 

13.  Our  Eastern  Question.  Thomas  F.  Millard.  The  Century 
Co.,  1916.  A strong  argument  concerning  the  present  and 
future  relations  of  China,  Japan  and  America. 

FINANCE 

14.  The  Trade  and  Administration  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  H. 
B.  Morse.  Longmans,  Green  & Co.,  N.  Y.,  1908.  The  best 
general  work. 


APPENDICES 


255 


15.  The  Gilds  of  China.  H,  B.  Morse.  Longmans,  Green  & Co., 
London,  1909.  A study  of  these  particular  organizations. 

16.  The  New  Atlas  and  Coinmercial  Gazetteer  of  China.  North 
China  Daily  News  & Herald.  Shanghai,  1917. 

“ The  biggest  and  best  book  on  the  resources  of  China  ” 
{Millard’s  Reviezv.) 

AGRICULTURE 

17.  Farmers  of  Forty  Centuries.  F.  H.  King.  Macmillan  Co., 
N.  Y.  Second  edition.  The  most  interesting  and  readable 
discussion  of  the  subject. 

PHYSIOGRAPHY  AND  GEOLOGY 

18.  Letters  of  Baron  Von  Richthofen,  igo2.  Shanghai.  Con- 
taining the  gist  of  his  standard  but  untranslated  work,  China. 

GEOGRAPHY 

19.  Richard’s  Comprehensive  Geography  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 
Translated  and  revised  by  M.  Kennedy,  T’usewei  Press. 
Shanghai,  1908. 

TRAVEL 

20.  A Yankee  on  the  Yangtze.  W.  E.  Geil.  A.  C.  Armstrong  & 
Son,  N.  Y.,  1904.  A well  written  description  of  scenes  and 
experiences  on  this  great  water-way. 

RELIGION  AND  ETHICS 

21.  The  Three  Religions  of  China.  W.  E.  Soothill.  Hodder  & 
Stoughton,  London,  1913.  Oxford  lectures  by  a recognized 
authority.  The  best  “ popular  ” presentation  of  Buddhism, 
Taoism,  Confucianism. 

22.  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese.  J.  J.  M.  de  Groot.  Mac- 
millan, N.  Y.,  1910.  Reprinted  1912.  Lectures  given  at 
Hartford  Seminary.  A summary  of  the  contents  of  his 
longer  work.  The  Religious  Systems  of  China,  6 volumes, 
1892-1910.  Emphasis  on  the  animistic  religion  of  the  people 
rather  than  upon  the  “ three  religions  ” treated  above. 


APPENDICES 


256 

23.  The  Ethics  of  Confucius.  M.  M.  Dawson,  with  introduction 
by  Wu  Ting-fang.  G.  P.  Putnam  Sons,  N.  Y.,  1915.  Sec- 
ond impression.  The  sayings  of  Confucius  and  his  dis- 
ciples, arranged  according  to  their  original  order,  with  com- 
mentary. 

LITERATURE 

24.  A History  of  Chinese  Literature.  H.  A.  Giles.  Wm.  Heine- 
man,  London.  D.  Appleton,  N'.  Y.,  1901.  “The  first  at- 
tempt in  any  language  to  produce  a history  of  Chinese  litera- 
ture." 

PHILOSOPHY 

25.  Brief  History  of  Early  Chinese  Philosophy.  D.  T.  Suzuki. 
Probsthain  & Co.,  London  1914.  A concise  treatment  by  an 
Oriental  scholar  of  high  reputation. 

26.  L’Ecole  Philosophique  Moderne  de  la  Chine.  Charles  de 
Harlez.  Vol.  XLIX  in  Memoirs  of  the  Belgian  Academy 
of  Sciences.  The  only  description  of  the  speculative  philoso- 
phy of  Chu  Hi  and  the  Sing-Li  School. 

MISSIONS 

27.  The  China  Missions  Year  Book.  (Annual)  Christian  Litera- 
ture Society,  Shanghai.  The  most  up-to-date  and  complete 
description  of  such  work. 

EDUCATION 

28.  The  Chinese  System  of  Public  Education.  P.  W.  Kuo. 
Originally  a thesis  written  at  Columbia  University.  Repub- 
lished by  Commercial  Press,  Shanghai,  1915.  A sketch  of 
the  history  and  present-day  problems  of  education  in  China. 

29.  Educational  Directory  of  China.  (Annual)  Edward  Evans 
& Sons,  Shanghai.  A manual  of  detailed  information  and 
statistics. 

ART 

30.  Chinese  Art.  Stephen  W.  Bushell.  Victoria  and  Albert 
Museum,  London,  1904.  Thrice  reprinted.  2nd  edition  1914. 
A general  survey  of  the  subject.  A standard  work. 


APPENDICES 


257 


31.  Chinese  Pottery  and  Porcelain.  R.  L.  Hobson,  2 vols.  Funk 
& Wagnalls,  N.  Y.  Cassell  & Co.,  London,  1913.  Two 
volumes  with  handsome  plates  and  pictures  and  the  fullest 
and  most  detailed  criticisms. 

REFERENCE  (GENERAL) 

32.  The  China  Year  Book.  (Annual)  H.  T.  Montague  Bell, 
& H.  G.  W.  Woodhead.  George  Routledge  Sons,  London. 
E.  P.  Dutton  & Co.,  N.  Y.  A valuable  reference  book. 

33.  Encyclopedia  Sinica.  Samuel  Couling.  Kelly  & Walsh, 
Shanghai,  1917.  A very  valuable  new  work  on  “ Things 
Chinese.” 

REFERENCE  (CUSTOMS  AND  MANNERS) 

34.  Researches  into  Chinese  Superstitions.  Henry  Dore. 
Translated  by  M.  Kennedy.  T’usewei  Press,  Shanghai. 
Thus  far,  4 volumes,  1914-1918.  The  fullest  and  most  ac- 
curate description  of  present  customs  and  superstitions. 
Profusely  illustrated. 

REFERENCE  (RELIGION  AND  LITERATURE) 

35.  The  Chinese  Classics.  Original  text  and  English  translation 

by  James  Legge.  7 volumes.  Oxford  University  Press, 
2nd  edition,  1893.  “ The  introduction  and  commentary  with 

the  translation  make  this  incomparably  the  most  useful  work 
in  its  field.”  (G.  F.  Moore.) 

Three  books  have  appeared  since  the  compilation  of 
this  list  which  the  author  should  like  to  add  to  it. 

HISTORY 

The  Development  of  China.  K.  S.  Latourette.  Houghton  Mif- 
flin Co.,  N.  Y.,  1917.  A concise,  scholarly  history  of  China, 
free  from  burdensome  dates  and  details,  with  a final  chapter 
on  present-day  problems  and  tendencies.  The  best  brief 
history  for  the  student  and  general  reader. 


APPENDICES 


258 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 
The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China.  B.  L.  Putnam- Weale. 
Dodd,  Mead  & Co.,  N.  Y.,  1917.  A detailed  and  optimistic 
account  of  the  development  of  the  Chinese  Republic  contain- 
ing all  the  most  important  documents  and  data  from  1911  to 
1917.  Indispensable  for  the  student  of  that  period. 

DESCRIPTION  IN  VERSE 

Profiles  from  China.  Eunice  Tietjens.  Published  by  Ralph 
Fletcher  Seymour,  Chicago,  1917.  A collection  of  sketches 
in  free  verse  “of  people  and  things  seen  in  the  interior.” 
The  familiar  sights  of  China  are  pictured  in  striking  and 
accurate  phrase,  in  this  “ most  unique  volume  of  verse  of 
the  year.” 


INDEX 


Administrative  conference,  5. 
Administrative  council,  34. 
America.  See  United  States. 
Analects,  47. 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  8. 
Annam,  103. 

Assembly,  national.  See  Par- 
liament. 

Assemblies,  provincial.  See 
Provincial  self-government. 
Atlas,  steamship,  73. 

Balkans,  147. 

Bibliography  on  China,  252. 

Black  Dragon  Memorandum, 

12,  128,  Appendix  I. 

Bolshevik,  144. 

Boxer  Indemnity,  86,  107,  152. 
Boxer  uprising,  107. 

Boycott,  against  Japanese 
goods,  26. 

British.  See  Great  Britain. 
Budget,  52. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  103. 

Burma,  103. 

Cabinet,  Chinese,  45,  86,  87. 
Cabinet,  Japanese,  178. 

Chang,  Chinese  Minister  to 
Japan,  134 ff. 

Chang,  Hsun,  89,  94,  95  ff. 
Chekiang,  50. 

Chen,  Eugene,  87,  129-130. 

See  Peking  Gazette. 
Chengghiatung,  60  ff. 

259 


Chiang  Chao-tsung,  94. 

China  Press,  on  China’s  sever- 
ance of  relations  with  Ger- 
many, 70-71 ; on  Baron  Ishii 
pledge,  124;  on  Sino-Japa- 
nese  military  agreement, 
1 30- 1 32. 

Chou  An  Hui,  27,  32. 

Christianity,  53-54- 

Chuan  Chao,  168,  169. 

Cochin  China,  103,  120. 

Commerce,  161. 

Concessions,  104. 

Confucian  Classics,  46. 

Confucianism,  53-54. 

Constitution,  provisional,  3,  45 ; 
permanent,  48,  51,  54,  88,  89, 
158. 

Constitutional  compact,  5. 

Constitutional  compact  confer- 
ence, 5. 

Council  of  State,  5. 

Currency,  160. 

Customs  duties,  80,  86,  104,  106, 
107,  152,  169. 

Czecho-Slovaks,  144. 

Democracy  in  China,  26-28, 
30  ff.,  46,  47,  51,  52,  54-57, 
TOO,  loi,  146,  159,  182. 

Dennis,  W.  C.,  178. 

Economic  Problems,  China, 
159-161. 

Education,  162-163. 


26o 


INDEX 


Election  laws,  4,  157. 

England.  See  Great  Britain. 

Exterritoriality,  78,  105,  165  f. 

Feng  Kvvo-chang,  42,  45,  95, 

97-98,  loi,  155. 

Five-Power  loan,  4. 

Formosa,  7,  103. 

France,  Lao-hsi-kai  incident, 
63,  64,  83 ; possessions  in 
China,  103-105. 

Fukien,  21. 

I 

Germany,  receives  ultimatum 
from  Japan,  9;  war  with  Ja- 
pan, 10;  loses  Tsingtao,  10; 
rights  in  Shantung  taken  by 
Japan,  14;  rights  at  Peace 
Conference,  59-78;  diplo- 
matic relations  severed  by 
China,  59  ff.,  67  ff. ; China’s 
note  concerning  submarine 
warfare,  68-69;  the  answer, 
73 ; Kaiser’s  speech  in  1900, 
75 ; reasons  for  China’s  dec- 
laration of  war,  72  f¥. ; argu- 
ments against,  81-84;  decla- 
ration of  war,  loi ; ousted 
from  China,  149  If. ; Terauchi 
on  Japanese  Alliance,  177. 

Goodnow,  Dr.  F.  J.,  5,  32,  83. 

Great  Britain,  opium  war,  82; 
adviser  against  dissolving 
parliament,  94;  possessions 
in  China,  103-105 ; supports 
open-door  policy,  106 ; affect- 
ed by  Ishii  Agreement,  120; 
war  aims  quoted,  153. 


Hangchow,  50. 

Hanyehping,  Iron  Company,  18. 


Hara  Takashi,  178. 

Hay,  Secretary,  102,  106,  182. 
See  Open  Door. 

Hongkong,  83,  103. 

Hornbeck,  S.  K.,  on  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  22,  23 ; on 
Open  Door  situation  in  1915, 
109;  on  revision  of  treaties 
with  China,  171 ; on  Allied 
financial  policy  in  China, 
175-176. 

Howe,  W.  S.,  146. 

Hsu  Shih-chang,  92,  156-158. 

Hsuan  Tung,  95. 

Hung  Hsien  Dynasty,  39. 

Ishii,  Viscount,  102  ff.,  124,  125, 
Appendix  III. 

Italy,  104. 

Japan,  growth  and  power,  7-8; 
ultimatum  to  Germany,  9; 
declaration  of  war  against 
Germany,  9 ; disclaims  terri- 
torial ambitions,  9-10 ; cap- 
ture of  Tsingtao,  10;  new 
aims  as  result  of  world-war, 
II  ; Twenty-one  Demands,  2, 
II,  13-23,  72,  78,  109,  123, 
128,  165,  169,  180;  Appendix 
II;  boycott  by  China,  26;  re- 
lation to  Chinese  monarchi- 
cal movement,  37 ; feared  by 
China,  81,  82,  149;  attitude 
toward  American  advice,  94; 
adviser  on  parliament,  94; 
relations  with  Russia,  108; 
attitude  toward  Lansing-Ishii 
agreement,  124,  125 ; mili- 

tary agreement  with  China, 
127  ff. ; terms  of  agreement, 
139-142;  relation  to  Allied 


INDEX 


261 


ideal,  146;  Terauchi  on  alli- 
ance with  Germany,  177. 

Japan  Advertiser,  142,  143-144. 

Kaiser,  Wilhelm  II,  75. 

Kang  Yu-wei,  84,  85,  95. 

Kato,  12. 

Kiaochow,  13,  80,  104. 

Kinnosuke,  Adachi,  112,  125. 

Koo,  V.  K.  Wellington,  on 
China’s  contribution  to  Al- 
lies, 151-152;  on  Allied  ideals 
in  the  Orient,  153;  on  United 
States’  relations  with  China, 
154-  155;  on  China’s  future, 
164-166. 

Korea,  7,  85,  103,  108,  118,  Ap- 
pendix V. 

Kun  Yuan  Pao,  71,  72. 

Labor  Battalions,  Chinese,  in 
France,  150-151. 

Lang  Fang,  96. 

Lansing,  Secretary,  iioff. ; on 
Ishii  agreement,  125-126.  See 
Lansing-Ishii  Agreement. 

Lansing  - Ishii  Agreement, 
102  ff.;  reasons  for,  110-113; 
notes  exchanged,  113-116; 
supplementary  statement,  116 ; 
criticism  of  agreement,  117- 
121 ; Chinese  attitude,  122- 
124,  Appendix  III;  Japanese 
attitude,  124-125 ; American 
attitude,  126,  Appendix  III. 

Lao-hsi-tai  incident,  63-64,  83. 

Leases,  104. 

Li  Ching-hsi,  89. 

Li  Hung  Chang,  89. 

Li  Yuan-hung,  4,  41,  44,  45,  52, 
77,  90,  91,  94,  96,  98. 

Liang  Chi-chao,  42,  68,  80,  81, 
96. 


Liang  Shih-yi,  95,  132,  156. 

Liaotung  Peninsula,  7,  104. 

Lu  Cheng-hsiang,  36. 

Lu  Yuang-ting,  158. 

Manchu,  3,  95,  97. 

Manchuria,  7,  8,  15-17,  59,  61- 
63,  103,  108,  109. 

Mason,  177. 

iMillard’s  Review,  on  duty  of 
the  United  States  in  China, 
100,  loi,  173,  174;  terms  of 
Sino- Japanese  military  agree- 
ment, 139-142;  prize-list  of 
books,  252  f. 

Min-kwo-hsin-pao,  54-55. 

Mission  schools,  163. 

Monarchical  movement,  32  ff. 

Monarchical  society,  33  ff. 

Mongolia,  7,  15,  17,  61-63,  108, 
109. 

Morrison,  Dr.,  31. 

Motono,  134  ff. 

Mukden,  62-63. 

Murdock,  Victor,  57. 

Nanking,  3,  4,  5',  40,  42,  155. 

National  Convention  Bureau, 
35- 

National  Salvation  Fund,  26. 

Ni  Shih-chung,  89. 

Okuma,  Count,  9,  10. 

Open  Door,  83,  102  ff.,  106,  107, 
108,  121,  126.  165,  166,  169, 
Appendices,  II,  F ; IV  and  V. 

Opium  trade,  82,  159. 

Opium  War,  103. 

Otani,  General,  144. 

Outlook,  The,  177. 

Parliament,  3,  5,  42,  45,  86,  88, 
94- 


262 


INDEX 


Parliament,  northern,  156. 

Parliament,  southern,  158. 

Parties,  3,  79,  93,  158  f¥. 

Peace,  conference,  24,  59,  72, 
78,  147-149,  153,  163,  167,  171. 

Peking,  95  ff.,  133,  155. 

Peking  Gazette,  on  retirement 
of  Yuan,  43;  on  severance  of 
relations  with  Germany,  71 ; 
on  war  with  Germany,  85 ; 
accuses  Premier  of  “ selling 
China,  87,  129-130. 

Peking  Jih-pao,  SSS'^- 

Port  Arthur,  7,  104,  108. 

Portsmouth  Treaty,  108,  121. 

Postal  service,  104-105. 

Protocol  of  1901,  96. 

Provincial  self-government,  52. 

Putnam-Weale,  on  monarchi- 
cal plot,  31 ; on  administra- 
tion of  Li  Yuan-hung,  50,  56; 
on  military  governors,  89 ; 
on  Twenty-one  Demands, 
129;  on  revision  of  Chinese 
treaties,  171. 

Railroad  concessions,  105. 

Rebellion  of  1913,  4. 

Recognition  of  Chinese  Repub- 
lic, 4. 

Reinsch,  Dr.,  79,  92. 

Religion,  state,  52-54. 

Revolution  of  1911,  3. 

Russia,  possessions  and  leases 
in  China,  103-105;  relations 
with  Japan,  108,  121 ; situa- 
tion in  1917,  112,  127,  128, 
144 ; affected  by_  Ishii  Agree- 
ment, 120.  See  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia. 

« 

Salt  monopoly,  104,  105. 

Shantung,  14,  78,  104. 


Siberia,  127,  144. 

Spanish-American  War,  106. 

Spheres  of  interest,  104-105. 
See  Open  Door. 

Sun  Yat-sen,  3,  4,  158. 

Sun  Yu-chun,  32. 

Sung  Chiao-jen,  4. 

Tang  Chi-yao,  39,  90,  91. 

Tang  Shao-yi,  158. 

Terauchi,  Premier,  81-82,  177. 

Tongking,  103. 

Tsai  Ao,  37,  41. 

Tseng  Chun-hsuan,  158. 

Tsingtao,  10,  81,  104.  See 

Kiaochow,  and  Shantung. 

Tuan  Chi-jui,  45,  76,  86,  87,  88, 
96,  1 29-1 30,  155. 

Twenty-one  Demands,  2,  ii, 
13  ff.,  72,  78,  87,  109,  123,  128- 
129,  165,  169,  180,  Appendices 
I and  II. 

Tw’enty-four  Demands,  21,  Ap- 
pendix II. 

Tyau,  M.  T.  Z.,  152,  153,  170. 

United  States,  recognition  of 
Chinese  Republic,  4;  protest 
against  Twenty-one  De- 
mands, 24,  123 ; influence  on 
China’s  relations  with  Ger- 
many, 60,  78,  79 ; peace  in- 
quiry, 64;  China’s  reply,  65- 
66 ; severance  of  relations 
with  Germany,  67 ; Chinese 
note  concerning  similar  ac- 
tion, 70;  note  to  China  on  in- 
ternal dissensions,  93-94  m; 
“ sells  ” railroad  concession, 
105 ; treaty  relations  with 
China,  105,  106;  Open  Door 
policy, — see  above  ; sends 


INDEX 


263 


troops  to  Siberia,  144;  rela- 
tions with  China,  154-155. 
Ussuri  River,  103. 

Vladivostok,  103,  127. 

Wang,  C.  T.,  51,  87,  89,  99,  158, 

173-175. 

Wang,  Yi-tang,  156. 

Waldersee,  Wei-Hai-Wei,  104; 
Count,  74. 

Weyl,  Walter  E.,  161-162. 
Williams,  F.  W.,  147. 

Wilson,  President,  64,  145  ff., 
167-176,  17S-181.  See  Unit- 
ed States. 

World  War,  effects  in  Orient, 
1-2 ; situation  in  China  at  its 
outbreak,  6;  situation  in  Ja- 
pan, 6-8;  Japan  declares  war 
on  Germany,  9 ; capture  of 
Tsingtao,  10;  new  aims. 


Ilf.;  China’s  severance  of 
relations  with  Germany, 
59  f¥. ; declaration  of  war 
against  Germany,  72  f¥.,  loi  ; 
Allied  ideals  in  Asia,  145- 
147,  176  ff.,  178,  181 ; China’s 
contribution  to  Allies,  149- 
152;  Japanese  foreign  policy 
resulting  from  war.  Appen- 
dix I.  See  Germany,  United 
States,  Japan,  Russia. 

Wu  Ting-fang,  41,  88,  94,  97, 
98,  99,  158,  170,  171. 

Yang  Shan-teh,  50. 

Yang  Tu,  28-30. 

Yangtze  Valley,  104,  155. 

Yuko  Hanuguchi,  142,  143. 

Yoshimoto,  61,  63. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  3,  4,  5,  30,  31  ff., 
38,  4C  44,  83. 

Yunnan. 


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^HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a few 
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care  by  all  those  jingoistic  and  fear-flustered  Americans  who 
break  out  every  now  and  then  into  speech  or  print  with  wild  out- 
cries about  what  they  insist  is  the  Japanese  menace.  The  pages 
are  eloquent  in  their  earnest  pleading  and  sturdily  honest  and 
downright  in  their  sense  of  the  justice  of  their  cause.” — N.  Y. 
Tim^s. 

“ Few  men  have  a clearer  insight  into  the  problems  raised  by 
the  relations  between  the  United  States,  Japan  and  China  than 
K.  K.  Kawakami.  ...  It  will  do  any  American  good  to  read 
Japan  in  World  Politics,  who  apparently  regards  a settlement  of 
the  far  eastern  problem  as  an  essential  preliminary  to  the  gen- 
eral disarmament  for  which  mankind  longs.” — San  Francisco 
Chronicle. 

Japanese  Expansion  and 
American  Policies 

By  JAMES  FRANCIS  ABBOTT 

Cloth,  12°,  $1.50 

“ So  much  talk  perfervid  with  alarm  over  the  Japanese  bogy 
is  constantly  blowing  up  and  down  this  country  that  Prof.  Ab- 
bott’s calm-eyed  and  reasonably-minded  book  is,  in  comparison, 
like  a cool  and  refreshing  zephyr  after  a monsoon,  . . . Just  such 
a calm  and  sane  looking  in  the  face  of  facts  and  treating  them 
in  a reasonable  way  as  the  Japanese  situation  needs,”' — N.  Y. 
Times. 

“ A sober  and  well-reasoned  study  . . . presents  a sympathetic 
account  of  the  development  of  Japan  in  the  Meiji  era,  points 
out  her  present  problems,  and  finds  their  solution  in  the  indus- 
trial and  commercial  field,  with  China  as  her  most  vital  market. 
He  sees  no  danger  in  our  relations  with  Japan,  unless  we  provoke 
it.”—  The  Dial. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


DR,  WALTER  WEYUS  BOOKS 


The  End  of  the  War 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL,  Ph.D. 

$2.00 

“ Mr.  Weyl  says  sobering  and  important  things.  . . . His  plea  is 
strong  and  clear  for  America  to  begin  to  establish  her  leadership  of 
the  democratic  forces  of  the  world  ...  to  insure  that  the  settlement 
of  the  war  is  made  on  lines  that  will  produce  international  amity 
everywhere.” — N.  Y.  Times. 

American  World  Policies 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL,  Ph.D. 

$2.2S 

“ It  is  refreshing  to  read  Dr.  Weyl  . . . his  approach  to  the  prob- 
lem is  absolutely  sound  and  right.” — The  Dial. 

“ An  economic  philosophy  neatly  balanced,  suavely  expressed,  and 
of  finely  elastic  fibre.” — Neiv  York  Sun. 

“To  find  so  fine  and  true  and  well  reasoned  an  interpretation  of 
that  attitude  which  has  been  so  shockingly  misrepresented  at  home 
and  deplorably  misunderstood  abroad  is  something  to  be  thankful 
for.  ...  It  is  a book  that  will  make  for  far-sightedness,  for  clarity 
of  thought  and  sanity  of  judgment  in  the  deciding  of  many  of  our 
problems.” — The  Bookman. 

The  New  Democracy 

An  Essay  on  Certain  Political  and  Economic  Tendencies 
in  the  United  States 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL,  Ph.D. 

$2.00 

“ A masterly,  scathing,  and  absolutely  fearless  arraignment  of 
things  that  ought  not  to  be  in  a republic,  and  of  tendencies  that  no 
democracy  ought  to  tolerate.” — Boston  Herald. 

“ A thoughtful  volume  ...  a big  synthesis  of  the  whole  social 
problem  in  this  country.  A keen  survey.” — Chicago  Evening  Post. 

“ A searching  and  suggestive  study  of  American  life.  ...  A book 
to  make  people  think.  . . . Notable  for  its  scholarship  and  brilliant 
in  execution,  it  is  not  merely  for  the  theorist,  but  for  the  citizen.” — 
Newark  Evening  News. 


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Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


H,  H.  POWERS^  BOOKS 

The  Things  Men  Fight  For 

By  H.  H.  powers 

“An  able,  unprejudiced  and  illuminating  treatment  of  a burning 
question.” — Philadelphia  North  American. 

$1.50 

“ Probably  no  other  book  dealing  with  the  war  and  its 
sources  has  made  so  dispassionate  and  unbiased  a study  of 
conditions  and  causes  as  does  this  volume.” — Nezv  York 
Times. 

“ Out  of  the  unusual  knowledge  born  of  wide  observation 
and  experience  came  this  unusual  book.  We  may  not  al- 
together agree  with  its  conclusions,  but  we  must  admire  the 
breadth  of  it,  and  feel  better  informed  when  we  have 
perused  it.  The  liberal  spirit  of  it  cannot  fail  to  impress 
the  careful  reader.” — Literary  Digest. 

America  Among  the  Nations 

By  H.  H.  powers,  Ph.D. 

$1.50 

“ For  an  understanding  of  this  new  crisis  that  we  are 
facing  in  1918  we  know  of  no  book  more  useful  or  more 
searching  or  clearer  or  more  readable  than  H.  H.  Powers’ 
‘ America  Among  the  Nations.’  It  is  really  a biography,  or 
rather,  a biographical  study.  Its  hero,  however,  is  not  a 
man  but  an  imperial  people.” — Outlook,  New  York. 

“ ^Ir.  Powers  takes  unusually  broad  views  and  they  are 
enforced  by  a historical  knowledge  and  a logical  develop- 
ment of'  ideas  that  carry  conviction.  . . . An  excellent 
book.” — Philadelphia  Public  Ledger. 

“ All  the  great  problems  that  here  confront  us  are  dis- 
cussed from  the  standpoint  of  an  international  observer  free 
from  cant,  and  the  result  is  refreshing.  This  is  particularly 
true  of  his  treatment  of  Pan- Americanism.” — Argonaut, 
San  Francisco. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


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